UKRAINE WAR TO END BY OCTOBER

Analysis of Putin’s statements and info on Russia’s missile stocks point to this conclusion

PREDICTING the beginning and end of a war is difficult. Many people would think of using models and data, which would most likely be about combat power, staff computing operations, etc.

A more advanced approach would include super-complex models, such as war games.

Overall, the use of these methods depends on the target audience. The approach and delivery are different for the media or academia, in which the use of data would be necessary for the audience to understand and verify the forecasted results.

If the target audience is neither the media nor academia, different approaches would be necessary.

The results would be tested on the battlefield rather than relying on statistics at the decision-making level.

A practical example is making predictions through information analysis.

The focus of such analysis is, naturally, information. The first important piece of information about when the war in Ukraine will end is to refer to news from Moscow that it plans to end the war in September.

The second piece of important news is that Russia has about 1,200 to 1,300 missiles in its inventory.

Combining these two pieces of information allows us to do a simple analysis.

If we calculate the average number of missiles that Russia uses on Ukraine every day, we find that at least 300 missiles are launched a month by the Russian army.

Now, we are in May. After five months, Russia’s missile inventory will be exhausted. This means that by October the Russian military will have almost no effective weapons to attack Ukraine with.

By then, of course, or maybe sooner, Russia will have to attempt to end the war.

The question that follows is, can’t the Russian army use other methods to continue the war?

The answer is no, because the Russian air force has gradually lost its advantage in Ukraine’s sky. If the air force is used to penetrate the battlefield, the losses will be heavy.

Hence, the offensive force that Russia can rely on now is only to project missiles from combat aircraft outside the line of sight.

Another approach is to use its large number of World War 2-era artillery to bombard indiscriminately. But the areas assaulted may include zoos and children’s playgrounds.

Therefore, the Russian army seems to have fewer battlefield options than what most people imagine.

Based on some key information, together with an analysis of Russia’s missile inventory, the conclusion is clear. All indications point toward the end of the war in Ukraine in September or October.

The accuracy of the forecast will be seen as events unfold, and this is a positivist style of thinking.

For some people, models and data are the only ways to forecast the future, rather than simpler methods like information analysis. Which method is better can be determined with the use of available data after the war is over.

However, right now we have a clear and convincing conclusion to judge the prospects of the war.