Hu case pointer to security risks
NZ universities may boost Chinese military progress
Is our university system being used to augment China’s military development? This is the question Western governments around the world are grappling with, and now New Zealand is too.
The first outward sign of this was news the Security Intelligence Service and the New Zealand Immigration Service is investigating a Chinese PhD student, Hu Bin, at Auckland University of Technology. His research on 5G technology has military applications.
In a military conflict, 5G networks could be used as a weapon or point of attack. China is linked to multiple cyber attacks on the US and others, including New Zealand.
It has a dominant position in network infrastructure and is expanding this via the Digital Silk Road; part of the globespanning Belt and Road Initiative. The Digital Silk Road could provide enhanced missile positioning, timing and enhanced C4ISR capabilities for China, as well as navigation services to more than 69 countries, including partners in Oceania. Our Government is mulling whether to sign up to the Belt and Road Initiative.
Hu apparently came to attention because under the Strategic Goods Regulations, New Zealand entities — including universities — cannot develop, produce or deploy any goods or knowhow with a military end use unless it has a permit from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade. New Zealand’s Strategic Goods Regulations are based on the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the control measures of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Wassenaar Arrangement signatories commit to not exporting dual-use goods, technologies, or know-how, to non-Wassenaar members. China is not a member.
China is New Zealand’s largest export market, absorbing 22 per cent of all our exports. It is also our largest market for foreign students and sixth-largest foreign scientific research partner.
Our Government has long encouraged universities to partner Chinese counterparts on science and technology projects. New Zealand and China signed a Science and Technology Co-operation Agreement in 1987, updated in 2003. The New Zealand-China Strategic Research Alliance (SRA) was set up in 2010. It aims to increase scientific research partnerships and greater commercialisation of science between the two nations. Most of these partnerships are benign. However, cases like that of the AUT PhD student show areas of concern where research links have a possible military end use application.
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) institutions, including PLA-affiliated and linked universities, work closely with non-military universities and companies in China. Through contacts abroad, Chinese universities and companies provide a channel that can allow the PLA to benefit from research outside China.
In recent years most of New Zealand’s universities have established partnerships with Chinese universities linked to the PLA. These range from the PLA Institute of Military Culture (Massey); the National University of Defence Technology (Auckland, Massey); North-western Polytechnical University (Canterbury), Shenyang Aerospace University (UNITEC), to Xidian University (Otago, VUW). A similar pattern of relationships is found in Australia.
New Zealand academics supervise doctoral students who were graduates of PLAlinked universities before coming here, and host graduate students and staff working at such institutions on short-term fellowships. Some Kiwi academics have joint appointments or advisory roles at PLA-linked universities.
Several New Zealand universities are in partnership with Chinese companies, such as Iflytek and Huawei, who are understood to have links with the Chinese military sector.
New Zealand needs to reexamine its policies on encouraging scientific exchanges with Chinese universities in light of China’s changed policies to merge military and civil research.
Connections between Chinese military-affiliated universities and our universities expose us to potential security risks. Some links potentially breach our international obligations forbidding the export of military end use goods, technologies and know-how. They may also have a negative impact on international sources of funding, if funding providers are uncomfortable that knowledge obtained could be shared with China.
Our universities must partner with the Government to find a solution that will uphold academic freedom and intellectual property rights, while dealing with the security concerns.