Israel’s strategic errors
The Zionist state may have greater firepower, but it possesses less moral standing compared even to Hamas.
THE ceasefire in Gaza has so far lasted only half as long as the Israeli onslaught against the civilian population there, yet everyone has been celebrating a “peace” that remains elusive if not mythical.
The highly volatile situation remains as precarious as ever. A ceasefire has broken out, for now, but nobody is betting on how long it will last.
A ceasefire is simply a cessation of hostilities before either a resolution of conflict or, as is far more likely in Gaza, a resumption of hostilities. It is not a truce, which presumes some form or degree of basic agreement towards the ending of violent conflict.
A truce itself is not peace, since peace is not just the absence of war. A just, meaningful and durable peace that Israel, the Palestinian Hamas authority in Gaza and everyone else say they want is something more.
Every party in the conflict must be too hard-bitten by now to be deluded by pretensions to peace. And yet everyone has been celebrating without reservation, lulling themselves and others into a false optimism, because they have their own reasons to celebrate.
Observers imagine some kind of deal must have been reached to explain the ceasefire. No such deal has yet been agreed upon, just a temporary convergence of selfinterests.
Gazans are simply glad that the Israeli bombing raids have stopped. That is the best reason for joy and celebration, despite all its limits and restrictions.
Hamas is celebrating because it says Israel has failed to destroy Gaza completely. By implication, it also claims to have deterred Israel from further aggression with its rocket attacks, however incredible that may be.
Hamas had wanted a border deal with Israel, but it seemed so tenuous that Egypt advised against it for fear of prolonging Israel’s attacks. Eventually, Hamas agreed only to a ceasefire to enable a tabling of terms.
Israel is also celebrating because it says it has succeeded in stopping Hamas’ rockets. The fact that this is only a ceasefire, and one of limited duration based on fluid circumstances, makes Israel’s claim as incredible.
Essentially, there is still no basis for any real move towards peace. But why did the ceasefire happen at all?
Neither Hamas nor Israel had the stomach to continue the violence, at least for now. Palestinians were losing lives in Gaza while Israel was losing face around the world.
But once Israel’s devastating attacks took off, neither side wanted to be seen to blink (or wince) first. It took a delayed US response, with Egypt’s mediation plan, to make the ceasefire happen.
So while neither Hamas nor Israel had any real interest in prolonging the carnage, they equally have no real incentive to proceed to agree on terms for peace either. The result is the present circumstances of a strategic stalemate.
It is also a stalemate whose most distinguishing feature is its temporary nature. Even as the ceasefire holds, the next phase is still more likely to be renewed violence than a genuine peace.
The net result is not quite a return to the status quo because of even greater instability than before, and higher tension all-round making for that instability. It is a situation that has worsened from two weeks ago, particularly for Israel, following its onslaught on Gaza and its murder of Hamas’ deputy military chief Ahmed Jabari on Nov 14.
Hours before he was killed, Jabari had received the draft of a “permanent truce agreement with Israel”, according to Israeli newspaper Haaretz. The prospect of that truce died with him.
Although Jabari was responsible for rocket attacks on Israel, he had also secretly agreed to divert some rocket launches into non-populated areas. Israeli peace activists talked with him behind the scenes in efforts to reach a truce that could lead to a more enduring peace.
Was Jabari’s killing by Israel therefore a mistake, or was it a deliberate attempt by some Israelis to derail any prospect of peace? The answer is not known, but the outcome making Israel the bigger loser is clear in at least a dozen ways.
First, Hamas has consolidated its authority and standing in Gaza. This comes immediately from Gazans themselves, including those who were not so committed to the Hamas leadership before, as well as from Palestinians in general.
Second, Palestinian factions tend to close ranks when attacked by Israel and, as the standing authority in Gaza, Hamas stood to benefit from it. Israel should have foreseen this as a consequence of its actions, but chose not to do so.
A key result, third, has been for Hamas to effectively develop its credibility and status in Gaza. This may be what a territory under siege needs, but it can never be what Israel wants.
Fourth, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi has also come into his own as an effective mediator and a Hamas supporter. With Hamas’ trust he won their agreement to compromise, and with Egypt’s strategic location relative to Israel, the latter had to go along.
The result is, fifth, Hamas being brought in as the negotiating party on behalf of Gazans and Palestinians in general. Despite the US and Israel branding Hamas a terrorist group and not someone to negotiate with, both the US and Israel now have to deal (if indirectly) with Hamas.
Sixth, the rise in Hamas’ stature also means the decline of the Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas. While the US and Israel prefer to negotiate with Abbas, the eight-day Israeli offensive has effectively made Hamas displace his Fatah faction.
Next, the shifting regional scenario introduced by the “Arab awakening” has moved regional leaderships closer to support for the Palestinians’ plight than any agreement with Israel. Morsi is only one of several examples that Israel and the US now have to contend with.
Eighth, the overwhelmingly disproportionate Israeli offensive where Palestinians suffered more than 96% of civilian casualties has made Israel an even bigger international pariah than before. There is now a bigger international aversion to Israeli claims of self-defence around the world, and not just in Arab or Muslim countries.
Ninth, Israel further lost prestige when an emboldened Hamas dared it to invade Gaza and it did not. Israel had earlier boasted of mobilising 75,000 reservist troops for a ground invasion, but that boast amounted to nothing after Hamas’ dare.
Tenth, Israel’s pulverising air attacks had clearly been superior to anything Hamas could manage, with or without pin-prick rocket attacks, but its heavy bombardment was made to look like it had succumbed to Hamas’ puny efforts. The zero-sum relationship between Israel and Hamas only multiplies Israel’s apparent weakness with each of Hamas’ seeming strengths.
Israel’s overkill approach was in error from the start. The world could see that its Goliath sledgehammer blows of combined military forces, against Gaza’s David-sized retaliatory efforts, were ludicrously disproportionate and unworthy of sympathy.
Residents of Sderot in southern Israel were completely unimpressed when Israel pulled back for the ceasefire. Israeli leaders had made the mistake of raising the hopes of anti-Palestinian groups, such as when the Interior (Home) Minister pledged to turn Gaza “back to the stone age”.
A new status quo may eventually emerge, but with a politically weakened Israel.