Big-power rivalry gives islands more leverage
The leaders of the Marshall Islands, a collection of 29 coral atolls lying halfway between Hawaii and Australia, know exactly why the United States just agreed to a deal promising US$700 million (NZ$1.08 billion) in new support over four years.
‘‘It’s because of China. We’re not naive,’’ Marshallese Foreign Minister Kitlang Kabua says. Fishing and harvesting coconuts are not sufficient to support the country’s population of about 80,000.
For the past 40 years, the Marshall Islands has relied on financial assistance from its former coloniser, which carried out 67 nuclear tests on two Marshalls atolls in the 12 years after World War II.
The current 20-year treaty expires this year, and talks about a new deal were not going well last year. Then the Marshalls’ government got Washington’s attention when several top officials refused to attend treaty negotiations running alongside a high-level Pacific summit at the White House in September unless the Biden Administration agreed to a better deal.
The bargaining tactic worked – the administration dispatched high-level representatives to the islands for further negotiations, and a newer and much larger agreement was reached.
The case of the Marshall Islands is emblematic of the increasingly fervent geopolitical competition in the Pacific as the US and China jostle for influence.
The Biden Administration has acknowledged that Pacific islands got ‘‘short shrift’’ as the US focused its attention elsewhere. It is now rapidly trying to make up for lost time as China lavishes money and attention on many island nations in an attempt to grow its influence across the Pacific and reap economic, diplomatic and military gains.
‘‘We’re caught between two big powers, like a girl two boys are fighting over,’’ says Peterson
Jibas, a Marshallese senator and member of the country’s negotiating team.
This month, the Biden Administration agreed to the outlines of a formal deal, pledging US$700m to the Marshall Islands’ national trust fund to help foster economic development, support nuclear victims, and protect against climate change.
It is negotiating similar deals with two other Micronesian countries, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau.
Joseph Yun, Biden’s special envoy in the negotiations, insisted that a range of issues shaped his offer, including climate change and the Marshalls’ ‘‘steady’’ support of America. But he admitted: ‘‘It’s no secret – China is a factor.’’
The new agreement gives Washington significant control over Marshallese foreign policy, a veto over foreign military use of Marshallese territory – which, with Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, covers an expanse of ocean larger than the continental US – and a long-term lease over the land used for a critical American military base. In return, the US will provide
financial support, and allow Marshallese citizens visa-free access to America.
The islands’ leaders have long complained that previous deals did not adequately compensate them for the damage done by American nuclear testing. The US detonated the equivalent of 7000 Hiroshima bombs on Bikini and Enewetak atolls by 1958, causing heightened cancer rates, miscarriages, and ongoing resentment that lingered long after the fallout had cleared.
‘‘They say communism is bad, but China didn’t drop 67 bombs on us,’’ says Jibas, who represents Bikini and remains suspicious of his country’s main financial contributor. ‘‘America is like a white rat with red eyes.’’
Even after Micronesian countries gained independence in the late 20th century, Washington maintained control through agreements like the one with the Marshalls.
The imbalance of power meant the Marshall Islands previously struggled to press its case, Jibas says. ‘‘America is like an older brother. What do you do when he slaps you?’’
Yet such frustration co-exists alongside a degree of goodwill felt by others, born of the US’s long presence in Micronesia. Many Marshallese routinely refer to America as ‘‘the mainland’’.
That familiarity with America is matched by a general suspicion of China.
Beijing last year proposed a sweeping Pacific-wide economic and security agreement that would have led to increased trade and Chinese involvement in the training of regional police forces, among other things. While Pacific nations rejected the deal during a regional summit, several expressed interest in a modified version.
China has also notched significant wins with several individual Pacific nations.
Kiribati, which lies immediately south of the Marshall Islands, cut ties with Taiwan in favour of China in 2019, and signed as many as 10 agreements deepening relations during a visit by China’s foreign minister last May.
The Solomon Islands signed a controversial agreement allowing it to invite China to deploy armed police and military personnel there, sparking fears that China might construct a military base. Solomons officials have dismissed such concerns, but this has not assuaged Western fears.
At the same time, China has provided Kiribati and the Solomons with significant aid and financing.
Now the Marshall Islands is enjoying playing its stronger hand. In its most recent negotiations, ‘‘we were much more wary, we were less naive – we put our foot down and made our demands’’, Kabua says.
‘‘We found that this is how we operate with the US, and we found it to be effective.’’