Verifying warheads in real-time without ‘seeing’ design data
LIVERMORE, California: Trust but verify. The catchphrase for arms control popularized by President Ronald Reagan sounds simple. However, verification involving sensitive data is a very complex endeavour.
Verifying that a nuclear warhead actually is a warhead may include confirming key attributes. But the act of confirming certain technical attributes might reveal critical design information — closely guarded national secrets for any country. Confirming these attributes will likely require overcoming the hurdle of protecting sensitive design data.
Sandia National Laboratories physicist Peter Marleau has developed a new method for verifying warhead attributes.
Called CONFIDANTE, for CONfirmation using a Fastneutron Imaging Detector with Anti-image Null-positive Time Encoding, the method could help addresstheproblemofconducting verification measurements while simultaneously protecting sensitive design information.
CONFIDANTE provides middle ground for the warhead owner, or host, who wants to protect sensitive information, and the monitor, who may be seeking to verify that sensitive information to confirm the inspected item is a warhead.
“CONFIDANTE is an implementation of a zeroknowledge proof (ZKP) as a way to demonstrate the validity of a claim while providing no further information beyond the claim itself,” explained Marleau.
“Unlike other ZKP confirmation methods, which rely on a measuring instrument that has been pre-loaded with sensitive information, CONFIDANTE allows the monitoring party to conduct the measurement in real time without accessing sensitive design data.”