Preparing for pre-planned firearms operations
IT IS exceedingly difficult for people who have not served to understand the distress and pain experienced by police officers when one of their own is killed in the line of duty. It is more like the murder of a member of the family than the death of a colleague. I have been at far too many crime scenes where police officers have been killed by armed criminals, and I have had to try to console partners, parents, children, and fellow officers, but the pain is too raw. Even the toughest and most experienced officers experience profound grief.
But the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) is made of people with astonishing courage and resolve, and when an officer is killed by evil men, they come together, they regroup, and they go back on the streets with renewed determination, absolutely committed to protect and serve the people of Jamaica. There is a sacred bond, shared by law enforcement officers everywhere in the world, that when one of their own is killed, they step up the fight against crime.
I will not comment specifically on the events leading up to the tragic murder of two young policemen and the serious injury of three others in the operation that started last Friday in Horizon Park, Spanish Town, because this is an ongoing matter. I can only add my most heart-felt condolences and prayers for the families and friends of Corporal Biggs and Constable Hylton, who were murdered, and my deepest sympathies to Superintendent Clunis and Constables Newman and Richards, who were seriously injured, and their families, who are with them now praying for their recovery.
Even as we struggle with our grief and loss, we have to address the questions that will inevitably be asked by family, friends, and fellow officers as to why the officers died and whether anything could have been done differently to avoid this loss of life. Any review process is upsetting because officers feel that their courage and judgement are being called into question. But a thorough and detailed process of enquiry is essential every time something like this happens because it is how we learn from the experience and ensure that the risk to life is reduced in future.
It is in this spirit that I decided to make public the protocols for spontaneous and pre-planned operations in policing.
TWO CATEGORIES
Firearm operations tend to fall into two categories. The first type consists of spontaneous operations, which is where police officers are suddenly confronted with a scenario involving armed suspects. In these cases, they have to make quick decisions, which depend on the circumstances. They may decide to back off if, for example, there is a high risk that members of the public will be caught in the crossfire, or they may decide to engage the armed suspects, especially if innocent lives are in imminent danger. They are trained to use only the minimum level of force needed to contain the situation, effect arrests, and eventually secure convictions in court.
The second category consists of preplanned firearms operations. This is when law enforcement receives information that an armed suspect is currently in a specific location. There are large numbers of illegal guns (including high-powered weapons) in Jamaica, so the JCF frequently receives information from various sources that a gunman is hiding at a particular address. This is similar to the circumstances that led to the murder and injuring of police officers in Horizon Park, Spanish Town on the June 12.
It is important to note that arresting armed suspects concealed in a building is always a dangerous operation. It requires meticulous operational planning by highly trained officers specialising in the tactical use of firearms. It is for this reason that (like all other police forces), the JCF has a Special Weapons and Tactical (SWAT) team that is trained to do deal with the planned arrest of the most dangerous armed criminals.
Most police forces have a process of rapidly assessing any information received to establish if it is genuine, reliable, and gives useful intelligence. If the information is good, the process goes to the next stage, which is planning an operation. This entire process, from intelligence to planning, and planning to operations, is documented. Decisions and operational plans are vital elements of any policing operation or criminal investigation, so they are recorded and may be used in any subsequent review, which makes the officers accountable for the decisions that they made at the time.
Consider a scenario where the JCF receives good intelligence from a reliable source that there is an armed and dangerous suspect in possession of a high-powered weapon within a dwelling. The police will immediately make a number of decisions. The top priority is to reduce the risk to members of the public and also the police officers who will be engaged in the operation to arrest the suspect and recover their firearm. One option that will always be considered is to take no immediate action. This would be the case in a situation where there is a high risk that the suspect might injure members of the public, take hostages, or fire at police officers in a confrontation. In these circumstances, the area may be cordoned off by the police to prevent the suspect from leaving the area, or there might be a covert surveillance operation to follow the suspect so that the police can wait until the suspect is in a location where it is safe for an arrest to be made. Each scenario is unique, but years of operational experience and training help the officers make these tough, life-or-death decisions.
COVERT TACTICS
When the risk of harm is high, the tactics used are likely to be more covert. One important factor is whether the subject is aware of the police officers’ presence. If so, an entry into the building by police might expose them and any innocent people nearby to a high degree of risk. In such circumstances, there are only two reasons for going ahead with an immediate entry.
One is where it is necessary to rescue a hostage, especially where there is an immediate threat to life. The other is where the suspect might destroy essential evidence.
The preferred option for most pre-planned operations involving armed suspects inside a building is to start by clearing any adjacent buildings of innocent people and to throw an inner cordon around the building to ensure that the suspect cannot escape. If there is no immediate threat to life, the entry into the building will then be planned and conducted by the duty SWAT team rather than the officers on the scene. In most instances, once a secure perimeter is in place, the usual plan is then to wait and to establish contact with the suspect.
As a general rule, unless there is an immediate threat to life, any pre-planned armed intervention to arrest criminals with high-powered weapons should only be conducted by SWAT teams, which are supposed to be on 24/7 standby. At a minimum, for all pre-planned firearm operations, a tactical adviser from the SWAT team must be consulted and must sign off on all decisions for any armed intervention to arrest suspects.
A dynamic entry into a building (which is always a last resort) will then be conducted by the SWAT team, supported by dogs, ballistic shields, distraction devices, and other specialised equipment. It is highly likely that these officers will all be wearing body-worn cameras to record the operation. In addition, a paramedic unit will be on standby, and in some cases trained negotiators, a media liaison officer, and other key staff components will also be available.
Unfortunately, the criminals are not bound by these clear rules and procedures. As the commissioner said recently, the criminals have no rules of engagement, while the JCF must act reasonably, proportionately, and within the law. This gives the criminals an advantage, which the JCF can only overcome with better planning and good training.
It is too early to come to any conclusions about the tragic loss of police lives in Horizon Park. However, we owe it to them, their families, and colleagues to ensure that there is a thorough review of the decisions made prior to this operation in order that we may learn from their tragic loss and reduce the risk of losing police and civilian lives in the future.
■ Mark Shields operates Shields Crime & Security and is a former deputy commissioner of police who served with the JCF and the Metropolitan Police Service in London. Send feedback to mark@ shieldscsc.com.