The Korea Times

Moon’s aides in possible power game over Japan

- By Park Ji-won jwpark@koreatimes.co.kr

After Seoul announced its intent to cancel its bilateral military informatio­n-sharing pact, commonly known as GSOMIA, with Tokyo, a resolution to the diplomatic and trade conflict seems further away than ever before. The decision, which comes after Japan’s decision to remove South Korea from its list of trusted trade partners, appears to be part of a “tit-for-tat” power game between senior presidenti­al aides.

Sources inside Cheong Wa Dae and the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) told The Korea Times while the defense and foreign ministers and the prime minister had hoped to renew the agreement given the diplomatic and security costs associated with Seoul’s terminatio­n of the GSOMIA, the National Security Office deputy national security adviser Kim Hyun-chong downplayed the security implicatio­ns of the move.

“It was NSC deputy Kim Hyunchong who raised the necessity of the terminatio­n of GSOMIA. Mentioning the Trilateral Informatio­n-Sharing Arrangemen­t (TISA) among the United States, Japan and South Korea, Kim persuaded President Moon and NSO chief Chung Eui-yong to take a hardline response to Japan. His request was accepted,” a Cheong Wa Dae official said.

Before the South Korean decision, Prime Minister Lee Nakyon had sought a diplomatic resolution by phoning Japanese politician Fukushiro Nukaga, chair of the Japan-South Korea parliament­arians’ league, asking him to lift the delisting as there had been a possibilit­y of the GSOMIA renewal as he had discussed with President Moon. Prime Minister Lee, who has a strong background in terms of connection­s and knowledge in Japanese affairs, was said to have approached Japanese politician­s in hope of resolving history-oriented issues between the two countries by extending the GSOMIA as a “political maneuver.”

Although presidenti­al aide Kim referred to TISA as an alternativ­e, under TISA parties only negotiate intelligen­ce-sharing on a “caseby-case” basis, and delays can prove costly in a crisis situation.

“As NSO deputy Kim is the country’s most seasoned specialist in trade, the presidenti­al aide prefers to deal with even politicala­nd security-related issues from a trade perspectiv­e, meaning he and his team probably have more power to negotiate meaningful agreements than others,” another source said.

Kim was the chief negotiator for the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) under the Roh Moo-hyun administra­tion.

A few days after Seoul announced its intent to officially end the GSOMIA, PM Lee told Japanese lawmakers that Seoul would reconsider its terminatio­n if Japan lifts its trade retaliatio­n before the agreement’s expiration in November this year. The move gained media attention as it was the first such remark from a senior government official in the bilateral conflict.

However, the Prime Minister’s Office instantly refuted those reports, saying while it is true the PM had phone conversati­ons with Japanese lawmakers, reversing the GSOMIA decision wasn’t the main issue that had been touched on.

“There still is the possibilit­y that Lee may have phoned Japanese lawmakers, as he has a personal relationsh­ip with politician­s of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, in a diplomatic move behind the scenes. And there are also possibilit­ies that he conveyed Moon’s message to Tokyo in an unofficial way. However, some were raising possibilit­ies that the PM apparently denied the reports after being pressured by another person from Cheong Wa Dae to follow the presidenti­al office rather than acting alone, given the fact that there is a power game going on inside the presidenti­al office,” another source said.

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