Lessons from Reagan for Korea’s new President

A major political party was left in political disarray after the resignation of its scandal-ridden president. The succeeding president from a different party, who began his term promising accountability at home and moral diplomacy abroad, then faced criticisms for domestic economic recessions and perceptions of weaknesses in foreign policy.

As a result, the previous ruling party achieved a political comeback four years later, electing a presidential candidate who advocated for the restoration of military strength and pro-business economic growth.

This was a short description of the 1980 U.S. presidential election when Ronald Reagan was elected president. However, the description also applies to the South Korean presidential election held this year. In 2017, when South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye was impeached after a political scandal, her conservative political party fractured and faced a serious threat of extinction.

The new president from the opposing party initially enjoyed high approval ratings with promises of political accountability and peaceful engagement with North Korea. Eventually, the Moon administration faced domestic dissatisfaction from soaring real estate prices, economic recession, and stalled progress in diplomacy with North Korea.

The previous ruling party, which renamed itself as the People Power Party, nominated Yoon Suk-yeol, a former prosecutor general, as its presidential candidate for the 2022 election. Yoon ran on a campaign advocating the rule of law, economic liberalization, and an assertive foreign policy toward North Korea and China.

Through his victory, Reagan achieved what U.S. political scientists evaluate as a significant political realignment. The traditional Democrat-leaning voters from the rural and working-class districts voted for the Republican candidate in historic proportion.

Reagan’s victory marked the emergence of a new political right in the U.S., which advocated for an aggressive anti-communist strategy over a peaceful coexistence (“detente”) with the communist bloc.

Though Yoon’s victory margin was narrower than Reagan’s, Yoon also significantly increased conservative support among young Korean voters who have traditionally voted for more progressive parties.

As a result, Yoon’s presidency also offers a possibility of a new brand of political right in Korea, distinct from past association with the military rule and industrialization period.

With such similarities in their political character, what foreign policy lessons could the upcoming Yoon administration learn from the past Reagan administration? There are four lessons.

First, despite his reputation as a Cold War warrior, Reagan was pragmatically selective in areas of foreign policy confrontation. While Reagan increased military pressures on the Soviet Union, he also ended the agricultural embargo and resumed trade with the latter.

Despite his private support for Taiwan, Reagan continued U.S. strategic alignment with communist China and maintained the One China policy of his predecessors. Though Yoon has promised a foreign policy based on strength and principle, the Yoon administration would also be prudent in picking areas of assertiveness and areas of restraint.

Even though the Yoon administration is likely to advocate a stance of “strategic clarity” toward China and North Korea, it should take a lesson from another conservative administration that “strategic clarity” should not equal “strategic rigidity.”

Second, Reagan valued personal interactions in international negotiations. Facing difficult U.S.-Japan trade relations, Reagan cultivated a close partnership with Japan’s Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, ensuring the stability of the bilateral alliance. Despite criticizing the Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” Reagan was proactive in building personal trust and partnership with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Yoon should take Reagan’s lesson in complementing state-to-state diplomacy with leader-to-leader diplomacy, building personal relations with other leaders within and outside Northeast Asia. While Reagan’s hardline strategy might have pressured Soviet leadership to engage in negotiation, Reagan’s personal interaction reassured Gorbachev to accept a nuclear agreement.

If the Yoon administration is committed to a strategy of “maximum pressure” against North Korea, Yoon should also prepare for the future when his personal credibility and reassurance would be crucial for the

North Korean leadership to eventually accept an agreement.

Third, Reagan displayed an undaunted cheerful, even humorous persona in the face of policy setbacks, which earned him the nickname a “happy warrior.” Such personal character was important in projecting an optimistic perception that “It’s morning again in America” even during the difficult times of Reagan’s presidency.

The Yoon administration will face multiple domestic and international challenges. Realistically, some of Yoon’s policies will result in disappointing outcomes, and Korea could encounter challenges beyond the administration’s control. In such times, Yoon should take Reagan’s lesson that a leader who inspires public confidence is not necessarily one whose policies are always successful. Rather, it is a leader who can display optimism and even humor in times of adversity and inspire others to feel the same.

Finally, Yoon should take a lesson from the political scandal of the Reagan administration, that a “detached presidency” can be as detrimental as an “imperial presidency.” The Iran-Contra affairs happened in large part because of the president’s lax management and lack of oversight over the conduct of his NSC staff members.

The Yoon administration has promised to prevent presidential power abuse and delegate independence to administrative staff. Yet, presidential vigilance and engagement are also important in preventing abuse of administrative responsibilities.

Though praised as a “great communicator,” Reagan failed to be also praised as a “great administrator.” In contrast, though Yoon might not display similar communicative talents as Reagan, through striving to enhance administrative leadership, Yoon’s presidency could avoid some of the mistakes of the Reagan administration.

One U.S. diplomat evaluated that at the end of the Cold War, Reagan and Gorbachev “didn’t always get things right, but on the most critical issues, they finally did.” As South Korea faces daunting foreign policy challenges in the new Cold War era, I also hope Korea’s new president might not always get things right but will on the most critical issues.

Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu) is a Ph.D. candidate and is also an adjunct faculty at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management, and East Asian regional security.