The occupation of Haiti?
The killing of haitian President Jovenel Moïse and the attempt on the life of his wife, Martine Marie Étienne Joseph, have naturally evoked sentiments of shock and horror in Jamaica and elsewhere.
The question is not whether something should be done about the situation; rather, following familiar terminology, the question is what is to be done?
Something has to be done because, first of all, those responsible for murdering a president should not be allowed to act with impunity. Where impunity prevails in such circumstances, the State becomes vulnerable to the possibility of violent reprisals and streams of assassination as diverse political groupings assume that the path to power and influence follows the bullet. The situation on the ground in Haiti today may be nebulous, but we can expect that vigilante justice and political violence are on the agenda of some activists. This opens the country to the prospect of fierce turmoil if nothing is done.
Something also needs to be done because developments in Haiti could have a precedential impact. This is not to suggest that Haiti portends violence against State forces in other countries, but it is to acknowledge that events in one place send signals beyond national borders. To recall C L R James’ Black Jacobins, events in revolutionary France stimulated the overthrow of the French colonial State in St Domingue. Where pre-existing conditions are amenable, unrest in one location can be contagious.
Aristide Precedent
In identifying what is to be done, we should perhaps recall the particular precedent of Haiti in 1994. In that year, the Haitian military led by General Cedras overthrew the democratically elected and popular President Jean Bertrand Aristide. With Aristide maintaining his legitimacy from an overseas base, the United Nations pondered whether and how it could rectify the situation. The P J Patterson Administration was not averse to military action in favour of Aristide, but the Opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) was lyrically against it, with Mr Seaga arguing that the struggle in Haiti was essentially between a “bad man” and a “mad man”.
Ultimately, the UN Security Council — largely with American leadership — authorised intervention to reinstate President Aristide. Military force was, however, called off when the Haitian junta relinquished power in the face of Un-sanctioned troops arriving off the Haitian coastline. Aristide was restored to power, physically unscathed; democracy prevailed.
Against this background of recent history, some persons will wish to have external intervention in Haiti to address the current crisis — and have indeed already argued for the occupation of Haiti to restore order. Some supporters of occupation suggest that neither the United Nations nor the United States should be involved, while others recommend no particular restrictions. These suggestions — that Haiti today should be occupied by foreign forces — may be contrary to international law and unjustifiable in policy terms.
Un charter
As to law, the United Nations Charter provides best guidance. According to the charter, all states shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states. This prohibition on the use of force represents a peremptory norm of international law, and as such, it allows no derogation. Generally, therefore, states should be reluctant to occupy Haiti even if — for some reasons — this may seem politically desirable.
At the same time, however, the UN Charter contemplates exceptions to the rule against the use of force. One exception concerns the use of force in self-defence — this would allow Haiti and its allies to use force against a State which were to attack it. Clearly, this exception is inapplicable to the current situation. A second exception is more relevant. According to the UN Charter, where a situation constitutes a threat to, or breach of, international peace and security, or an act of aggression, the UN may use force to resolve the problem. This exception was relied upon by the UN for the 1994 action in support of Aristide noted earlier.
The assassination of President Moïse could conceivably threaten international peace and security, especially if, as has been intimated, mercenaries from other countries were involved in the killing. But up to the present time international peace and security have not been undermined by Haiti’s internal crisis. In due course, some states, including Jamaica, may have refugee challenges arising from the current debacle, but the flow of people is not apt to be regarded as a threat to international peace and security.
humanitarian intervention
If the Haitian crisis were to explode into massive unrest, with grave loss of lives, the United Nations or some states acting individually or collectively may decide that humanitarian intervention is appropriate. The United Nations Charter does not expressly authorise such intervention but there is some state practice in its favour. Similarly, the United Nations could invoke the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a basis for intervention in Haiti. These approaches — humanitarian intervention and R2P — would, however, be permissible only if killings and human rights abuses on the ground reach levels that “shock the conscience of mankind” (to use the formulation of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht).
So, as a matter of law, occupation will not readily be justifiable. We should note, though, that the Haitian authorities could invite occupation. If this is done, then intervention by the invitees would, by definition, not be in breach of either the territorial integrity or political independence of Haiti. But for this to work, the invitation needs to be genuine and must emanate from the legitimate (presumably de jure) authorities in Haiti. With an eye to the 1983 intervention by American and Caribbean forces in Grenada, this invitation should not be delivered ex post facto. In relation to Haiti, the putative invitees should also ensure that the Haitian Constitution allows any leader the power to invite foreign troops into the country.
Policy
If states are invited to occupy Haiti, should they accept? Haiti is a Caricom State, a fact which places a special burden of responsibility to help Haiti on each Caricom member. This point which is especially valid if the Haitian State approaches complete collapse. On the other hand, Caricom policy must be guided by realism and practicality. If the current crisis is not handled carefully, Haitian unrest could grow to a scale that easily overcomes the resources of the small, economically deprived countries in the regional grouping. Caricom countries should distance themselves from occupation deliberations.
There is another basic policy argument against occupation. This goes to the question of purpose. Why would it be necessary for foreigners to take up arms in Haiti today? In the case of Aristide in 1994, at least the objective was clear: the reinstatement of the democratically elected president. In today’s Haiti there are conflicting social forces, and one hears repeatedly about “the oligarchs”, but the precise delineation of the different factions is somewhat elusive.
Generally, the best approach to the immediate crisis may be for Caricom to promote negotiations in Haiti among the rival political groups. This may be done through the good offices of the Organization of American States (OAS) although, admittedly, OAS stocks are not in high demand among some Caricom countries owing to issues concerning Venezuela.
Even in its weakened state, the OAS, with support from a majority of its members, could assist Haiti on the path to constitutional agreement and good governance.