A rescue against the odds
officer, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Webb, absorbed information and passed it on to Sector West.
What was obvious to me as chief of staff, to the planners, and to those about to conduct the mission was that the situation in Atambua was far from clear.
We knew roughly how many were to be collected, but not their precise physical state, nor the militia state of mind at that point, nor the attitude of the local TNI. We also needed to get airspace clearance from Indonesia.
The rescue
Blanchard and his battalion staff planned to start the rescue on the morning of September 6.
‘‘The situation in Atambua appeared calm, but tense, and the UN staff were incredibly fearful of immediate future attacks on them,’’ Blanchard said.
The SAS tracking team received a hurried briefing from Guiney, as they were driving to the helicopters.
Going into the unknown, Guiney ordered they go fully combat-kitted with all gear, including rocket launchers.
At 5.02pm the rescue started, with the liftoff of the three Iroquois from Suai, under the command of Squadron Leader Mark Cook. They carried the 10-strong tracking team.
Blanchard, flying separately in an Australian Kiowa, light observation helicopter, would provide a communications re-transmission facility from the ground rescue forces to the HQs monitoring the operation, plus overall command of the rescue. Being in an Australian helicopter, he would not cross the border.
Cook recalled that, despite being prepared, the team didn’t really know where they were going.
‘‘We had no idea what the payload would be, and only started to get information halfway there. The numbers for collection changed about three times.’’
As they closed in on Atambua, concerns drifted through the minds of those about to take part in the rescue. What to do if the helicopters broke down?
What if the militia launched a counter-attack against the small tracking team? Would they be able to get all the hostages out on the three helicopters available? And before last light? What if they have to fight their way on foot back to the border? Looking back, Blanchard said the ground forces would have had to pretty much look after themselves in the short-term if things went pearshaped.
At 5.17pm the rescue team crossed the border into Indonesian airspace, and West Timor.
In the spirit of Anzac mateship, Commanding Officer of the Australian Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mick Moon, advised Blanchard that, in the event of a life-threatening emergency on the ground in Atambua, then he would be ready to send in one of his companies of mechanised infantry and Aslavs with 25mm canons.
That simple gesture highlighted the ‘‘will do’’ attitude of the Aussies, and the enormously strong relationship built between the Australian 6 RAR Battalion and the Kiwis.
Cook identified a clear area to land at Atambua near the UNHCR compound. Two Iroquois landed, while the third loitered in ‘‘overwatch’’. The tracking team and their gear were quickly
‘‘I could not work out why the Indons [Indonesians], who were assuring us the remaining staff were safe and secure, did not drive them to the border themselves. It seemed odd, unsettling even.’’ Captain Steve Guiney
unloaded. Into the unknown. The helicopters then left to join the overwatch and refuel rather than remain at risk on the ground.
On landing, the SAS team found that the TNI had set up a small perimeter where the UN staff and workers were being held. Some militia mingled with the crowds, observing.
Aiming not to stoke tensions, Guiney instructed his team to place their weapons to their sides – an unthreatening posture – but at full alert in case of aggression. The SAS formed a triangular defence. Guiney approached a knot of TNI officers. ‘‘The TNI generals/brass seemed to be preoccupied with something as I walked over to them in the compound,’’ Guiney said.
‘‘It took me a couple of attempts to get their attention.
‘‘They were polite, but in deep conversation – I suspect about the situation and how bad it looked in the ‘world’s eye’.
‘‘I suspect the TNI brass on the ground, were getting some heat from above.’’
The Indonesian officers were not angry with the Kiwis, but were very stressed with the general situation and the uncertainty of militia actions.
Guiney insisted on seeing the hostages and discovered some walking wounded.
‘‘They were petrified and still in shock at the loss of their colleagues.’’
With the help of cautious Indonesian soldiers, the SAS assembled the hostages into helicopter ‘‘packets’’ ready for loading. One worker was badly wounded.
A pre-determined codeword was relayed back to the helicopters to return for extraction.
The helicopters returned, evacuating 43 hostages in two ‘‘taps’’, or lifts, with one tracking team member as security in each helicopter.
Just before 6pm, all personnel – including the trackers – were heading back to Fort Balibo and the Australian casualty evacuation point. By last light all were safely back on the East Timor side of the border.
‘‘It was a long 40 minutes on the ground waiting for those helicopters to come back,’’ Guiney said. ‘‘And we weren’t confident they were coming back. But in the end, they did, so we shook hands with the TNI and returned.’’
On return to Suai, the rescue force was met by Brigadier Duncan Lewis who congratulated them on a job well done.
As the deployment area was an alcohol-dry mission, Lewis presented them with an uncharacteristic tray of Coca-Cola and chocolate bars.
The following day the TNI delivered the bodies of the three UN staff, plus another 49 UN staff and NGOs by road to the border with the Australians.
The courage and high standards shown by New Zealand personnel involved in the operation were highly praised.
The acting Chief of the Australian Defence Force, Lieutenant General Mueller, paid tribute to ‘‘the rapid response and concise execution of this sensitive and difficult task’’.
Forty-three hostages were rescued by the small detachment of Kiwi Defence Force members, flown in on the ageing-but-trusty Iroquois.
It was hastily planned; executed against the odds; literally into enemy territory (they had no real out if the Iroquois had broken down or the SAS were captured); with the ADF unable to do it, yet closer and better equipped; approved at the highest level in next-to-no time and with typically the NZ ‘‘give it a go’’ approach.
Aussie Battalion Commander Mick Moon sent a message following the successful rescue: ‘‘From CO and all ranks of AUSBATT [Australian Battalion] to all NZ pers[onnel], congrats and bloody well done on Evac Op Heliwan. Have processed some rattled but very grateful Evacuees.’’
Acknowledgements: NZDF imagery, Ron Crosby SAS: The First 50 Years, Steve Guiney, Mark Cook (RNZAF, retired), Lyndon Blanchard (NZ Army, retired), Mark Webb (ADF Colonel, retired), John Crawford and Glyn Harper Operation East Timor, Mick Moon (ADF Brigadier, retired).