+ Nepal: Prachanda’s Power Play + looming End of Putin’s Neo-Imperial Project + Beijing’s long Game in Taiwan
Nepali Maoists Straining for Power
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, who styles himself as Prachanda – his nom de guerre -- [“the fierce one”] harping to the days when he was the undisputed leader of the militant Maoists in the decadelong (in)famous People’s War against the Nepalese state, is a man with a mission, albeit a sinister one.
He was thwarted on the battlefield in capturing state power by the Royal Nepalese Army, but was welcomed to the fold of mainstream political parties by none other than the other – spineless – main parties under heavy pressure from the Indian establishment, which has been very proficient in micromanaging Nepalese domestic politics.
Prachanda was twice in power as prime minister where he was again frustrated in weaponizing his notorious Prachanda Path adapted from Mao Zedong’s teachings. His administrative and political record was indeed dismal.
He is now making his third and presumably final attempt to reach the pinnacle of power – not of his own accord – but on the coat-tails of Nepali Congress leader Sher Bahadur Deuba, who is also striving for yet another term as PM.
Speaking at a function organized by the Nepal Mountaineering Association, Prachanda claimed: “I had taken the lead to unify left forces. But I did not succeed and I do not want to talk much about that” (THT/The Himalayan Times, June 25).
The schemer and carpetbagger that he is, he was, of course, talking about his Machiavellian project of uniting the Communist parties just before the last parliamentary elections and achieving a two-thirds majority. To all intents and purposes, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu played a helping hand.
But all to no avail. The Communist government under the leadership of K.P. Sharma Oli was thoroughly corrupt, inefficient and purposeless. Prachanda and Oli were at daggers drawn and the ‘powerful’ government collapsed through its own inner contradictions. With his authoritarian and headstrong tendencies, Prachanda is not capable of sharing power. He has also become old and jaded and new and vibrant ideas will not be forthcoming.
In addition, like all major political parties, the CPN-Maoist Centre has not been able to practice internal democracy and nurture younger leaders with capabilities.
It is, therefore, an empty promise when he states: “But if I become the PM again with your blessings, I will steer the country towards a new age” (THT). He also falsely claims that he had united left forces to ensure political stability, social justice and development – all very much missing in the Communist dictionary!
God forbid that Prachande again steers the ship of state. But through his machinations, he may very well become PM again – and God help our nation!
Putin and the Future of Ukraine and Russia
Putin’s Latest Terrorist Acts, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
Russia intensified its campaign of terror this Monday with a missile attack on a shopping mall in the central Ukrainian city of Kremenchuk. At least 18 innocent people were killed and scores injured, (BBC, June 28). At the time, the G 7 was meeting in the Bavarian Alps. With his. long-distance strike on a nonmilitary object, Putin signaled to the world that he did not care a fig about international public opinion. But he was progressing by leaps and bounds in digging his own grave!
Ukrainian President Zelensky described the strike as one of the “most brazen terrorist attacks in European history.”
The leaders of the G 7 group of richest nations condemned the brutal attack as “abominable”. Putin’s war in Ukraine is now in the fifth month and it has now become clear that among the movers and shakers in the domestic and international arenas, Putin’s role is crucial, if not paramount.
In a succinct and brilliant essay in the prestigious Foreign Affairs, journal Vladislav Zubok [professor of International History at the London School of Economics] narrates the lessons of the collapse of the Soviet Union in general, and the reasons for Putin’s decisionmaking in particular.
Zubok sets the record straight and corrects the faulty reading of history by Western intellectuals. He makes clear that the Soviet Union did not collapse for the various attributed reasons: a humiliating defeat in Afghanistan, military pressure from the U.S. and Europe, nationalistic tensions in the constituent republics of the S.U., and the siren song of democracy. In fact, it was because of the misguided economic policies and a series of political missteps by the ‘darling of the West’, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that caused the Soviet empire to selfdestruct.
Putin has really learned very much from the implosion of the Soviet Union.
