Militants still see no reason to tremble
Without brakes, the roller-coaster ride of Pakistan-us relations grows more crowded with each turn.
THEY tried armed attacks, they tried unmanned drones and they even tried international conferences, but Us-led efforts against militant groups in SouthCentral Asia have failed to weaken them. Instead, these groups have been emboldened and probably re-energised.
Doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting a different result has been defined as stupidity. What, then, might be considered something approaching intelligence?
A pivotal problem in the fight against terrorism in South-central Asia is the dysfunctional relationship between two supposed allies – Pakistan and the United States. The scope of their differences is broad and the sense of their mutual incompatibility runs deep.
However, few of these differences that span political culture, national identity and strategic purpose relate directly to the cause against terrorism that they share. Yet these extraneous issues manage to magnify the challenges undermining prospects for a common front against terror.
In recent years, the path of Pakistan-us relations has been nothing if not a nervewracking roller-coaster ride with more downs than ups. Although more players have hitched on the ride, whether or not by design, the two principals have to bear responsibility for most of the misgivings.
In recent weeks and days, there has been a sense of each inching laboriously towards a thawing of frozen ties. Both seem loath to acknowledge their reciprocal relationship as allies in a largely unconsummated alliance.
Pakistan complains that US doubt and distrust of Pakistan amount to treating it as an unworthy ally. US infringements of Pakistani national sovereignty and territorial integrity further inflame nationalist and Islamist sentiments.
More than 90% of Pakistanis are said to oppose improved ties with the US. With elected politicians ever sensitive to the public mood, how are Pakistan’s political leaders expected to respond?
The US public is similarly incensed by perceived irregularities in Islamabad occasionally amounting to a betrayal by an ally. That all this comes at a financial cost to the US of billions of dollars in economic and military aid since 1948 seems inexplicable.
The US security establishment in particular sees Pakistan’s key institutions of power as lacking transparency. Even after many long years of engagement, Washington is still not clear as to who in Islamabad decides what for which reason and how.
US officials have lately pressured Pakistan by announcing cutbacks in financial assistance. That made Pakistan turn to its trusty neighbour China for replacement aid, which neither the US nor India wants.
But if Pakistan had expected China to fill the shortfall, it had to come away disappointed. Beijing has preferred to remain aloof in an already complicated region, especially since others may see any such move as an expression of territorial domination.
Pakistan’s overt postures abroad are largely defined by the individual national leader at the time. These consist of some broad strokes by some key figures.
In the 1970s, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was distinguished for his foreign policy and a range of domestic policy positions. Government then was defined by the prime minister, and civilian rule held sway over the military, as according to the British system.
However, Bhutto’s nuclear energy programme and certain left-leaning policies found disfavour in Washington, which peaked during the Carter years. President Jimmy Carter worked to undermine Bhutto’s government although he later tried to stop Bhutto’s execution by Gen Zia ul-haq, but by then it was too late.
Enter Ronald Reagan’s Republican administration, which proceeded to promote Zia. This also had the effect of promoting military rule and the growth of the military’s influence in Pakistani politics.
Zia’s other “side effects” included consolidation of the presidency over the premiership, development of Pakistan’s nuclear programme and further Islamicisation of the country. These came to have further effects on the country to this day.
However, the official US position was that Bhutto’s eventual downfall was his own fault. After Zia, another general to occupy the presidency was Pervez Musharraf, who maintained many of Zia’s priorities albeit with a revised image.
When I asked a Pakistani source once what he thought of how Musharraf’s leadership was finally getting to grips with a powerful, shadowy, sometimes controversial and allegedly rogue ISI (Inter-services Intelligence), he merely said: “But the government now is a product of the ISI!”
Much as it was then, so is it now. Pakistan’s government is defined by the presidency, its nuclear missile arsenal has grown from strength to strength, and the military remains influential in the government where it effectively decides on foreign policy.
The latter may be seen as the armed forces simply clinging jealously to its gains. It could also be seen as a necessity, given that so much of Pakistan’s immediate foreign policy revolves around India and the disputed Kashmir region with India.
For Islamabad and Delhi, bouts of detente such as those occurring between Musharraf and Manmohan Singh have been punctuated – and punctured – by longer spells of competition, animosity and outright conflict, all layered over undercurrents of mutual suspicion and rivalry.
For Islamabad, periods of brooding over US insensitivities have repeatedly come to a head. Amid several issues over border skirmishes in the US “war on terror” came two major crisis points.
There was the US mission to kill Osama bin Laden last May, which took place on Pakistani soil close to a Pakistani military camp without prior consultation or cooperation with Pakistan. That offended Pakistani sovereignty and embarrassed Islamabad.
Later there was the tragedy of Salalah Ridge last November, where Us-led forces bombed and strafed a Pakistani military post, killing 24 soldiers. Instead of an apology that Pakistan expected, the US produced a summary report shifting part of the blame to Pakistan itself without holding any US party accountable.
Sentiment in Pakistan boiled over until commentators predicted that the wounds would never heal this time. Islamabad took several if limited retaliatory measures, including stopping Nato’s supply convoys going into neighbouring Afghanistan.
But pressing security considerations would re-assert themselves soon enough. Last month, Pakistan’s Parliament approved a proposal to re-engage with the US.
Then earlier this month, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went to India where she accused Pakistan of failing to do enough against a militant leader accused of masterminding the Mumbai attacks. Anti-us sentiment boiled over in Pakistan again.
After much of the world including Pakistan was disheartened by the Bush administration’s unilateral attacks on weaker Muslim countries, presidential candidate Barack Obama said publicly that he would not hesitate to move unilaterally against any country if the US saw fit. Pakistan must know by now that US foreign policy differs little between the two major parties.
This weekend Nato is holding its 25th summit in Chicago, with Afghan security a major feature on the agenda. At first, Pakistani pundits considered whether to snub the occasion, then US analysts wondered if Pakistani officials would even be invited.
But recent days have seen prospects for Pakistani-us relations on the rise again. The invitation was sent out, Pakistani generals are in attendance, and Nato supply lines for Afghanistan have been reopened.
The Chicago conference comes after an earlier one in Bonn, and before the next one in Tokyo. Whatever the state of Pakistani-us relations by then, militants in the volatile “Afpak” (Afghanistan-pakistan) border region are likely to remain as active and carefree.