A dangerous soft shoe with Assad
Seeking to restore the Iran nuclear deal and reduce US involvement in the Middle East, the Biden administration appears to be going easy on Syrian President Bashar Assad, potentially opening the door to US rivals.
US President Joe Biden appears to be following his predecessor Barack Obama in sacrificing US interests for higher-priority concerns. Desperate to ensure that nothing derailed US-Iran talks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Obama ignored the support given to Assad by Iran as the regime slaughtered thousands of Syrian civilians, as well as Tehran's continued backing of Assad.
Even worse, less than a year after Obama had established the use of chemical weapons as a red line, his administration essentially sat on its hands after the Assad regime was found to have killed more than 1,000 of its own people in a sarin gas attack in eastern Ghouta.
Now Biden may be walking the same path with the nuclear deal again a top priority. However, the recent election of hard-liner Ebrahim Raisi could further complicate efforts. The White House is already falling short of full enforcement of the Caesar Act in an effort to placate Assad's chief backer, Iran. House Republicans last week announced a probe into the issue. This was followed by a US Treasury's decision to lift sanctions on two companies owned by Samer Foz, a Syrian businessman with strong links to Assad.
“It is sadly not surprising the Biden administration is electing not to press for accountability on Assad's crimes against humanity,” Mariam Memarsadeghi, a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, told Al-Monitor. “Now that the Biden administration is seeking to re-enter [the nuclear] deal, it is signaling a soft line toward the regime in various ways, including by removing pressure and scrutiny on its proxies.
US policy in Syria rests on a small troop presence in the northeast plus the supposed pressure of Caesar Act sanctions
against Assad. Biden's moves to end a waiver extension to a US oil company operating in northeast Syria and cut funding to the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) suggests the administration may be looking to pull out its troops and end its partnership with the SDF in exchange for Russian concessions on reopening humanitarian corridors. The UN Security Council mandate for Bab al-Hawa, the last remaining border crossing between Turkey and Syria, expires next month. With Russian President Vladimir Putin refusing to commit to renewing UN cross-border aid into northwestern Syria at the most recent Biden-Putin summit in Geneva, the White House may find itself outmaneuvered.
US passivity has prompted Gulf states to push the envelope with Assad. Under Trump, the US took a clear stance on countries seeking closer ties with Syria.
AFTER THE UAE and Bahrain reopened their embassies in Damascus in 2018, James Jeffrey, the State Department's special envoy for Syria, warned states
against providing assistance to the Syrian regime, using the threat of sanctions as a deterrent. With Trump no longer holding the line, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan criticized US sanctions in March for undermining regional rapprochement efforts, and Saudi and Syrian intelligence chiefs recently met for the first time since the conflict began.
If the US continues to reduce its role, China and the Gulf states may move to expand their commitment and influence in Syria. China recently congratulated Assad on his election victory and has, up until now, played a low-key role behind the scenes, maintaining diplomatic relations and using its veto along with Russia at the UN Security Council to protect the Syrian regime.
With more than a third of the country's infrastructure destroyed during the conflict and Assad desperate for reconstruction aid, China could move to invest in the country in the belief that the US will not enforce sanctions. Last June, Assad claimed that the government had “started discussions with a number of Chinese companies experienced in reconstruction.” The UAE has been a key supporter of Gulf states' rapprochement with Damascus, including lobbying aggressively for Syria's return to the Arab League. Real tensions could develop between the US and its Gulf allies.
“Abu Dhabi isn't deterred by the threat of sanctions and that's a real problem for Washington,” says Charles Lister, senior fellow and the director of the Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs at the Middle East Institute. “As US law, the Caesar Act isn't going away, and if the White House fails to enforce it, there'll be an uproar in Congress.”
Syria's looming reintegration into the Arab League will increase pressure on the US to remove its troops – a move that would further reduce its regional influence. Reduced aid or a reduced footprint in the northeast could lead to a resurgent ISIS and further instability, particularly given the existence of ISIS sleeper cells in SDF-run detention camps. The SDF depends on US support and financial assistance for its very survival.
“The US and its allies must stand firm and persist, ideally by reinforcing our military presence in the northeast to confront a resurgent ISIS and by surging our investment in diplomatic efforts to negotiate a resolution,” said Lister.
US-Turkish cooperation may put pressure on Russia, particularly in light of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's and Biden's successful meeting last week at the NATO summit.
On Iran, the Biden administration should not sacrifice elements of its Syria policy in return for progress on the nuclear talks. US sanctions, while problematic, remain an important source of leverage against one of Assad's main backers. If Biden does continue to prioritize the Iran deal, it could leave Gulf states, Russia, Iran and China jostling for influence in Syria.