Viktor Oban’s hold on Hungary is unrelenting
Turkey pointed to the future.
‘‘We have to abandon liberal methods and principles of organising a society,’’ he said. ‘‘The new state we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state, because liberal values [in the West] today incorporate corruption, sex and violence.’’
Orban is not just talking. Since the 2010 election, he has had a twothirds ‘‘super-majority’’ in parliament that lets him amend the constitution as he likes. (Theoretically, the supreme court might overrule him, but he has also chosen 11 of the 15 supreme court judges.) New media laws have turned public television into a government mouthpiece, and he has ruthlessly altered electoral boundaries to guarantee victory for his Fidesz Party.
Other familiar elements of authoritarian nationalist regimes have also begun to appear in Hungary. Non-governmental organisations are under attack as foreign agents and foreign-owned banks are to be partly nationalised. Land leased by foreigners any time during the past 20 years must be returned to its Hungarian owners. Every one of these arbitrary changes creates opportunities for corruption that rarely go unexploited by those close to the regime.
The problem has grown so severe that last year, the United States government, in an initiative unprecedented against an EU member country, banned 10 Hungarian officials from entering the US on the grounds of corruption. And President Barack Obama, discussing corrupt, authoritarian governments, bracketed Hungary with Azerbaijan, Russia and Venezuela.
Victoria Nuland, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs, went further by saying to Orban, ‘‘How can you sleep under your Nato blanket at night while pushing ‘illiberal democracy’ by day, whipping up nationalism, restricting free press, or demonising civil society?’’
But she said it from a safe distance (Washington’s about 7000km away), and he didn’t bother to reply. And the Hungarians went on voting for him. In last April’s parliamentary election, Orban’s ‘‘big tent’’ Fidesz Party won two-thirds of the seats in parliament again (though only by one seat this time).
In the European elections in June, it won 12 of Hungary’s 21 seats. And in local elections in October, it won 19 of Hungary’s 21 larger towns and cities, including the capital, Budapest.
Why do a majority of Hungary’s 10 million people go on voting for him? Actually, they don’t. In the April parliamentary elections, 2.8 million people voted for other parties and 2.3m for Fidesz.
But the opposition parties are weak and divided (except for the neo-fascist Jobbik movement, on 14 per cent popular support). Fidesz wins partly by gerrymandering and partly by default – but that’s good enough for Orban.
Orban is a skilled demagogue and Hungarians are as susceptible to nationalist rabble-rousing as any other people. But he cannot be completely secure so long as the democratic electoral system survives: a big enough swing of public opinion against him would win, despite the gerrymandering.
He has no immediate worries: the next parliamentary election is not due until 2018. But last Sunday, Fidesz lost a single byelection, and suddenly its ‘‘super-majority’’ in parliament vanished. Viktor Orban said it didn’t matter, since he had already pushed through all the constitutional changes he wanted, and for the moment, that’s probably true.
However, if dissatisfaction with his rule continues to grow (he’s now being called the ‘‘Viktator’’), he may one day wish he had it back. Just in case he needs to change the constitution again.
Gwynne Dyer is an independent journalist based in London.