Stalemate in Venezuela becoming staler
The effort this past week to topple the Nicolas Maduro Government in Venezuela in what Juan Guaido dubbed the final phase of Operation Freedom, spurted and sputtered, leaving him with the appearance of someone push-starting a car whose engine wont rev up.
The anatomy of the struggle in Venezuela is instructive. The “Bolivarian Revolution” started by Hugo Chavez was hugely popular among the Venezuelan people. Its social welfare programmes appealed to those in the slums of Caracas, as well as the rural poor who were deeply resentful of the opulence of the minority who had controlled and benefited from the country’s oil wealth. Chavez garnered 63 per cent of the popular vote in the presidential elections of 2006.
Chavez was steeped in populism and oblivious to the fiscal unsustainability of his policies, which included the nationalisation of privately owned enterprises and their long-term damage to the economy. He was buoyed by the super profits derived
from oil exports. During his 14 years in office, oil prices rose from less than US$20 to over US$100 per barrel. Venezuela was awash in petrodollars.
For both strategic and altruistic reasons, Chavez shared this largesse with several countries in the region, including Jamaica, and he became the most iconic figure next to Fidel Castro. He even taunted the US Government by providing free heating oil to poor neighbourhoods in Boston and New York during the bitterly cold winter of 2007/2008.
Chavez’s passion and charisma gave the revolution an endearing face. Venezuela’s oil wealth gave it fleet-footed legs. His death in 2013 robbed it of its inspirational force. The economic crisis that began in 2014 when oil prices started to decline crippled its legs.
Chavez’s close ally, Evo Morales of Bolivia, adopted a smarter approach. He is no less ardent a socialist and his anti-imperialist rhetoric is no less strident. After nationalising the country’s oil and gas enterprises in 2006 and seeing the negative effects on foreign investments, he abandoned that policy. His social programmes have been tailored to what the economy can afford, and Bolivia continues to enjoy annual growth of more than four per cent.
Chavez, himself, would have had difficulty sustaining the revolution in the face of the economic crisis in which Venezuela found itself. It has proven to be even more difficult with Maduro, who lacks the charisma and political skills of his mentor and predecessor.
Betrayal of the revolution
The Bolivarian revolution also lacks the kind of integrity of purpose that has sustained the Cuban revolution, for more than 60 years, through very difficult times and against powerful external pressures. Rampant corruption involving high-ranking members of the Venezuelan regime and the military has betrayed the revolution. Vast assets, including cash and real estate belonging to several top officials, have been frozen in the United States, Mexico, Switzerland and the European Union.
Last year, the US Government froze assets worth more than US$800 million belonging to Diosdado Cabello, the president of the Maduro-controlled Constituent Assembly. Former Finance Minister Alejandro Andrade was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment in a US court in February, in a plea deal that included his admission to having collected more than US$1 billion in bribes while in office.
Even before the economic collapse became evident, Maduro and the revolution were losing popularity. In the first presidential elections following Chavez’s death in 2013, Maduro won by a narrow margin of less than two per cent. In the subsequent parliamentary elections in 2015, the Opposition forces won by a margin of more than 15 per cent.
Maduro’s strong-armed response in adulterating the constitution — removing all semblance of independence from the judiciary, stripping the National Assembly of its powers, and embarking on a military-led crackdown on dissent and the media is an effort to sustain his regime entirely by force, without the accompanying popular support that Chavez enjoyed.
Wrong playbook?
The failure of the Opposition forces to dislodge Maduro is due to the playbook from which their strategies have been drawn. Guaido has given new energy, leadership, and a bright young face to the political struggle — but he has so far failed to generate the overwhelming people power that is needed to overcome Maduro’s military entrenchment.
The Venezuelan situation contrasts with that of Sudan, where protestors occupied the streets in such ever-increasing numbers and with such unshakeable determination that
many rank and file soldiers chose to side with and protect them. This prompted the military leadership to remove President Omar al-bashir and establish a transitional military council, with a commitment to facilitate the transfer of power to a civilian government.
The protest movement was so strong that it forced the head of the military council to step down within 24 hours because he was seen as too closely associated with the deposed president. So strong, too, that the military council has been forced to engage in negotiations with the protest organisers on the composition of a transitional government that would make arrangements for democratic elections.
The factors that account for Guaido’s meteoric rise to prominence may well be the cause of his inability, so far, to triumph. Guaido’s claim to be the “interim president” of Venezuela is, at best, questionable. It is based on the provision in the constitution that if the positions of president and vice-president become vacant, the president of the National Assembly shall assume the presidency until a new election is held within a specified time.
Maduro won the 2018 elections virtually unopposed, since the main Opposition parties refused to participate. Maduro had, by then, jailed his leading opponents or had them disbarred from holding public office. Guaido is therefore on solid ground in arguing that he was not “duly and properly” elected. But it is a bit of a stretch to assert that the position is vacant without the issue having been adjudicated. And, of course, Maduro fully controls the adjudication process.
Guaido’s strategy might well have worked had he been able to demonstrate that he commanded the support of a substantial majority of the Venezuelan people. Indeed, with that support his legitimacy would not have to rest on some dubious interpretation of the constitution, but would be firmly rooted in the people themselves as their presumptive leader. He has not yet been able to demonstrate that level of support and enthusiasm — despite all the economic misery that the people are undergoing. It was pathetic to watch him last week pleading for people to join him on the streets.
There are also class issues involved. The resistance to the Maduro regime has been organised primarily by the middle and upper classes, which have always opposed Chavismo. The masses have not yet been persuaded or allowed to assume ownership of the struggle.
Unhelpful international response
The Us-led recognition by more than 50 countries of Guaido as the legitimate president of Venezuela is unprecedented and has defied international conventions. Not even in contested elections where credible evidence indicates that the “loser” had secured the majority of votes has the international community been prepared to recognise him as the legitimate leader of the country.
The US Government has even provided Guaido access to Venezuelan State assets that it has frozen, and it has secured the admission of his nominee as the official representative of Venezuela to the Organization of American States (OAS). His legitimacy seems to be recognised more outside than inside Venezuela, and it is arguable that rather than helping, it has hurt his cause. Latin Americans, even when they reject their own leaders, are instinctively wary of those that appear to be “installed” by the United States. The history of such interventions is too indelibly etched in their memories.
Guaido, himself, should be perturbed. President Trump wastes no opportunity to remind countries, big and small, how much assistance they have received from the US, what he expects in return, and the consequences of not delivering. The Venezuelan people have good reason to be concerned as to whether Guaido’s triumph would be a victory for them or for US policy toward Latin America.
The real tragedy that dims any hope for a resolution to the crisis is the fact that positions inside and outside of Venezuela have so hardened that there is little, if any, negotiating space left and few, if any, honest brokers around. The OAS, Caricom and the European Union are conflicted. The Caricom-led appeal to the United Nations for the secretary general to use his good offices to negotiate a peaceful solution seems to be the last hope. However, the UN can intervene only with the agreement of the Government and the Opposition forces, and the US is likely to undermine any effort that stops short of Maduro’s summary removal.
The solution to the crisis in Venezuela ultimately rests in the hands of its people. It does not appear that they have yet determined what the solution is or demonstrated, if they have, that they are prepared to make the sacrifices to achieve it. The contortions of the international community may well be contributing to their indecisiveness.