Bloodthirsty jihadists destroying themselves
The jihadists in Iraq are winning for now but are breaking the rules for long-term success laid down by Osama bin Laden, writes
THE Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Isis) is scaring the hell out of everyone. It has infested Syria, overrun Iraq, alarmed Iran and convinced United States politicians it’s the most dangerous terrorist organisation ever.
But frightening everyone isn’t a long-term growth strategy. Al Qaeda, the organisation from which Isis recently split, understands this truth. For years, Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants tried to explain to their affiliates the folly of unchecked brutality.
In letters and directives captured in the 2011 raid on his compound, bin Laden stressed the importance of patience, discretion and public opinion. His advice, boiled down to seven rules, forms a clear outline of Isis’ mistakes: Bin Laden recognised that battling for territory against local governments was a lousy way to get to theocracy. He wrote that as people got killed survivors would want the fighting to stop and ‘‘this would promote the ideology of secular governments that raise the motto of pleasing all sides’’. Isis, also known as Isil, rejects this rule. It calls itself a state. It measures its progress in territory. It’s trying to control as many as 100,000 square kilometres with an estimated 10,000 fighters. That was bin Laden’s principal regret. He called for guidelines that would instruct jihadists to avoid ‘‘unnecessary civilian casualties’’. Mass bombings in mosques and other public places, he lamented, had resulted in ‘‘the alienation of most of the nation from the Mujahidin’’.
Isis spurns this guidance. It has slaughtered civilians in Syria and Iraq, according to Human Rights Watch and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. It targets not just enemy soldiers but anyone who has worked for the government. In
Isis advertises its savagery. It chops off people’s heads.
Syria, an important cleric renounced Isis because it blew up children and other civilians. In Iraq, Baathists fighting alongside Isis have promised to restrain it from killing ‘‘innocent people’’. One of the captured al Qaeda letters, believed to have been written by Bin Laden or his aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, urges al Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate to ‘‘stay away from words that will affect the people’s support to the mujahidin’’.
Isis advertises its savagery. It chops off people’s heads. It vows to kill every Shi’ite. It posts videos in which captives are shot dead and moving cars are machine-gunned. A week ago, Isis uploaded photos purporting to show its fighters executing 1700 captured Iraqi soldiers. ‘‘The filthy Shi’ites are killed in the hundreds,’’ said one caption. ‘‘The liquidation of the Shi’ites who ran away from their military bases,’’ said another. ‘‘This is the destiny of Maliki’s Shi’ites,’’ said a third. ‘‘Look at them walking to death on their own feet,’’ said a fourth. It’s hard to imagine propaganda better designed to repulse the public and galvanise the enemy. Bin Laden was a theocratic fundamentalist, but he cautioned his allies to avoid the ‘‘alienation from harshness’’ that was ‘‘taking over the public opinion’’.
When Isis captures a city, it follows this rule at first. But soon, the nice-guy act disappears. The group seizes property and humanitarian aid. It executes Christian and Muslim ‘‘apostates’’. Two days after taking Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, Isis banned booze and cigarettes, instructed women to stay home and said that government employees who failed to repent would be put to death. In his 2010 letter, bin Laden warned: ‘‘The issue of providing for basic needs is a matter that must be taken into consideration before taking control of nations or cities.’’
Isis pays no heed to this guidance. Its founding literature says that for people who fall under its dominion, ‘‘improving their conditions is less important than the condition of their religion’’. In Fallujah, a city Isis has controlled for six months, the Red Cross reports ‘‘a severe shortage of food, water and health care.’’ Bin Laden tried to rein in the fratricidal belligerence of Isis’ precursor organisation, al Qaeda in Iraq. He asked his associates to ‘‘resolve any conflicts between all of the Jihadi entities in Iraq’’.
The lesson is lost on Isis. It refused to co-operate with al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, the Nusra Front. It attacks other Syrian rebels. In 2010, bin Laden advised his followers in Yemen not to escalate the war there, in part because ‘‘the emergence of a force in control of the Mujahidin in Yemen is a matter that provokes our enemies internationally and locally and puts them on a great state of alert’’. The Saudi rulers, once alerted, would ‘‘pump huge funds into recruiting the Yemeni tribes to kill us’’.
Now the Syrian military, which had previous steered clear of Isis, is bombing Isis militants in Iraq. Thousands of Shi’ites are signing up to reinforce the Iraqi Army. The United States and Iran – sworn enemies for decades – are exploring a limited partnership to stymie Isis’ advance.
Eight years ago, jihadists in Iraq made the same mistakes. They alienated the public and were driven out by tribes that had fought alongside them.
Now the jihadists are back to doing what they do best: destroying lives, communities and themselves.