Strange things happen in NK
Last Wednesday, North Korea released a picture of its leader Kim Jong-un riding a white horse on the snow-covered top of Mount Paektu. The news agency reported that on horseback, Chairman Kim renewed his determination to build “a powerful and prosperous country against all headwinds” overcoming the “difficulties and hardships from sanctions and pressure from the hostile forces.”
According to Pyongyang’s storyline, his grandfather Kim Il-sung was riding a white horse, commanding “revolutionary guerrilla warfare against Japanese colonialists,” using Korea’s highest mountain as his military base. The North’s second ruler, Kim Jong-il, is said to have been born on the slope of the same mountain. Thus, began the legend of “Paektu bloodline” for the Kim dynasty.
Average North Koreans may not believe this fairytale-like legend, but they do not publicly question its veracity. The symbolism of the legend serves to consolidate the support and unity of the people for their leader. There may be the legacies of superstitious shamanic mysticism from old Korean culture still lingering in the minds of the people.
Another strange story, on Oct. 15, North Korea hosted a World Cup qualifier game competing with South Korea in an empty stadium in Pyongyang, with no spectators and no live broadcast of the game that ended with no score. The best result from the game, a South Korean player said, was “no injuries to the players.”
It indeed was a strange way of hosting an international sports game that certainly did not help improve the already unfavorable image of North Korea. Perhaps the sponsors of the game had feared a defeat by the South Korean soccer team widely rated to be better than theirs.
Maybe, the North did not want to cooperate with the South on anything, as it has been shunning the South for months. The known reasons are joint military exercises that the South conducts with the U.S. and its military modernization program. The North says the downsizing or format of the exercises does not matter as long as their goal is preparation to invade the North.
Military training for readiness and modernizing military hardware are common practices among the nations of the world. The North does its own military training. It keeps developing ballistic missiles, including SLBMs that it test-fired recently. But it suspended launching ICBMs almost two years ago.
After the breakdown of working-level talks in Sweden Oct. 5, the North made it clear that it would not move first. Pyongyang is sticking to the end-of-the year deadline it set last April for the U.S. to return to the table with a new position. The North is still waiting for the U.S. to accept a stepby-step approach with reciprocal actions by both sides to take at the same time. It is not clear what Kim Jong-un may do, if the deadline is missed.
The North has enough weapons to deter foreign invasion. It is most concerned about its economy that is still working sluggishly somehow despite the impact of sanctions, for reasons that economists cannot explain.
Sanctions did not end the North’s nuclear program.
A few possible scenarios include: (1) continuation of the stalemate until after the 2020 U.S. elections, while the North continues to develop and test mid-range ballistic missiles; (2) Pyongyang’s resumption of nuclear and ICBM tests and a return to the “fire and fury” of 2017, risking a nuclear war; (3) a breakthrough by U.S. flexibility on the methodology of denuclearization, including the North Korean proposal, to start making real progress.
The second option above ought be to avoided by all means. Nobody wants to go through the nightmare of 2017 again. Even when Kim was on Mount Paektu, it is unlikely he had thought of taking the second option, a prelude to self-destruction.
The two remaining options — a plateau in stalemate or a breakthrough — hinges upon Washington politics that seem to tie up Trump’s hands on North Korea. Pyongyang knows if Trump loses in his re-election, U.S. policy will change again. Trump has been good for Kim, and Kim may decide to offer a modest, interim deal in support of Trump’s re-election.
On the contrary, Kim may miscalculate that Trump will be inept to respond to his more provocative launch of another ICBM. Such a miscalculation could precipitate the very dangerous situation that Kim wants to avoid. As a minimum, the North should honor its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and ICBM tests.
It is ironic that Kim seems to have freer hands than Trump on nuclear talks at this juncture.