Revisiting Cuban crisis

The Cuban missile crisis occurred more than a half century ago, but the lessons of that terrifying Cold War episode remain important. Fading of memories over time argue more strongly for a review of the story.

Dangers of fatal military miscalculation may be greater today than during the Cold War. In the United States, our military presence in the Mideast fuels partisan political debate, but little discussion of potential confrontation with Russia.

During Oct. 22-28, 1962, the Cuba crisis dominated world attention, as Washington and Moscow sparred on the edge of a thermonuclear war. Lessons include difficulty securing accurate intelligence, and the unpredictability of events.

On Oct. 14, 1962, U.S. reconnaissance photos revealed the Soviet Union was placing offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, despite contrary assurances. On Oct. 16, after thorough review and analysis, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy informed President John F. Kennedy.

Kennedy and his advisers spent a week debating options. On Oct. 22, 1962, he addressed the nation and stated the missiles must be removed. Until Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to withdraw them on Oct. 28, Armageddon loomed.

Senior Kennedy’s administration officials, with the exception of CIA director John McCone, had assumed Moscow would never fire long-range missiles into Cuba. They erroneously calculated the Soviets also felt the move would be just too risky.

Earlier, reconnaissance flights over Cuba were curtailed to avoid antagonizing Moscow, and resumed only because McCone aggressively pressed the matter. Analysis developed photographic evidence of the Soviet deception just before the missiles would become operational.

However, there was already circumstantial evidence, including reports from reliable Cuba agents, that something of this nature was underway. As with the George W. Bush administration regarding Iraq weapons, senior officials chose evidence they preferred.

At the start of the crisis, there was strong sentiment, especially among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for a conventional air attack followed by an invasion of Cuba. JFK imaginatively decided instead on a naval quarantine as the U.S.’ first step.

Throughout the crisis, Kennedy demonstrated calm open-minded engagement. He assembled a group that freely debated a wide range of options. When tensions mounted, the president would shrewdly suggest taking a break. The initial strong support for an immediate military attack dissipated.

Lessons of the crisis include the importance of thorough, objective intelligence analysis, and communicating effectively with opponents.

Then and now, strong U.S. presidential leadership is essential.