Kiwi values are what make differences with China inevitable
One occasionally runs into New Zealanders who appear to believe Aotearoa’s relationship with China is somehow an intrinsically trilateral arrangement among Wellington, Washington and Beijing.
A common variant of this perspective is that New Zealand’s best interests lie at a point equidistant from both great powers – or even that Kiwis would get along just fine with Beijing if it weren’t for those pesky Americans.
It is of course true that Wellington takes into consideration American and Chinese positions in managing its relations with both countries. Viewing New Zealand’s ties with Beijing as intrinsically bound to those with Washington, however, ignores the enormous degree of agency Wellington possesses, and it underestimates the challenges China poses for Aotearoa all by itself.
New Zealand wants to pursue mutually beneficial co-operation of all kinds, including trade, with China. But despite the opportunities it provides, China is also problematic for New Zealanders and, regrettably, it’s growing more problematic.
First, China’s human rights conditions are difficult to ignore. Its authoritarian regime, as a matter of course, brings its full resources to bear against anyone it defines as a threat – be she an ethnic Tibetan, a women’s rights activist, or a Hong Kong democracy advocate.
And the situation has deteriorated in recent years. Xinjiang alone starkly confirms that, as much as it has changed since Mao Zedong’s days, the party-state will respond without legal or moral constraint to whatever it perceives as disobedience.
As a matter of doctrine, Chinese authorities explicitly reject universal human rights, judicial independence, civil society and other principles of fundamental importance to New Zealanders. The conflict between these views and the liberal values that Kiwis embrace is not somehow intrinsically Chinese, despite Beijing’s efforts to represent them as such. One has only to look across the Taiwan Strait to see a successful liberal democracy built on identical cultural foundations.
Beijing’s treatment of its neighbours and sweeping South China Sea claims make many New Zealanders uncomfortable. A generational Chinese military buildup and provocations around Taiwan seem needlessly threatening to regional peace and prosperity.
Meanwhile, China has intensified influence operations in democracies around the world, including New Zealand. On a global scale, Beijing is attempting to dilute the rules-based order to make it more accommodating of Chinese preferences.
On the trade front – the anchor of New Zealand-China relations – Beijing has retreated from the marketisation the global community expected when it welcomed China into the World Trade Organisation in 2001.
It was always hard for foreign companies to compete with Chinese firms on an even playing field, and prospects have dimmed further in recent years as the party-state has deepened its role in all sectors of the economy.
Telling China’s full story, of course, demands recognition that its people have made extraordinary progress in recent decades, that the national economy is a driver of global growth, and that some of its people have more de facto freedom in their private lives than they did a generation or two ago.
These developments are not as paradoxical as they may seem: China is an enormous, complex country undergoing a historic transition to an unknown future. They cannot, however, in some way obscure Beijing’s challenging behaviour at home and abroad.
For the international community, responding to these trends can be daunting: China does not make it easy to disagree. It attacks its critics, often in deeply personal terms, through sophisticated state propaganda across traditional and online media. Coercion is a standard tool of Chinese statecraft: Beijing’s recent treatment of Australia follows a familiar pattern.
I have confidence in New Zealand’s ability to respond to these challenges. Its diplomacy is effective, its China policy sophisticated, and Kiwis have an impressive record of protecting their interests while contributing to international public good.
If I could make one contribution to the popular debate, it would be to elevate appreciation that the Chinese party-state poses significant challenges to New Zealand’s interests and values all on its own. Managing conflicting priorities in dealings with Beijing will be an ongoing task for Wellington for the indefinite future.
In 1985, to demonstrate its strong opposition to nuclear weapons, Aotearoa chose to sacrifice an alliance with a longstanding security partner and fellow liberal democracy. The question before Kiwis today is: how will they respond to Beijing’s transgression of other important values, across multiple fronts?
New Zealanders will answer this question for themselves, of course. At any rate, the notion of New Zealand having to choose between China and America is false. It will co-operate and disagree with both countries, as its interests require.
At a fundamental level, however, New Zealand has already made its choice: limited government, universal rights, and a rules-based international order. These values – not pressure from the US, the UK, or any other country – are what make differences between Wellington and Beijing inevitable.
Kiwis would prefer an amicable, mutually beneficial relationship, while reserving bilateral differences. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s May 3 speech was as elegant a statement of this preference as any national leader could make. The ball is in Beijing’s court.
The notion of New Zealand having to choose between China and America is false.