A gaze into Gaza’s violence
Massey University Middle East politics specialist explains how the current Middle East crises relates to the people, history and shifting power relations in the area.
THE RENEWED outbreak of violence between Israel and the Gaza Strip is the latest intensification in the IsraelPalestine conflict.
It’s not a war between two countries (even though Palestine was admitted as a non-member observer state by the United Nations General Assembly in 2012 which New Zealand voted in favour of). Instead, like the campaigns that preceded it, Israel’s Operation Protective Edge is a hugely one-sided conflict pitting a subject people against the Middle East’s most powerful military.
Operation Protective Edge follows on the heels of the similar campaigns in recent years: Operation Pillar of Defence in 2012 and the much bigger Operation Cast Lead of 2008-09 that left 1400 Palestinians dead.
Hamas is an acronym derived from the Arabic for Islamic Resistance Movement. The group evolved from the Muslim Brotherhood – newly banned – in Egypt. Hamas emerged in its own right in 1987 during the early days for the first intifada, an uprising against the Israeli occupation. Hamas has ruled the Gaza Strip since a short but brutal fight with its Palestinian rival Fatah in 2007.
Like the Palestinian people, the Hamas leadership is dispersed. The group is currently led inside Palestine by Ismail Haniyeh and outside by Khaled Meshaal in Qatar. Egypt to the south. Just 360 square kilometres, Gaza is home to more than 1.8 million people, most of whom are refugees. Over 60 per cent of Gazans are under 25 and their numbers are growing fast.
Benjamin Netanyahu has been Prime Minister since 2009. He heads the right-wing party Likud in a coalition government which supports the concept of Israeli settlements in Gaza and other territories occupied during the 1967 Six-Day War. The current mood in Israel means the political pressure on Netanyahu doesn’t come from the centre or the left but from the far right.
Egypt. Former military chief, now president Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has overseen a systematic crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and is no friend of its Palestinian offshoot Hamas. This contrasts sharply with hostilities in 2012 when the Brotherhood governed in Cairo and intervened quickly in Gaza’s defence. Sisi did broker a ceasefire but pointedly did not consult Hamas in the process; in turn, Hamas rejected his efforts.
Arafat symbolised Palestine but his standing had eroded before he died in 2004. Hamas bitterly opposed the Oslo process overseen by Arafat and Fatah since 1993. The process did permit the Palestine Liberation Organisation to establish and run the Palestinian Authority but this would not translate into independence for the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, Israel greatly accelerated settlement construction. That combined with mismanagement and the Oslo fiasco left Arafat and Fatah discredited.
True. In 2005 Israel did withdraw its settlers and military from Gaza. But it did so unilaterally, refusing to negotiate or coordinate with the PA. This left Hamas to claim the credit. Hamas then won elections in 2006; Fatah tried to subvert the result and fearing a coup, Hamas moved first. Reconciliation attempts led just a few weeks ago to a neutral technocratic government that both Hamas and Fatah could support. The international community largely accepted this. Israel did not.
The immediate trigger was the kidnap and murder of three teenage Israelis hitchhiking from a settlement in the West Bank; Israel blamed Hamas although it is not clear it was directly responsible. The killings prompted a massive search operation in which six Palestinians were killed and hundreds were arrested; many were re-arrested after being released in previous deals. In East Jerusalem, Palestinian teenager Mohammad Abu Khdeir was kidnapped and burned to death; three Israelis, two of them teenagers, are reported to have confessed. Hamas responded with rocket fire from Gaza into southern Israel. In the longer run, Israel remains hostile to Hamas as the group refuses to formally recognize it, to abide by the terms of the Oslo process or to renounce armed struggle.
The US has more leverage with Israel than any other country although this appears to be waning. President Barack Obama has called for a renewal of the ceasefire whilst stressing that Israel has a right to defend itself. During two terms in office, the Obama administration has tried to broker fresh Israel-PLO negotiations and at times pressed Israel to halt settlement construction and release Palestinian prisoners; the results have been minimal. In the meantime, Israel benefits to a unique extent from US economic, military and diplomatic support.
The UN Security Council has called for a restoration of the 2012 ceasefire. The High Commissioner for Human Rights has asserted that Israeli actions are probably in breach of international law. The UN reports that up to 80 per cent of casualties are thought to be civilian, many of them children.
Yes, but to which level precisely will only become apparent as the scale and duration of the invasion unfold. The opening moves have included barrages across the Gaza Strip with a focus on the north; if the aerial campaign centered on rocket launching sites the ground invasion is now targeting tunnels. The risk of casualties among Palestinian combatants and civilians increases with a ground invasion; elements in Hamas may welcome the development as an opportunity to confront Israeli forces directly.
No, although the two groups do have a few surface features in common: Both are Islamic with a political agenda; both are Sunni Muslim; and both confront Middle Eastern enemies backed by the US. But Hamas is basically Palestinian nationalist – first and foremost it wants to liberate Palestine (or at least the West Bank and Gaza occupied by Israel in 1967). Hamas rule in Gaza is conservative and perhaps dour but ideologically it does not approach the radicalism of ISIS. Hamas has more pressing concerns than the caliphate.