In contrast to the Soviet state, Putin’s regime is still carrying on despite intense international sanctions. At the same time, Putin’s Russia features a very different combination of resilience and vulnerability than that which characterized the S.U. in its final stages.
According to Professor Zubok, the West is on the wrong foot by projecting its misconceptions about the Soviet collapse onto present-day Russia.
How the West can Undermine Putin
alliance and made Putin’s Russia look like a kleptocratic third rate power.
Putin thuggishly and blatantly miscalculated by invading Ukraine and thereby exposed the regime’s major vulnerabilities – an economy that is much more interdependent with Western economies than its Soviet predecessor ever was.
Moreover, in contrast, Putin established a highly concentrated political system that lacks the tools for political and military mobilization possessed by the Soviet Communist Party.
The longer Putin’s war of choice grinds on, Russia will become a less powerful international actor.
A prolonged invasion could even possibly lead to the kind of chaos that brought down the Soviet Union, but defeat is likely to be more prolonged.
Lessons of the Soviet Experience Zubok argues that the Soviet Union was destroyed not so much by its structural faults as by the Gorbachev-era reforms themselves.
Glasnost & Perestroika [or ‘openness’ and ‘restructuring’] unleashed entrepreneurial energy but not in a way that created a new market economy and filled shelves for Soviet consumers. Rather, it paved the way for oligarchic kleptocracy. [Similarly, the dawn of a new political era in Nepal after the Palace Massacre or 2001, ushered in “Loktantric Kleptocracy”]. Gorbachev’s attempts liberalization were intentioned but
Putin himself was lamenting something that was unavoidable when he claimed that “the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century.
In the first half of his rule, in stark contrast to his predecessors Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, macroeconomic stability and a balanced budget were among his top priorities. However, the primary purpose of his sound financial policymaking was to bolster his power.
When Putin singlehandedly decided to invade Ukraine in February this year, he firmly believed Russia’s large financial reserves would allow the country to ride out whatever sanctions resulted. Until now he has been proved correct.
In the short term, therefore, it is unlikely that the West’s harsh sanctions will conquer the ruble and force the Kremlin to yield.
Divide & Conquer?
at well
During the Soviet political crisis of 1990-91, members of the middle and upper classes played a huge role in bringing about the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
A new Russian elite that embraced a ‘new nationalism’ and opposed the Soviet old guard allied itself with the country’s ‘knowledge workers’ and intelligentsia to help bring down the Soviet empire.
Gorbachev encouraged such political activism, but not Putin. Putin does not tolerate political opposition. He has had opponents poisoned, exterminated and arrested, like Alexei Navalny. Russia’s security services are ruthlessly efficient in suppressing protests and demonstrations.
In any case, only the urbanites in large cities culturally connected to the West – comprising just one-fifth of the population – are the source of opposition to Putin. The other sections of Russian society, second, the residents of poorer industrial cities, nostalgic for the Soviet past; third, those living in declining rural towns; and fourth, the multi-ethnic non-Russians of the North Caucasus [including Chechnya] and southern Siberia; overwhelmingly support Putin because they depend on subsidies from the state and adhere to traditional values.
Many from the first section have voted with their feet; the invasion has done little to erode Putin’s support among the other three segments – no need to engage in mass repression to keep himself in command.
Putin has also been helped by Russia’s turbulent history that has led most of its people to want a strong leader and consolidation of the country.
Putin Faces No Challenge from Elites
The mood of the so-called Russian elite – a kaleidoscope of senior officials, business executives, journalists and intellectuals is somber – the sense that the country’s future is out of their hands (NYT/Anton Troianovski, June 25-26).
Almost no Russian billionaire/ business magnate [“oligarch”] has spoken out forcefully against Putin’s, fearing his certain repression and retribution, although the economy has suffered greatly from the war. Many Russian business owners and intellectuals voted with their feet and fled after the invasion to the UAE, Turkey and Germany. This “brain drain” will have a long-term effect if they do not return.
