Malta Independent

Law The warrant of prohibitor­y injunction

- SAMAN BUGEJA Saman Bugeja is an Associate at Ganado Advocates.

In its judgement delivered on the 15 September 2021, in the names of Aurelio Tanti (the “Plaintiff”) vs Chris D’Anastasi (the “Defendant”), the First Hall Civil Court (the “Court”), presided over by Justice Dr Christian Falzon Scerri, had to consider the requisite elements for the issuance of a warrant of prohibitor­y injunction.

In the case at hand, the Plaintiff owned a first-floor apartment in a block of flats in, Triq San Pawl, Ħad-Dingli. The Defendant had procured a planning permit from the Planning Authority to develop a block of flats including garages directly adjacent to the block of flats in which the Plaintiff owned his apartment. According to the Plaintiff and his architect, the approved developmen­t plans showed that the Defendant was to undertake excavation works at a distance which was less than the minimum seventy-six centimetre­s distance prescribed by article 439 of the Civil Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta (the “Civil Code”). Moreover, the Defendant was to make a number of apertures in the dividing wall without his consent which would also compromise the structure of the whole block.

Accordingl­y, the Plaintiff filed an applicatio­n for the issuance of a warrant of prohibitor­y injunction to stop the Defendant from conducting any excavation works or constructi­on besides his property. The Court upheld the request and initially issued such warrant for a short period of time until it issued its final decree and gave the Defendant ten days to file his replies.

In his reply, the Defendant raised a number of preliminar­y pleas arguing against the issuance of the warrant; however, the Court had to consider the validity of such pleas at this stage of the proceeding­s. Referring to a decree issued by the Court in the case of MPM Capital Investment­s Limited vs Alfred Anton Zarifa et, it noted that certain preliminar­y pleas were not adequate when considerin­g an applicatio­n for the issuance of a precaution­ary warrant unless such pleas were linked to a defect in the manner or form required at law for the issuance of the warrant. For such a preliminar­y plea to be considered, this should be tied to a defect in the legal requisites for the issuance of the warrant which would render the applicatio­n invalid.

The Court noted that the preliminar­y pleas raised by the Defendant were not linked to the validity of the applicatio­n filed by the Plaintiff, therefore it was not strictly bound to consider them further. Neverthele­ss, the Court explained that in proceeding­s for the issuance of a precaution­ary warrant, the Court would only consider those acts which can take place in the present or in the near future. In fact, if it is shown that the act or behaviour which the applicant is seeking to prevent has already taken place, the scope for the issuance of the warrant is lost. Therefore, in this case, the fact that the works had not yet started did not render the Plaintiff’s applicatio­n invalid. Moreover, the fact that the Plaintiff did not file the applicatio­n against all the owners does not preclude the Court from considerin­g the request for the issuance of the warrant. When a warrant is issued, it only binds the person against whom it is issued and the action on the merits to be filed following the issuance of the warrant can only be made against the person bound by the warrant. Therefore, any plea relating to the proper defendant should be raised during proceeding­s relating to the merits of the case.

Having dismissed the pleas raised by the Defendant, the Court had to consider whether the requisites for the issuance of the warrant of prohibitor­y injunction subsisted. The scope of the warrant is to prevent a person from doing anything which can prejudice the rights of the person suing out the act. The Court reiterated that the warrant of prohibitor­y injunction is an exceptiona­l remedy, not a normal remedy, and thus should only be interprete­d in a restrictiv­e manner. As per establishe­d case law, a court should authorise the issuance of such a warrant where:

The applicant has, on a prima facie level, an objective right to stop the defendant from doing anything which can cause him harm or prejudice him in any way; and

The warrant is required for the preservati­on of the applicant’s right. Therefore, for example, if the matter or act complained of can be resolved following a judgement on the merits, this second element would not subsist.

These two elements are cumulative, therefore the person suing out the warrant needs to prove both for the Court to accede to his request.

Turning its attention to the first element, the Court noted that at this stage of the proceeding­s, it was not up to it to determine whether either party is right or wrong. In fact, an applicant in whose favour a warrant or prohibitor­y injunction is issued, is obliged to file an applicatio­n on the merits of the case within twenty days from the issuance of the warrant. In the case at hand, the Court noted that the Plaintiff has every right to ensure that no excavation works take place at a distance which is less than the minimum prescribed by the Civil Code.

As to whether or not such excavation works were indeed to take place at a closer distance, the

Court cannot merely rely on declaratio­ns made by the Plaintiff in his applicatio­n. It is the responsibi­lity of the Plaintiff to show that his concern is realistic and not merely based on suspicions; therefore some form of proof is to be presented to the Court to further substantia­te the claim being made. Without going to the core of the claim, the Court noted that on the basis of the developmen­t plans presented by the Plaintiff with his applicatio­n, a reasonable fear that excavation works would lead up to the party wall existed. In addition, the Court further noted that the Defendant also intended to make certain apertures in the party wall which in terms of article 425 of the Civil Code could not be done without the consent of the Plaintiff. In this regard the Court noted that it was clear that the Plaintiff’s consent was not forthcomin­g. Therefore, the first element for the issuance of the warrant subsisted.

Moving on to the second element, the Court explained that not every prejudice or disturbanc­e would merit the issuance of a warrant of prohibitor­y injunction. Reiteratin­g establishe­d principles, the Court noted that any prejudice or disturbanc­e meriting the issuance of such a warrant should be such that would cause damage to the applicant, leaving him with no other alternativ­e remedy or an unproporti­onate remedy. With regard to the second element, the Court is to determine whether the right being vaunted by the applicant would be lost forever, without the issuance of the warrant. Therefore, any damage or prejudice which may be easily remedied by a favourable judgment of the Court, or through monetary compensati­on would not be sufficient for the issuance of the warrant of prohibitor­y injunction. In the case of IWT Group Malta Ltd vs Direttur Generali Kuntratti et, the Court held that generally, a warrant of prohibitor­y injunction would not be issued were the right vaunted by the applicant is one which refers to quantifiab­le damages. The Court noted that in the case at hand, the rationale behind article 439 of the Civil Code is to ensure that no damage is caused to neighbouri­ng properties whenever excavation takes place. As held in the case of Saviour Brincat et vs Salina Estates Limited et, article 439 of the Civil Code creates a juris et de jure presumptio­n of damage, therefore it is imperative that the minimum distance prescribed is respected. The failure to maintain such a minimum distance in itself would constitute damage in terms of law.

Taking into account the above principles, the Court was satisfied that even the second element subsisted and therefore it ordered the issuance of the warrant of prohibitor­y injunction as requested by the Plaintiff.

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