Sino-American Standoff: Neither Confrontation nor Conflict, but Cooperation Necessary
In one of the most versatile and brilliant essays in Foreign Affairs, Jessica Chen Weiss (professor of China and AsiaPacific Studies at Cornell University) has underlined the urgent necessity of course correction in U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis China (September/ October 2022).
Competition with China is foremost in the minds of U.S. decision-makers.
They are focused so much on countering China that “they risk losing sight of the affirmative interests and values that should underpin U.S. strategy”, according to Prof. Weiss. America’s current course will bring manifold dangers: - Internationally, indefinite deterioration of US-Chinese relations and a growing danger of catastrophic conflict - Globally, it also threatens to undermine the sustainability of U.S. leadership in the world;
And not to underestimate - Domestically, the vitality of American society and democracy at home.
On the one hand, Weiss argues that a more powerful China has become the central concern of policymakers and strategists in Washington and other world capitals.
On the other, under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has grown more authoritarian at home and more coercive abroad.
The instinct in Washington to “counter every Chinese initiative, project and provocation remains predominant, crowding out efforts to revitalize an inclusive system that would protect U.S. interests and values even as global power shifts and evolves.” Thus, even as Putin’s unprovoked war in Ukraine claims considerable U.S. attention and resources, the war’s broader effect has been to intensify focus on geopolitical competition, reinforced by Sino-Russian convergence.
Both Washington and Beijing claim to want to avoid a new Cold War. The fact is that both adversaries are already engaged in a global struggle.
The U.S. seeks to perpetuate its pre-eminence and an international system that favours its interests and values. China sees U.S. global leadership as weakened by hypocrisy and neglect, providing an opening to convince other nations to accept China’s influence and legitimacy.
Unfortunately, on both sides, there is growing passive acceptance that confrontation or even conflict is unavoidable, and perhaps even about Weiss argues that U.S. should judge its policies on the basis of whether they further progress towards a better, desired world rather than whether they undermine some Chinese interest or provided some advantage over Beijing. An inclusive and affirmative global vision requires meaningful bilateral discussions, not only about crisis communications and risk reduction but also about plausible terms of coexistence and the future of the international system – a future that Beijing must necessarily have a role in shaping.
Is Sino-American Rivalry Inevitable?
In Washington, the standard view is that the US-China relations have deteriorated because China has changed.
It is also a question of China’s growing clout and Xi’s way of using that clout.
At the same time, Washington has met Beijing’s actions with a wide range of punitive actions and protective policies, from tariffs and sanctions to restrictions on commercial and scientific exchanges.
In the process, the U.S. has further drifted from the principles of openness and nondiscrimination.
The U.S. has also wavered in its support for the international institutions and agreements that have long structured global since both sides have adopted a more combative approach, it has produced a “mirroring dynamic”.
Prof. Graham Allison has explained the growing Sino-American tensions through structural shifts in the balance of power – the Thucydides Trap: the notion that when a rising state challenges an established power, a war for hegemony frequently results [analogy of the struggle between Athens and Sparta in Ancient Greece].
However, such a focus on capabilities alone cannot explain the twists and turns in Sino-American relations, which are also “driven by shifting perceptions of threat, opportunity and purpose.” During the era of Deng Xioping’s “lying low strategy”, Chinese leaders saw a strategic opportunity to prioritize China’s development in a stable international environment.
The global financial crisis of 2008 was the turning point for China’s awareness that the West had made a mess of economic governance.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became increasingly fixated on the idea that foreign forces were intent on obstructing China’s rise.
Manifestations of a broader conception of “national interest” animated by fears of domestic unrest came to the fore.
China abandoned any semblance of strategic humility. It became more assertive in defending its territorial and maritime claims. It also overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010 [Germany remaining fourth-largest]. It also began to exert its economic power in compliance with CCP aims and interests.
US Policies and Actions under Three Presidents
Observing China’s growing capabilities and willingness to use them, the Obama administration started its policy of neo-containment and announced that it would “pivot” to Asia.
It showed little willingness to grant China a significant voice in the international system. Donald Trump made a complete mess of U.S. China policy. He took Abgrenzung [=hedging off] to extremes.
In the US perspective, Communist China was out to only exploit the United States, dominate the world and subvert democracy.
Consequently, the Trump administration started a trade war, began to talk of “decoupling” the two major world economies, and started initiatives to counter Chinese influence and undermine the CCP.
Some officials even talked of regime change.
