What Trump can do for Korea
Three weeks into Trump’s transition to power, nobody seems to have a clear idea of what the incoming American administration will do on the Korean Peninsula, regarding the menacing nuclear North Korea in particular.
The president-elect has not clarified or reconciled conflicting comments that he made on the campaign trail. He is likely to present an overall foreign policy agenda or a Trump doctrine after he takes office on Jan. 20.
For some time now, attention is being focused on who will be heading national security. This may be an indication of how Trump will conduct his foreign policy. President-elect Trump is still going through the process of assembling his White House staff and cabinet secretaries.
As of this writing, he is yet to pick a nominee for the post of secretary of state from four finalists — former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney, former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, retired Gen. David Petraeus, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker. For secretary of defense, Trump said Thursday night that he will nominate retired Marine Gen. James “Mad dog” Mattis.
Trump appointed retired Army Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn, a strong advocate for fighting “radical Islamists,” as his national security adviser at the White House. From his book “The Field of Fight,” some critics are concerned about his view that there is “an alliance” between extreme Islamists and countries such as North Korea, China, and Russia. True, North Korea cooperated with Pakistan, Iran, and Syria on missile and nuclear development, but there is no evidence that the North Koreans worked with extreme Islamists.
On foreign policy, one place that requires an urgent security deal is North Korea. Here is a set of ideas for Trump’s security team to consid- er in dealing with North Korea.
— Announce a serious interest to engage the DPRK and confirm the U.S. treaty commitments of alliances to the Republic of Korea — hopefully through an inaugural speech. At one point, Trump said he would negotiate with Kim Jong-un. Trump also said his administration would seek no hostile policy against other countries. What goes around comes around is a proverb in which the North Koreans believe.
— Maintain various forms of leverage, including sanctions and deterrents against provocation and threats from the North. Remind Pyongyang of the economic and political rewards for its positive response.
— Unlink the human rights issues from the issues of war and peace. The UNSC resolution 2321 that was adopted last week would reduce the DPRK’s revenue of foreign currency by roughly 25 percent but is unlikely to persuade the North to cease its nuclear program. Pyongyang immediately rejected the latest U.N. sanction, repeating its narrative of self-defense, but it did not vow to keep strengthening its nuclear capability, as it did on previous occasions. A phased plan of sanction removal can be designed to lock in steps of progress of a denuclearization process, if serious negotiations are undertaken.
— Reopen the New York channel for a communication channel. An immediate goal should be to prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations, and to reduce tension and secure stability. A total freeze of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs under international inspection and verification in return for corresponding carrots as well as agreements on non-proliferation to a third state or a non-state actor should be reached as a transition phase to the ultimate goal of denuclearization. Initial containment of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is not incompatible with the policy of non-acceptance of a nuclear North Korea.
— Coordinate with South Korea to reopen the Gaeseong Industrial Complex and encourage resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.
— Bring China on board again to work on the North Korean nuclear and missile issue.
— Reconsider the deployment of a THAAD battery to South Korea. At least, announce a plan to re-examine the plan. Deterrents should include the option of a preemptive strike, if it can serve as a preventative on the North Korean military from launching an attack. Enhancement of allied defense capability, including joint exercises, should continue until such a point when an adjustment or moderation may be warranted due to progress in nuclear negotiations.
These measures would be radical but constructive departures from President Obama’s failed policy of strategic patience. Washington must lead, instead of responding to provocations from Pyongyang. Take the first step and see what happens — one step at a time. What’s your take?