New Zealand toughens stance on China’s claims in South China Sea
Over the last few months more than a few commentators at home and overseas have become highly sensitive to changes in the New Zealand Government’s China settings.
Statements about everything from Hong Kong, cyber-security, the origins of Covid-19, and the treatment of the Uyghurs have been subjected to forensic scrutiny.
Yet 10 days ago, perhaps lost amid a late deluge of Olympic medals, a significant development in New Zealand’s position on China’s claims in the South China Sea went largely unnoticed.
By submitting a statement or ‘‘note verbale’’ to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, New Zealand joined a growing number of countries, including Australia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, the UK, the US, and Vietnam, setting out their legal position on the South China Sea disputes.
In doing so, the Ardern Government has gone much further than it was previously willing to go in rejecting Beijing’s expansive territorial claims.
New Zealand has followed a fairly consistent approach on the South China Sea disputes for much of the past five years. It takes no position on the various claims to sovereignty. It has preferred to frame its concerns in general terms, typically calling on ‘‘all parties’’ to respect international law, eschew militarisation, and resolve things peacefully.
The 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Statement raised a few eyebrows with its extended description of worrying developments, but, as with many issues in its China relationship, Wellington has preferred predictable, ‘‘no surprises’’ diplomacy to public confrontation.
The recent statement doesn’t abandon that approach, but it arguably signals the biggest change since 2016 when an international tribunal ruled on the issue.
New Zealand’s note to the UN lays out in detail what the Government sees as the applicable international law. It underscores the importance of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the ‘‘definitive legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out’’. It reiterates clear support for the basic freedoms of navigation, overflight, and innocent passage.
But it goes further. Beijing argues that ‘‘historic rights’’ are the foundation of its claim over most of the South China Sea. New Zealand’s statement bluntly says ‘‘historic rights’’ claims have no basis in international law. It also rejects the assertion that artificial islands can generate a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or continental shelf.
China has criticised as ‘‘illegal and null and void’’ the 2016 verdict of a tribunal that ruled against it and in favour of the Philippines. New Zealand’s note makes it clear that Wellington regards the tribunal decision to be ‘‘final and binding on both parties’’. It pointedly reminds Beijing that ‘‘non-participation by one party does not constitute a bar on proceedings’’.
Why such a detailed and expansive discussion now? First, there is a growing sense that China is consolidating its position. In the five years since the Arbitral Tribunal made its historic ruling, Beijing has turned its artificial islands into military bases. It has used them to expand the reach of its air force, coast guard and maritime militia to harass fishing and survey vessels from other countries.
In March, for example, more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels tied up at
Whitsun Reef, a feature clearly inside the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone.
Second, maritime governance is under pressure, and not just in Asia’s waters. The Ardern Government’s new Maritime Security Strategy concludes, ‘‘New Zealand’s maritime security operating model is becoming increasingly stressed . . . in the face of a range of maritime security challenges characterised by climate stress, technological change and a more complex geopolitical environment’’.
The use of ‘‘grey zone’’ tactics – coercion designed to change the status quo but short of provoking war – is becoming more widespread.
There is growing concern that the tactics used in the South China Sea might be seen closer to home, in the Pacific or southern oceans. It was notable that the recent meeting of Pacific Islands Forum leaders endorsed a new declaration based on UNCLOS designed to protect existing maritime areas as sea-levels rise.
Finally, it’s surely no accident that New Zealand’s statement was released the same week that foreign ministers from across the region met for annual discussions at the East Asia Summit.
Maritime security was one of three priority issues Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta said she’d be raising with her counterparts. New Zealand’s closest Asean partners will be pleased to see
Wellington speaking up. The new language will be warmly welcomed in Canberra, Tokyo and Washington.
And, coincidentally, the UN Security Council just held its first open debate on maritime security – under India’s presidency. So there’s a shrewd bit of Indo-Pacific positioning as well.
So far there has been no public response from Beijing. But even if this issue passes quietly, expect the South China Sea to keep raising challenges. In January, China introduced a new Coast Guard Law. Parts of it appear to be troubling, especially when it comes to authorising the use of force in maritime disputes like those in the South or East China seas.
Several regional countries have already expressed concerns. Japanese Defence Minister Nobuo Kishi raised the issue in a videoconference call with his New Zealand counterpart, Peeni Henare, in April. You can bet that others will be doing the same.
And with one of New Zealand’s frigates back from a long and expensive refit in Canada, the dilemmas won’t just be legal ones. Much has been made of New Zealand’s upcoming engagement with the visiting British carrier strike group currently in the region.
Even Henare has made a rare public point on that issue. New Zealand naval vessels haven’t operated in the South China Sea since 2017.
What sort of a reception can they expect when they return to one of the focal points for maritime competition in Asia? At the very least, New Zealand’s sailors should be brushing up on what they know about the grey zone.
‘‘There is growing concern that the tactics used in the South China Sea might be seen closer to home, in the Pacific or southern oceans.’’
David Capie