In contrast to Trump’s unilateralism, the Biden administration stopped any talk of regime change and took a multilateral approach. Unfortunately, it continued many of the previous policies, especially the assessment that China’s growing influence must be stopped. It firmly believes that the U.S. and its allies will not accept China as a superpower. This has led to “both U.S. and Chinese decision-makers believe that the other side respects only strength and interprets restraint as weakness.”
“The Centre Cannot Hold”
Prof. Weiss firmly believes that even if the U.S. and China can avoid a crisis, the continuation of the current baleful course will reinforce geopolitical divisions while inhibiting cooperation on global problems.
This is especially true since the U.S. is increasingly focused on rallying countries around the world to stand against China. [In the case of Nepal this is a hopeless undertaking!].
The unfortunate side-effect is that the current US approach to bilateral competition will also strength the Sino-Russian alignment.
It is essential for the world at large that the United States and China achieve a détente – as did the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Early in the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy, hailed the need to “make the world safe for diversity” and stressed that “our attitude is as essential as theirs.” His warning to Americans then is still a burning issue and just as prescient: “not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible, and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.”
Who or What will Achieve Regime Change in Russia?
In an opinion piece in The New York Times (NYT), the Russian journalist, Oleg Kashin has stated that currently no one can/ will get rid of Vladimir Putin (August 19).
It is fanciful to think that Putin will suddenly declare an end to the war on Ukraine and withdraw his troops because the war is a result of his personal obsession, and it’s hardly likely that he will voluntarily agree to end it.
It is equally imaginative to hope that a Russia without Putin revises his policies, ends the war and begins to re-build relations with Ukraine and the West on a peaceful new foundation as a result of regime change in Moscow.
Both developments are highly unlikely.
Putin’s power is just as solid six months into the war; his approval ratings are still very high and he doesn’t have a single opponent whose voice can be heard.
Kashin writes that of his two most likely successors – Mikhail Mishustin, the prime minister, and Aleksi Navalny, the prominent opposition leader – one is bound by deep loyalty and dependence to the president, and the other is in a penal colony.
Short of a sudden change of heart [his ex-wife said Putin was born under the astrological sign of the vampire!] or medical emergency, he will remain fully in control.
For years, domestic and international critics relied on endemic corruption to galvanize opposition to Putin.
For a while, Navalny’s approach made some inroads, but not enough.
For as Kashin writes so compellingly: “Corruption is the glue that holds the system together, not the catalyst to bring it down.”
Putin based his power on the thievery and embezzlement of his subordinates. His aim was not to ensure their comfort and wellbeing but to “bind the ruling class within a conspiratorial system of collective solidarity.”
Putin erected such a condition of complicity that no one could emerge to challenge him. Furthermore, corruption in Russia is like a system of incitement and blackmail. If you are loyal and Putin is pleased with you, you may steal to your heart’s content. However, if you are disloyal and have the temerity to criticize, you’ll be thrown in prison for theft!
The Ukraine war had the potential to upend this calculus.
Not a single group in Russia was more kleptocrats – but their hands are bound!
His military escapade has had a devastating impact on the lives of the establishment elite, on whom he has always relied. But these very elites are incapacitated by their own dependence on power for their wealth and security, find themselves in no position to challenge Putin.
Kashin points out that wars often bring out a new elite among officers and generals. But this is not happening in Russia.
In fact, Putin has surrounded himself with favoured security personnel whose loyalty to him is beyond question.
Therefore, Russia’s functionaries can do little than play the waiting game.
It is a given that members of the ruling elite cannot/will not topple Putin. It is the same with the professional middle classes. Things are no better at the popular level. The initially promising protests against the war have been brutally suppressed. Threats of prison time are also a disincentive. The Single, Possible Threat to Putin’s Regime: The Ukrainian Military!
Russian journalist Kashin concedes that the only factor seriously threatening Putin’s hang on power is the Ukrainian Army. “Only losses at the front have a realistic chance of bringing change to the political situation in Russia – as Russian history well attests”.
After defeat in the Crimean War in the mid-19th century, Czar Alexander II was forced to introduce radical domestic reforms.
Defeat in the unpopular Russo-Japanese War led to the [First] Russian Revolution of 1905.
A long period of repression and unrest, compounded with the reluctance of the Russian people to continue to fight in World War I, led to the October Revolution. Perestroika and Glasnost [restructuring & openness] in the Soviet Union was driven in large part by the failure of the war in Afghanistan.
If Ukraine manages to inflict heavy losses on Russian forces, history may indeed repeat itself and wide-ranging domestic reforms in Russia could unfold – leading finally to regime change.