The ‘Iron Lady’ fought war on her terms
Britain’s firstwomanprime minister threatened her allies and rejected their advice in her determination to regain the Falklands. JACKMALVERNREPORTS.
The race to prevent Argentina from obtaining more Exocet missiles at the height of the Falklands conflict led British prime minister Margaret Thatcher to issue stark threats to her allies as well as consider a plot worthy of a James Bond film.
Files opened yesterday at the National Archives show that, behind the scenes, Thatcher had to threaten French president Francois Mitterrand, rebuff United States president Ronald Reagan and entertain an ‘‘expensive and dirty’’ plan to disrupt Argentina’s arms deals.
The single greatest threat to British forces as they attempted to reverse Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands in 1982 was the French-made Exocet, against which Royal Navy ships had little or no defence. At the beginning of the war Argentina had five, including one that was used to cripple HMS Sheffield, and was seeking more.
When Thatcher learned that a batch of Exocets was due to leave France for Peru, one of Argentina’s allies, she demanded that Mitterrand halt the shipment.
Although Thatcher and Mitterrand had a warm relationship in public, she dispatched a secret telegram on May 30, two weeks before the Argentine surrender, warning of dire consequences if he failed to stop the missiles.
‘‘If it became known, as it certainly would, that France was now releasing weapons to Peru that would certainly be passed on to Argentina for use against us, France’s ally, this would have a devastating effect on the relationship between our two countries,’’ she wrote in a document declassified under the 30-year rule.
‘‘Indeed, it would have a disastrous effect on the Alliance as a whole.’’
Mitterrand almost certainly complied. Thatcher later wrote in her memoirs that the French president was an ‘‘absolutely staunch’’ ally. ‘‘I was to have many disputes with President Mitterrand in later years, but I never forgot the debt we owed him for his personal support throughout the Falklands crisis.’’
Fears of Argentina mounting a counter-attack continued until at least early July, when Thatcher was briefed by attorney-general Sir Michael Havers about a scheme to hijack aircraft carrying missiles to Argentina.
He wrote to her on July 1. ‘‘The risk of resupply to the Argentines of further air-to-sea missiles justifies consideration of all options to prevent this – even the most way-out, which may be thought to be more appropriate to a James Bond movie!’’
Havers, who had spoken to a friend in the air freight business, was convinced that arms sold to Argentina could be diverted by infiltrating cargo airlines.
‘‘The profits [of an arms shipment] can be enormous and will attract the cowboy carriers in circumstances where the exporting country will not want to risk its own aircraft for publicity reasons,’’ he wrote. ‘‘If we can discover a situation where the freight is being offered to the cowboys . . . [My friend can] get the job but with the condition [not unusual] that the ‘loadmaster’ is a man whom he nominates.
‘‘If this can be agreed, the loadmaster has total control over the flight and, therefore, could redirect the aircraft in transit to [for example] Bermuda. This will cost money [this is an expensive dirty business] but would, in my view, be cheap at the price.’’
It is unclear whether this plot was ever put into action.
Thatcher also had to rebuff unwelcome diplomacy from Reagan. The US president rang her at 11.30pm on June 1 in a telephone call that became increasingly awkward.
Diplomacy rebuffed:
No-one was available to write a transcript, but Thatcher relayed the conversation to John Coles, her private secretary for overseas affairs.
His memo shows that she rejected Reagan’s suggestions for talks with Argentina three times.
Each of Thatcher’s rejections of Reagan’s suggestions for a ceasefire and multinational peacekeeping force was more emphatic than the last.
‘‘The prime minister said that she understood the president’s fears but as Britain had had to go into the Islands alone, with no outside help, she could not now let the invader gain from his aggression. She was sure that the president would act in the same way if Alaska had similarly been threatened.’’
Thatcher ended the call by saying that Argentina must withdraw without further negotiation.
‘‘There was no alternative,’’ she said.