Biden’s strategy in Yemen: Drawdowns and diplomacy
In US President Joe Biden’s first foreign policy speech on February 4, 2021, he dramatically announced that he would be ending US support for “offensive operations” in the war in Yemen. Biden’s decision appeared to mark a turning point from his two predecessors, who helped support the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces in Yemen.
The war in Yemen, waged between the Iranian-backed Houthi rebel forces and a Saudi-led coalition, is entering its seventh year. Fighting started in 2014 between the Houthis and the weak Yemeni government after the Houthis took control of the capital Sanaa. In response, Saudi Arabia and eight other Arab states backed by the US, UK and France started a campaign centered around airstrikes.
In 2015, amid the negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal, former President Barack Obama gave a green light to Saudi Arabia’s coalition, including providing military support, partially to offset the kingdom’s strong opposition to the deal. The Trump administration continued such support as a part of a broader strategy focusing on strong US-Saudi ties.
However, before coming to office, Biden ran on a campaign focused on limiting unconditional support to the Saudis, including increasing accountability for human rights abuses and “mak[ing] them in fact the pariah that they are.”
Since coming to office, Biden appears to have taken a step back from this position. Instead of a policy of redlines and holding Saudi Arabia accountable, the president has been trying to advance his platform without rocking the boat. His strategy lies in a broader policy of balancing his desired reduction of US involvement in the Middle East without losing key allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia.
For example, Washington has been removing Patriot antimissile batteries from the Gulf since April, including from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, part of a broader strategy of US reduction of forces in the region.
At the same time, to offset some of the fallout from such disengagement, Biden has been signaling to the Saudis that the US still values a partnership with them. Even after the report came out earlier this year linking Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the response from the administration was muted.
“We’ve talked about this in terms of a recalibration. It’s not a rupture,” State Department spokesman Ned Price said of the US-Saudi relationship in March, after the report on the killing came out.
Part of this “recalibration” lies in moves like inviting top Saudi officials to Washington. Last week, Deputy Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, brother of the crown prince, visited the US capital to talk about Yemen and threats from Iran but, significantly, did not discuss the Khashoggi murder even though Khalid was reportedly involved in the cover-up.
THE WAR in Yemen follows a similar pattern. Biden’s policy lies in relying on diplomacy and military reductions, in hopes of an eventual withdrawal from the conflict.
The first part of this strategy lies in his announcement in February of halting support to offensive operations. This included blocking arms sales, including precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in direct opposition to former President Donald Trump’s policy in the country, which was marked by support for the Saudi-led coalition.
Those who supported such an action said it was long overdue and that it sent an important signal to the Saudis. But critics, including progressive democrats in Congress, say it is unclear what “offensive operations are.” On February 24, some 41 members of Congress sent a letter to Biden supporting
the withdrawal and asking for clarification on the language; the administration’s response was muted.
Such limits on “offensive operations” do not necessarily mean that the US no longer supports the Saudi-led coalition. For example, US forces still helping service Saudi aircraft to keep the warplanes in the air, backing a key element of the kingdom’s strategy.
The next prong of the strategy lies in increased diplomacy. Biden himself said: “We’re also stepping up our diplomacy to end the war in Yemen – a war which has created a humanitarian and strategic catastrophe. I’ve asked my Middle East team to ensure our support for the United Nations-led initiative to impose a ceasefire, open humanitarian channels and restore long-dormant peace talks.”
In support of this goal, Biden appointed Tim Lenderking as the US special envoy to Yemen, the first one filling that position since the war started.
Lenderking’s main strategy since assuming the post lies in focusing on regional players, including tours of the region. Recently, on June 4, he went to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and the UAE to meet with senior officials and Yemenis to discuss the crisis, as well as returning to Saudi Arabia on June 18.
AMERICA’S TONE toward the Houthis has also changed. In February, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken revoked the Houthis – whose slogan is “death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam” – from being classified as a terrorist organization, reversing the Trump administration’s decision. On June 25, Lenderking described the move: “The US recognizes them as a legitimate actor. No one can wish them away or out of the conflict, so let’s deal with realities that exist on the ground.”
Such recognition of the Houthis is likely intended to increase diplomatic channels with the group in an attempt to reach an agreement to end the conflict. But there have still been no direct talks so far between Lenderking and the Houthis.
But has Biden’s strategy worked? So far, not really. In response to Biden’s actions, the Houthis have only escalated their campaign, including intensified drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, as well as territorial expansion inside of Yemen. Diplomatic approaches have not proved fruitful, as the Houthis have rejected both Saudi Arabia’s offer of a ceasefire as well as offers of concessions, such as easing restrictions on Hodeida Port and opening Sanaa airport to some destinations, in addition to rejecting a separate US ceasefire plan.
The Houthis have also increased their offensive against the oil-rich Marib province in the North, which is the center of the internationally recognized government. Marib is an important strategic location, as it is the Yemen National Army’s last stronghold in the North and a gateway to the South, which is divided between the government and the Southern Transitional Council, providing an opportunity for the Houthis to capitalize on their disunity.
In response, on May 20, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on two key military officials leading the Marib attack, hoping to deter the group from continuing their advance. However, the offensive was undeterred.
According to Elana DeLozier, the Rubin Family Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “the recent uptick in international political will to end the war seems instead to have emboldened Houthi perceptions of their negotiating position.” Critics of Biden’s policy also emphasize that the US is losing leverage over the Houthis in their diplomatic strategy. Many also point out that Iran does not want the Houthis to back down, so that it can keep leverage in potential nuclear talks.
For the time being, it appears that the war in Yemen is not coming to an end. As the stalemate drags on, the losers of the conflict are the Yemeni people, who suffer from widespread malnutrition and disease in one of the greatest humanitarian disasters in the world. Biden’s strategy for now does not appear to be ending the conflict, prompting the question: Will the war in Yemen ever end?