Going nuclear would be costly

Should South Korea acquire its own nuclear weapons? This question tends to arise periodically whenever Pyongyang significantly ups the pace of its nuclear and ballistic missile tests. With North Korea growing increasingly provocative with its ballistic missile tests and adopting a policy that allows for preemptive nuclear strikes, it is not surprising that the issue has surfaced again. However, any debate should include a robust discussion of the cost of going nuclear.

The arguments in favor of South Korea acquiring its own nuclear weapons have tended to fall into four categories, and a fifth has been added by some experts recently. One, that has been somewhat changed by North Korea’s willingness to engage in a preemptive strike, is that Pyongyang is seeking to develop a second strike capability that would alter the military balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and that a South Korean nuclear weapon is needed to counter the growing threat from the North.

Another argument that is often used to justify a South Korean nuclear weapon is that the international community has been ineffective in convincing North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. Related to this position is that a South Korean nuclear weapon, and potentially a Japanese nuclear capability, could focus the minds in Beijing and perhaps help to facilitate talks.

The fourth reason often given is whether the United States would give up Los Angeles, or any other U.S. city, to save Seoul. A new rationale that has come to the surface and relates to this conundrum is that a South Korean nuclear weapon would eliminate the need for the United States to engage in nuclear retaliation.

While there are other reasons for South Korea to acquire a nuclear weapon — polling by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs, for example, suggests 26 percent of South Koreans believe it would raise South Korea’s prestige — policy-related reasons tend to fall into concerns about North Korea’s growing capabilities, the inability of the international community to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile developments and concerns over U.S. reliability.

There are problems, however, with these rationales. While Russia in the past has engaged in negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons with the United States, China has steadfastly refused to do so. There is little reason to believe that Pyongyang would engage in arms control reduction simply because Seoul had its own nuclear deterrent. Instead, a South Korean nuclear weapon is just as likely to be used as another justification for North Korea to cling to its own program.

The debate over whether the United States would sacrifice Los Angeles for Seoul is unlikely to be the choice the United States confronts. Should Washington back down in the face of North Korean nuclear blackmail it would place itself at risk of Russian and Chinese blackmail, further undermine faith in its broader alliance system and also encourage other states to develop nuclear weapons.

Any North Korean attack on South Korea is also likely to result in tens of thousands of U.S. civilian and military deaths, something no president could afford not to respond to. The question will merely be whether eliminating the Kim regime can best be achieved with conventional or nuclear weapons.

A South Korean nuclear weapon could also focus China, but in ways detrimental to South Korea. China would likely look to the United States to take the lead on international economic sanctions of South Korea as it has on North Korea. As a trade-dependent nation, South Korea would be especially vulnerable to economic sanctions if the United States were not supportive. Even if the United States were to support a South Korean nuclear weapon, South Korea could still face economic costs. China is by far South Korea’s largest trading partner and could do significant economic damage on its own. Any effort to go nuclear would most likely require a strategic decoupling of the two economies in areas such as critical technologies, minerals and manufacturing parts in advance.

Seoul could also face a worsening strategic position. If Washington were unwilling to sanction Seoul over acquiring nuclear weapons, Beijing may simply remove any pretense of implementing U.N. sanctions and provide economic and military aid to Pyongyang.

The costs of South Korean nuclear weapons are not merely the prospect of a worsening strategic position and economic sanctions, but also potential power shortages. Nuclear power accounts for 27 percent of South Korea’s power supply and the Yoon administration would like to expand that to 33 percent. Without its own domestic reserves of nuclear fuel, South Korea is dependent on the Nuclear Suppliers Group which conditions the supply of nuclear fuel on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The decision to go nuclear is ultimately one for South Korea to make based on its own security needs, but the costs would potentially be very high with no certainty that doing so would achieve Seoul’s strategic objectives. Any debate that does not robustly discuss the downside of acquiring a nuclear weapon risks leaving South Korea worse rather than better off without them.