The Korea Times

Breakdown of N. Korea talks

- Tong Kim Tong Kim (tong.kim8@yahoo.com) is a columnist for The Korea Times. He is also a fellow at the Institute of Corean-American Studies.

Long-awaited U.S.-North Korea working-level talks that finally got underway in Stockholm Oct. 5 have broken down after the first day of meeting. The breakdown came as a surprise since they were expected to make some progress. Or it was not a surprise. It was doubtful anyway that the talks would be a breakthrou­gh for North Korea’s denucleari­zation.

Kim Myong-gil, head of the North Korean working-level team, ended the talks because the U.S. side, he said, came to the table with nothing new, disappoint­ing the North’s expectatio­n that the U.S. would come up with “the correct method of calculatio­n to accelerate positive developmen­ts in DPRKU.S. relations.” DPRK is the North’s name for itself, standing for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Despite the absence of details on what U.S. representa­tive Stephen Biegun might have actually offered to the North, it is still clear it was not enough for the North to continue the talks. Kim Myong-gil said his country has no luxury of time to continue negotiatio­ns for the sake of negotiatio­ns.

Kim said he suggested a realistic way for the U.S. to exit from the state of stalemate and find a breakthrou­gh.

It will be up to the United States, Kim continued in a statement in Stockholm, whether to resume dialogue or end it forever.

In a Q and A, Kim Myong-gil also said whether the freeze on nuclear and ICBM tests will continue depends on the United State as well.

In Washington, the State Department’s spokespers­on argued that the U.S. team had taken creative ideas to the talks and had good discussion­s with the North Koreans, saying Kim Myong-gil’s descriptio­n failed to reflect the spirit and contents of eight hours of discussion that took place at the talks.

Now it is not difficult to understand what has really happened in the talks in Sweden. No doubt the North Korean negotiatio­n strategist­s created an atmosphere of optimism and pressure for the U.S. to come up with a new position favorable to them.

Kim Myong-gil, passing through Beijing last week, said that he had gotten “a new signal” from Washington, so he “had high expectatio­ns and optimism” heading to the talks in Sweden.

On Oct. 1, first vice foreign minister Choe Son-hui said “her expectatio­n was the working-level negotiatio­ns would accelerate positive developmen­ts in DPRK-U.S. relations.”

However, there was a caveat. Kim Kye-gwan, adviser to Pyongyang’s foreign ministry, said Sept. 27 that as long as Washington is “obsessed with an assertion of nuclear disarmamen­t first… it is doubtful whether a new breakthrou­gh in DPRK-U.S. relations could be brought about even if another DPRK-U.S. summit may be held.”

On Sept. 30, Pyongyang’s U.N. ambassador Kim Song said the U.S. should have had “enough time to find out a calculatio­n method that can be shared with us.” He added, “It depends on the U.S. whether the DPRK-U.S. negotiatio­ns will become a window of opportunit­y or an occasion that will hasten the crisis.”

The North Koreans have been consistent on their position that they will negotiate with the U.S. in a method that is acceptable to them only: that is a step-by-step approach with each phase requiring reciprocal actions.

In an opening statement in Stockholm, the North Koreans could have said what they did to implement the Singapore agreement of last year — turning over the remains of the American soldiers from the Korean War, while complainin­g that the U.S. side did nothing to improve relations with the North, and nothing to build a durable peace regime in Korea, only increasing and toughening sanctions.

The North might have insisted on not repeating the sort of comprehens­ive big deal approach for an early solution without correspond­ing measures that the U.S. tried and failed in Hanoi. It was an all-or-nothing game from which nothing was gained except mutual bitterness.

From the current Washington political climate with talk of a potential impeachmen­t, Trump may have preferred his team to prepare for another summit toward the end of this year. The breakdown of the working-level talks is bad news for Trump.

Trump would want to have a sort of agreement with Kim Jong-un — that could be an interim step yet politicall­y symbolic enough for him to claim a victory for his 2020 election battle.

Summit diplomacy still has hope since working-level talks for the past 30 years have not been able to resolve the North Korean issue. And the North Koreans are still holding the expectatio­n that Trump will ultimately serve their interests.

At the failed working-level talks, the U.S. could have accepted a phased, parallel process — a parallel process of discussing all three issues of improvemen­t of relations, a peace regime and denucleari­zation — as agreed in Singapore.

Denucleari­zation needs to go through a long haul, which may not be possible at the end.

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