President Moon, trust yourself
Sanctions and pressure on North Korea are tools aiming to fix a problem that does not exist. North Korea’s behavior is not due to a lack of pressure from the outside. Nor is it due to a misunderstanding of the military power at hand if Seoul or Washington decided to use it. Rather, it is primarily due to Pyongyang’s fear and mistrust of, and need for, the U.S. More pressure obviously will not address these issues; it will do quite the opposite. Perhaps U.S. leaders should have thought this through before they decided to unilaterally destroy a working multilateral agreement with the North 17 years ago. At that time the DPRK had no nuclear weapons.
For South Korea, more stern warnings and more robust military defenses are addressing a threat that remains remote. North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests are aimed at Washington, not Seoul. Seoul’s only convincing message to Pyongyang would be that it will work on Washington — in the interests of all three — to diffuse tensions, get diplomacy started again, and drive for a lasting deal. If the Blue House cannot influence the White House or other capitals, the North Koreans will see no reason to talk to them.
For the U.S., forcing the DPRK to capitulate in order to begin some fuzzy “talks” will not address the issue of the North’s compliance with any new deals. Only creating a deal that addresses what both sides require will do that. And in order for the U.S. to even begin to plan for diplomacy that caps and then rolls back nuclear and missile capabilities, it must create or agree to a roadmap for denuclearization, security, diplomatic ties, and development. In order to do this, a senior, experienced and enabled U.S. team would need to talk directly to senior North Koreans.
As of this writing, there is no sign that the U.S. administration has grasped what it needs to do, much less how to structure a deal so that the North’s compliance is more “baked in” and U.S. compliance is more long-term and less dependent on elections. Nevertheless, these are the three guiding requirements of the next deal: an end to extreme or unilateral sanctions, reduced or postponed military exercises, and the start of realistic, credible and detailed talks about what each party needs.
Seoul’s special role
In this situation, South Korea is the only party that could play a convening and managing role. Because the U.S. and South Korea are democracies, they have no time to waste. Because Donald Trump and Kim Jung-un are both — for different reasons — unable to act first to de-escalate this crisis and propose realistic steps toward agreements, Seoul must do so.
It makes practical and institutional sense for South Korea to work closely with the U.N. in order to put such a proposal forward. Luckily, Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha knows her way around the organization, and was a top adviser to Secretary-General Antonio Gutierres.
At least until the next U.S. president takes office, the U.S. would have to be led by allies, friends and partners to use its considerable assets to help address and defuse the Korea crisis, and transform it into an engine for regional security and development. We have watched in the past nine months as individual players have been unable to break the momentum of boasts and threats that now define U.S.-North Korea relations. If, however, many of those players were asked by a legitimate democratic authority to help, they would be eager to do so.
The result of these unfolding events and moving parts is that great pressure and responsibility rest on the shoulders of South Korean President Moon Jae-in. He seems not to have expected this, and to be fashioning the best response he can. If he was not prepared for his main ally to become a rogue element acting against Korea’s interests; or for his Chinese neighbor to be more concerned with a symbolic missile battery than with regional peace; or for his fellow Korean counterpart to ignore him unless he addresses U.S. policy; then he has plenty of company. The list of heads of government who arrived in office unprepared is very long.
Moon’s options and flexibility seem constrained, and he appears to find himself in an ideological and political box. However, he may have more room to maneuver, and a wider list of options, than he thinks.
Regarding the alliance with the U.S., it is worth remembering that the U.S. has refused for 15 years to understand its error in destroying the Agreed Framework (AF) of 1994. Hillary Clinton was on course to follow much the same approach Trump has. So President Moon would have had to deal with an ally “in denial” in any case. Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun both endured a post-AF American president who misunderstood and sacrificed Korea’s interests in the service of mistaken or ideological assumptions. Unlike them, however, Moon has a weakened and far less capable White House to deal with. The Trump team needs his leadership, ideas and friendship more than ever before.
Regarding the Chinese, not one of the four players: Trump, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-un or Moon, cares much about one missile battery. THAAD is instead symbolic of how strong and how independent South Korea will be on the issues of security in the region. The fact that it is the subject of heated debates among governments demonstrates Seoul’s latent power, not its limitations.
On the North Korea question, China’s interests overlap South Korea’s far more than do those of the current U.S. administration. This is why the U.S.-DPRK AF garnered unprecedented regional support, and why China would be one of Seoul’s most important allies in advancing a return to that basic bargain. What China will NOT do is abandon its interests to join the misconceived U.S. pressure campaign. If he has the boldness to do so, Moon can leverage the THAAD battery in exchange for Xi’s specific assistance in advancing a new denuclearization and development roadmap. He should also publically hand Xi a bill for the $15 billion or so his illegal boycott has cost Seoul so far.
Regarding the North Koreans, it should not be surprising that Pyongyang is absorbed in its existential conflict with the U.S. Because of this, Seoul will only be seen as helpful if it can move the U.S. back to new, mutually advantageous and durable deals with them.
Moon should do so. This would require tough bargaining. But Moon can rely on his background and on an experienced staff. He has been close to policymaking, and to institutional and presidential power. Many of his staff and ministers know these realities. It is in Korea’s and the region’s interest for his administration to drive forward a new solution and to take on additional responsibilities. Needless to say, such an initiative would also be in Washington’s interest. The U.S. is in a jam. Helping it now would be the best demonstration of friendship Korea could possibly make.