Undiplomatic What US diplomats really thought about NZ
David Lange was fascinating, Robert Muldoon shrewd, and Kiwis marvellous if a little selfrighteous, according to documents in an American archive. By Will Harvie.
The United States secretary of state – the nation’s highest diplomat – ‘‘does not get up every morning and ask how things are in New Zealand’’, said Josiah Beeman, American ambassador to New Zealand 1994-1999.
But lots of American diplomats did ask those questions because they were stationed here or had New Zealand responsibilities in Washington DC or places like Canberra. Happily, what these lower-ranked American diplomats thought about New Zealand has been preserved in the Oral History Collection of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training in Washington.
It is here we learn, for example, that prime minister David Lange ‘‘did not have any core principles’’, in the view of Paul Cleveland, US ambassador to New Zealand, 1986-1989. ‘‘Our meetings were pleasant enough,’’ said Cleveland, but ‘‘we never trusted him.’’
Of the more than 2000 interviews in the archive, New Zealand is discussed in about 50.
These date from 1949-99 and by far the most common questions asked of these former diplomats concerned nuclear-armed ships, which dominated NZ-US
relations in the 1980s but which had earlier origins.
‘‘New Zealand, beginning in the 1960s, fancied itself as clean, green and nuclear free,’’ said Alphonse La Porta, deputy chief of mission, Wellington, 1987-1991. ‘‘We used to say, only half in jest, that New Zealand was the westward extension of the protest movements in California. If all the Leftists in La La Land wanted a nice haven to go to, they would just go to New Zealand.’’
Prime minister Robert Muldoon would ask the US to send nuclear ships to this country, according to Anne Martindell, US ambassador, 1979-1981. ‘‘I need a ship, I need a ship,’’ he would say. ‘‘He wanted one so he could send the police out to clobber the protesters. This would build up his constituency.
Cleveland said: ‘‘He in effect ordered us to bring [a] ship into New Zealand as a show of contempt for the peaceniks . . . we had serious reservations about the wisdom of doing so.’’
‘‘Muldoon was a tremendously shrewd politician,’’ said Richard Dols, political counsellor in Wellington, 1977-1981. ‘‘He could con the shoes off anybody and he certainly did con the shoes off Ambassador [Armistead] Selden.’’
Martindell ‘‘never even got within speaking distance of the [NZ] Government’’, Dols said.
‘‘Before she left Washington, she was invited to the New Zealand embassy for a dinner at which Muldoon was present.
‘‘They sat next to each other. Muldoon liked to tipple a little heavily. Somewhere in the conversation he told Anne, who was somewhat of a feminist, ‘I don’t like lady politicians’. She was highly offended. What did she do but tell . . . the New York Times [about] that little episode.
‘‘Muldoon reacted, of course, vehemently because Labour then began castigating him in Parliament . . . So Muldoon in effect let it be known that he was going to have nothing to do with her, period. And he kept that promise.’’
Muldoon was voted out in 1984 and the Labour Party under Lange came to power. The new government implemented a policy that banned nuclear-propelled ships and ships carrying nuclear weapons from New Zealand waters.
Lange later passed legislation to this effect. The US was furious.
‘‘We read off to [Lange] the sanctions that would be taken against New Zealand if they persisted in their policy,’’ said John Glassman, country director, Australia and New Zealand affairs, Washington, in the mid 1980s.
‘‘Lange kept staring over our heads. We couldn’t understand what was happening. Lange was a very fat man, he probably weighed about 250-300 pounds, and we couldn’t figure out why he kept staring over our heads. We turned around and there was a plate of pastries on the shelf.’’
‘‘Lange [was] a fascinating character . . . He was one of the most witty men I have ever seen,’’ said James Morton, political counsellor, Wellington,
1984-1987. ‘‘One time he was asked about [US ambassador] Monroe Brown’s latest outrageous statement . . . Brown was a cattle rancher but he was also a horse breeder and he had a horse that he ran in the Melbourne Cup . . . The horse’s name was Lack of Reason.
‘‘Back to the press conference . . . someone said: ‘Prime Minister Lange, what do you think of Monroe Brown’s latest comments?’ He said, ‘Well, what do you think about a guy who names a horse after his country’s foreign policy?’ ’’
‘‘Well, [NZ] stuck to their guns [on nuclear-armed ships],’’ said William Lenderking, US Information Agency public affairs officer, 1984-1986. ‘‘But the sky didn’t fall.
‘‘New Zealanders are marvellous people and they have a lovely country but they also tend to be a little self-righteous and they saw themselves as leading a crusade to keep nuclear weapons away from the South Pacific, and beyond.’’
‘‘We reached an agreement with the Australians,’’ said Glassman. ‘‘[They] were pushing us very hard to take action against New Zealanders because the Australian Labor Party felt that this could be very contagious within their own party if New Zealand policy was allowed to stand without sanction.
‘‘It was agreed that we would suspend New Zealand from the Anzus alliance.’’
‘‘I’m afraid my hero, Secretary [of state George] Shultz, mishandled it,’’ said Phillip Mayhew, Australia and New Zealand affairs, Washington, 1988-1989. ‘‘Before this all blew up, we used to have regular consultations with the Australians and New Zealanders ...
‘‘When Shultz arrived for those talks in 1986, New Zealand had just elected a Labour government, and Shultz was pushing them to promise that they wouldn’t change their policy on this [nuclear ships] issue.
‘‘It was just the wrong moment to do so. They had just come into power and they were completely preoccupied with an internal crisis of their own because they were facing a sudden and major foreign currency crisis, and it was exactly the wrong moment to push them to make a complex foreign policy decision like that.
‘‘But we did, and they got their backs up and said no, and we reacted badly and it all went rapidly downhill. Looking back later, we wondered why in the world we hadn’t just let it wait for a better moment.’’