Mounting Pressure on Putin
Zubok allows that the Soviet Union’s collapse may not offer a preview of Russia’s trajectory. However, in the long term, the West’s actions will definitely have an impact on the country’s future.
1. The sanctions will cause Russia’s economy to shrink as supply chain disruptions mount.
2. The Russian militaryindustrial complex may continue to go unimpeded for now, but will eventually face shortages and hamper crucial exports [a severe danger sign for India which is highly dependent on Russian armaments].
3. The Russian energy sector has largely escaped the penalties, and as prices soar, it is making more money on exports than it did before the war. However, energy output will also deteriorate. The energy sector, too, will need spare parts and technological upgrades that only the West can supply.
If the West stays united and maintains the sanctions regime resolutely, then – so Zubok – Putin’s war chest will gradually shrink.
No Danger to Taiwan’s Status Quo
There is growing concern in the Western establishment – civilian and military – that China is preparing to attack Taiwan in the near future.
Putin’s war in Ukraine has intensified these fears.
However, Andrew J. Nathan [professor of Political Science at
Columbia University] has convincingly argued in a ground-breaking essay in Foreign Affairs (June 23) that fears of an imminent Chinese attack on the selfgoverning island nation are hugely misplaced. Prof. Nathan makes the compelling point that for decades, China’s policy toward Taiwan has been characterized by strategic patience, from the East China Sea to India to the South China Sea.
He is convinced the war in Ukraine will reinforce Beijing’s commitment to playing the long game, from the point of view of geostrategic realpolitik: “The price Moscow has paid, both militarily and in the form of international isolation, is but a fraction of what China could expect if it were to attempt to take Taiwan by force.”
The Waiting Game
First, from Beijing’s point of view, it can afford to wait for strategic power in the Western Pacific to tilt decisively in its favour. The time will come when
Washington finally realizes that the cost of defending Taiwan is beyond its means. Concurrently, Taiwanese leaders come to the conclusion that Washington no longer has the wherewithal or interest for an armed conflict with China. Consequently, Taiwan could pragmatically negotiate a political arrangement that was acceptable to Beijing. Second, contrary to the common Western perception that China is thirsting for war, Beijing has demonstrated that it is willing to wait patiently.
China has used diplomatic, economic and military “gray zone tactics” to change the status quo without triggering an armed conflict in the South China Sea, the contested Senkaku Islands [Chinese: Diaoyu Islands]. The only exception was the fighting in India’s Ladakh region, which can be attributed to the excessive enthusiasm of the local Chinese military stationed there. “That same strategic caution has so far been evident in China’s policy toward Taiwan, where Beijing has dialed up tension and deterred a Taiwanese drive for independence without precipitating a crisis” (Nathan).
The lesson that China’s Xi is learning from Putin’s protracted war in Ukraine is that territorial aggression is both difficult and costly. Unlike Putin, Xi is not isolated by ‘yes men’ who tell him that the war over Taiwan can be easily won [strengthening his own conviction ].
And unlike in Russia, China has robust institutional structures in both the party and government with experienced and knowledgeable national security experts to inform [and possibly rein in] the presidentcumgeneral secretary. As the great Irish playwright George Bernard Shah wrote: “Beware of false knowledge; it is more dangerous than ignorance.”
The grinding conflict in Ukraine makes it crystal clear that war is unpredictable and rule over a resisting population is ruinous. “The amphibious operation China would need to undertake to seize Taiwan would be far more difficult than the land invasion Russia has carried out in Ukraine” (Nathan).
The post-war scenario for the Chinese economy would not only be devastating in itself, it would threaten domestic political stability – perhaps the death-knell for the CCP.
Nathan sees a prolonged standoff in the Taiwan Strait as the most likely prospect for the foreseeable future. And the side with the nerve and patience to hold on will probably succeed. Here the dictum of the ancient strategist Suntzu has validity:
“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”