Crisis in 2021?

Could the Korean Peninsula see a renewed nuclear crisis in 2021?

The probable election of Joe Biden as the next U.S. president in November will be viewed as unfavorable by North Korea. Biden has historically adopted a tougher stance on North Korea than Donald Trump, whose conciliatory approach to Pyongyang has reduced tensions since early 2018. North Korea may be emboldened to resist further U.S. pressure on the nuclear issue if it receives increased support from Beijing as Sino-American relations continue to deteriorate.

Meanwhile, a diplomatic breakthrough between Washington and Pyongyang on the nuclear issue before the November election appears unlikely. North Korea is pressing for the relaxation of sanctions before making any concessions on reducing its nuclear arsenal and there is almost no indication that the Trump administration is willing to do that. Biden will thus inherit a stalemate on the nuclear issue if he is inaugurated as the 46th U.S. president in January 2021. Biden’s previous foreign policy track record as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and then vice president under Barack Obama suggests that he would adopt a hardline policy on North Korea.

He is unlikely to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, as Trump has done, unless concessions have been made by Pyongyang. There is already bad blood between Biden and North Korea. Biden last year described Kim as a “murderous dictator,” which caused the North Korea media to call Biden a “rabid dog” that ought to be “beaten to death.” Biden would be expected to place increased emphasis on human rights abuses in North Korea, a subject that Trump has largely ignored. Biden is also likely to resume scaled-up joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises (COVID-19 permitting) and maintain current U.S. troop levels in South Korea.

The strength of the national security hawks in Washington has already been apparent even during Trump’s administration despite his conciliatory moves. Trump’s former national security adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have been effective in blocking any concessions on North Korea, such as sanctions relief, that Trump may have contemplated.

Faced with a renewed hardline policy under the Biden administration, Pyongyang may decide to abandon its freeze on nuclear and long-range missile testing that it adopted in the later part of 2017. Frustrated about the lack of progress in talks with the U.S. there are indications that Kim Jong-un is already considering abandoning his “byeongjin” policy, which aims to balance North Korea’s nuclear weapons program with economic development, and switching back to his father’s “seongun” (military-first) policy where nuclear weapons took precedence.

The resumption of long-range missile tests could come even before the U.S. elections, with one date being suggested as Oct. 10 when North Korea celebrates the 75th anniversary of the founding of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea. This would enforce Pyongyang’s message that whoever is elected president, it will remain a nuclear power and either Trump or Biden must continue to engage North Korea.

Any decision by North Korea to resume missile testing either before or after the U.S. election would also depend on whether Pyongyang receives covert or overt backing by China in confronting what they perceive as their common enemy, the U.S. And Biden is likely to pursue a tough line against China, a policy that is enjoying growing bipartisan support in the U.S. This would include shoring up U.S. defense commitments to South Korea and Japan.

In conducting testing, though, North Korea runs the risk of discouraging the Biden administration from considering what appears to be the most realistic solution to the nuclear issue. This would be the freezing of the North’s nuclear weapons program and a limited reduction of its warheads in return for diplomatic recognition and economic rewards.

A hardline policy on North Korea by the Biden administration could also strain relations with Seoul under the current administration of President Moon Jae-in. Although Biden would most likely pursue a more conciliatory policy when it comes to defense cost-sharing, the Moon administration would be unhappy if the U.S. is seen as hampering Seoul’s renewed outreach efforts to North Korea.

Moon’s recent appointments to the unification ministry and the National Intelligence Service signals that he wants to pursue a more independent course on North Korea by raising questions about the effectiveness of sanctions and emphasizing the need for “out of the box” solutions.

Further complicating the situation are several “known unknowns” such as the state of the health of Kim Jongun, who has dramatically reduced his public appearances this year. Another would be a surprise election victory by Trump, who would likely try to pursue a “grand bargain” with North Korea during his second term in office. This deal would be expected to include some degree of acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear status and an easing of sanctions.