Enlivening peace talks

Seoul should be bold in ending truce

South Korea has started an effort to establish a peace structure on the Korean Peninsula.

The heart of this effort is to have North Korea freeze its nuclear programs by 2020, the fourth year of President Moon Jae-in’s five-year term, a precondition for talks for a peace treaty to replace the current truce.

As shown by its choice of words — peace structure rather than peace treaty —Seoul is very cagey. First of all, it is not the party in the 64-year-old truce signed by the U.S., North Korea and China. The South stayed away when then President Syngman Rhee insisted on unification. Also making Seoul negative is Pyongyang’s tactic of making any possible discussion of it a matter between it and Washington, excluding the South.

Seoul would be the most affected by a change in the status quo and thereby should be given priority in determining how it will come about. The North’s nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to the South. If Pyongyang decides to open up, Seoul would pick up the biggest tab for economic assistance. That means that a peace treaty can’t be complete without the participation of the South.

President Moon Jae-in should be bolder in boosting Korea’s role. He made a good start with his inter-Korean peace initiative in Germany earlier this month by proposing a summit with the North’s leader Kim Jong-un to discuss the replacement of the word truce, among other things.

Moon gained consent from U.S. President Donald Trump about Korea playing the leading role in fostering the conditions that could lead to unification and in defending itself. For that purpose, the two leaders confirmed Seoul’s prompt takeover of wartime control of its troops from the U.S., which, when effected, would significantly raise its responsibility for its own defense.

Trump should match his promise with actions, letting it be known that Korea is a leader in the peace talks with the North and that Seoul’s position reflects that of Washington. Of course, it doesn’t mean precluding a U.S. effort for talks on peace with the North, as long as its stance is closely coordinated with Seoul.

This way, the parties concerned will most likely get what they want — Seoul would get lasting peace; the U.S. would see a neutralized threat from a nuclear attack by the North; China would have stability on its western regions; and the North would be assured of no regime change.

For this process to begin, the first domino should fall. The North is getting ever closer to gaining reliable nuclear weapons and systems to deliver them over a long distance to the U.S. The window of opportunity is narrowing, meaning that Moon should be extra ambitious.