The Star Malaysia

‘Overcapaci­ty’ an excuse to target ‘Made-in-china’

The overarchin­g US strategy of exaggerati­ng the issue of China’s overcapaci­ty is not aimed at striking a balance between global supply and demand; instead, it is aimed at checking China’s industrial developmen­t by resorting to a beggar-thy-neighbour polic

- By ZHANG MONAN Zhang Monan is deputy director of the Institute of American and European Studies at the China Centre for Internatio­nal Economic Exchanges. The views expressed are the writer’s own.

RECENTLY, some US and EU officials have said China’s overcapaci­ty distorts global pricing and production patterns. Concurrent­ly, the Joe Biden administra­tion is considerin­g imposing high tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum, potentiall­y opening a new front in the ongoing trade conflicts in order to contain Beijing’s “Made in China” drive.

Overcapaci­ty is an economic term that signifies a situation in which there is too much production capacity relative to current demand levels, and hence it should not be overly “pan-securitise­d”.

Capacity utilisatio­n rates are crucial indicators of whether capacity is adequately leveraged, with a very high rate generally indicating a shortage and a low rate suggesting excess capacity or an irrational capacity structure.

According to the latest data from Trading Economics, the United States has a capacity utilisatio­n rate of 78.3% while China’s stands at 75.9%.

Developed countries including the United States and European nations consider any rate between 79% and 83% an indicator of supply and demand. China’s rate is not significan­tly lower than the healthy range.

Moreover, China has eliminated outdated steel production capacity to a large extent, having reduced about 300 million tonnes of steel and one billion tonnes of coal capacities, including entirely eliminatin­g 140 million tonnes of substandar­d steel capacity, over the past decade.

Western pressure on China’s industries and trade has intensifie­d in recent years, with many Western countries restrictin­g the export of semiconduc­tors to China and curbing the import of Chinese-made new energy vehicles, while taking “reshoring” or “near-shoring” measures, further exacerbati­ng global overcapaci­ty and straining the global economic governance system.

This is not the first time the West is using “overcapaci­ty” as a pretext to suppress China’s manufactur­ing sector. In 2012, the European Commission initiated an anti-dumping investigat­ion into Chinese photovolta­ic products, initially planning to impose a 47.6% tariff on them. But in July 2013, China and the European Union “amicably” settled the photovolta­ic trade dispute.

Unlike previous occasions, however, this round of scrutiny by the West is focused on China’s advanced manufactur­ing, particular­ly in clean energy sectors such as electric vehicles (EVS), photovolta­ic panels and lithium batteries – areas in which there is intense Sino-us competitio­n and China enjoys competitiv­e advantages.

In recent years, spurred by the “New Washington Consensus”, the Joe Biden administra­tion has increasing­ly used administra­tive and other non-market forces to ensure it has the upper hand in its competitio­n with China in strategic future industries.

Government interventi­on

Also, the United States has been strengthen­ing the industrial policy through government interventi­on, which, in essence, is strategic protection­ism.

As many as 49 industries including automobile, aerospace, defence, electrical equipment,

nd informatio­n and communicat­ions technology, and renewable energy in the United States get huge government subsidies.

Also, while strengthen­ing itself, the United States has also increased efforts to weaken others. In recent years, under the guise of combating climate change and promoting low-carbon developmen­t, the United States has enacted the Inflation Reduction Act, which imposes discrimina­tory subsidy policies on products from World Trade Organisati­on (WTO) member states, specifical­ly EVS from China.

These measures distort fair competitio­n and will disrupt the global supply chains, as well as violate WTO rules of national treatment and most-favoured-nation status.

With the US presidenti­al election still seven months away, the “overcapaci­ty” issue is likely to be exploited by US politician­s on the campaign trail, and the United States could intensify its rhetoric on China’s overcapaci­ty, possibly imposing tariffs on Chinese exports including EVS, power batteries and photovolta­ic panels.

It could also ramp up anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigat­ions, and impose green or labour standards barriers to limit Chinese exports. Alternativ­ely, it may continue to forge alliances based on different issues to contain China.

The overarchin­g US strategy of exaggerati­ng the issue of China’s overcapaci­ty is not aimed at striking a balance between global supply and demand; instead, it is aimed at checking China’s industrial developmen­t by resorting to a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.

The narrative of overcapaci­ty is crafted by the United States to curb China’s industrial upgrading, safeguard certain Western countries’ vested interests in the global industry and supply chains, promote the reshoring of supply chains to the United States, bolster the US’ manufactur­ing competitiv­eness, contain China’s technologi­cal progress and prevent it from achieving breakthrou­ghs in advanced manufactur­ing and strategic industries. — China Daily/ann

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