Four states could save or sink Trump
The fight for next year’s US presidential election could end up being held on a very narrow battleground, writes Dan Balz.
In a politically divided nation, with attitudes among many voters hardened and resistant to changing, the
2020 United States presidential election could be contested on the narrowest electoral terrain in recent memory.
Just four states are likely to determine the outcome. Each flipped to the Republicans in
2016, but President Donald Trump won each by a percentage point or less. The four are Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Florida. Many analysts point to Wisconsin as the single state upon which the election could turn.
Shifting demographics, the growing urban-rural divide and the gap between white voters with and without college educations have helped to create an electoral map unlike those of the recent past. So too have Trump’s unique profile, messaging and appeal.
‘‘Because of the partisanship of the country and the partisanship of the president, we are now looking at the smallest map in modern political history,’’ says Jim Messina, who was campaign manager for president Barack Obama in 2012.
Both Trump’s campaign and that of his eventual Democratic
challenger will seek to put other states in play. But those opportunities are fewer than in past campaigns.
Trump has done nothing to expand his base while in office, which Democrats claim will make it difficult for him to win states he lost in 2016. Trump campaign officials disagree. Democrats’ aspirations for expansion rest in part on whether politically changing, Republican-held states such as North Carolina, Georgia and Arizona are truly ready to shift.
Current polling shows the president vulnerable when matched against several of the Democratic candidates – though he overcame weak approval and favourability ratings to win in 2016. Based on current attitudes, he will have to do so again to win re-election.
One obvious wild card is the identity of the Democratic nominee. Will he or she run on a platform that moderate voters see as too far left? Will that nominee be able to energise the party’s woke base and still appeal to white working-class voters? Regardless of who that person is, the election will put a focus on several demographic groups.
First, white working-class voters who went strongly for Trump and are an important part of the Republican base. Of particular concern for the president will be white women without college degrees.
Second, college-educated suburban voters, especially women, who have moved decisively into the Democrats’ coalition.
Third, African-Americans, and particularly younger ones, whose turnout levels will be critical to Democrats’ fortunes.
Fourth, Hispanic voters, who will play a key role in Florida and some other states, especially in the West.
How strongly each of these groups supports Trump or the Democratic nominee, and the numbers by which they turn out to vote, are variables that election modellers are analysing closely and tweaking regularly, even at this early stage.
Trump lost the 2016 popular vote to Hillary Clinton by roughly three million people but won 304 electoral votes and the presidency. Based on current polling, his chances of winning the popular vote are at least as challenging as in 2016, leaving open the question of whether he can again produce an electoral college majority.
The electoral college combinations all begin with Florida and then move to the upper Midwest. If Trump were to win Florida again, Democrats would need to recapture all three of the northern states – or find substitutes – to win the White House. If Democrats could win Florida, any one of the three in the upper Midwest would give them the White House, unless Trump can put something else in his column.
Election analyst Ruy Teixeira says the three Midwest states were
so closely decided that even small changes could shift them to the Democrats. For Trump, that means there is an ‘‘absolute necessity’’ to maintain and increase his margins among white, non-college voters.
While many Democrats are optimistic that the gains in the
2018 midterms foreshadow success in 2020, a report earlier this year by the progressive firm Catalist noted: ‘‘It is not safe to assume that Democratic gains from 2016 to 2018 will hold.’’
In past campaigns, when there were a dozen or more truly competitive battlegrounds, presidential nominees could chart multiple paths to 270 electoral votes and worked to keep as many of those options alive as long as possible. Over many years, however, growing polarisation has created red and blue strongholds, with bigger and bigger victory margins.
In 2016, with a narrow popular vote margin, more than two dozen states were decided by margins of 15 points or more. In 1988, when the popular vote margin was seven points, there were just 17.
Florida has been ground zero in presidential politics for two decades and, with 29 electoral votes at stake, is the biggest competitive prize on the map.
Florida is also the most complex and costly of the big battlegrounds and, for Trump, it is the most important state in the country. His team has divided the US into nine political regions. Only Florida constitutes its own region.
Both sides know what they need to do in Florida. It will come down to who turns out to vote.
Of the northern states, Trump won Michigan by the fewest number of votes, just 11,000. Between 2012 and 2016, the Democratic vote badly eroded, with Clinton falling about 300,000 votes short of Obama’s total.
But Democrats made gains among white, working-class voters in the midterms. Matt Grossmann, director of the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research at Michigan State University, says that poses a question of strategy.
‘‘Is the better hope of returning some traditional Democrats back into the fold, or continuing to make gains among highly educated voters that were more traditionally Republican?’’
Richard Czuba, a Michiganbased independent pollster, says the biggest threat to Trump is the prospect of an increased Democratic turnout. Trump got about the normal number of votes that past Republican candidates have received; Clinton was significantly below not just Obama but other Democrats.
Though both sides are highly motivated, Czuba says: ‘‘The only upside in an increased turnout is for the Democrats.’’
Pennsylvania presents another challenge. Clinton was criticised for her campaign’s failure to pay more attention to Michigan and Wisconsin, but that was not an issue in Pennsylvania, where she campaigned constantly and invested heavily.
She held her own in Philadelphia and its suburbs, but Trump swamped her in other parts of the state.
Terry Madonna, director of the Center for Politics and Public Affairs at Franklin & Marshall College in Lancaster, does not rule out another Trump victory in the state.
‘‘But to do it he’s got to win those rural and small towns with significant turnout and/or find a way not to lose the Philly ’burbs by a larger percentage than [against Clinton].’’
David Urban, a political adviser to the president and his campaign, says the time and effort Trump put in Pennsylvania in 2016 paid off. ‘‘This time he’ll do the same, but he’s going to have to put a little more effort in, because Democrats who took him for granted in 2016 will not be taking him for granted in 2020.’’
That leaves Wisconsin, where Democrats will hold their convention next summer, as potentially the most competitive of the three. It is seen as more difficult for the Democrats than Michigan or Pennsylvania because it has a higher percentage of white voters overall, particularly of white non-college voters.
Where Democrats see particular opportunities – and Republican see reasons to worry – are in three Republican counties in suburban Milwaukee: Waukesha, Ozaukee and Washington. Dubbed the ‘‘WOW counties’’, all still favour Republicans, but Democrats have been gaining in their share of the vote.
‘‘Those counties are still voting Republican, but as much as 16 points less on the margin now than they were,’’ says Charles Franklin, who conducts the Marquette University Law School poll.
Brian Reisinger, a Republican strategist, says the Democratic growth in these suburban areas in 2018 has been ‘‘a real wake-up call for people to see there was a way for our traditional coalition to not be quite enough’’.
The Trump campaign and Democratic strategists also point to states beyond the big four as opportunities for flipping. The president’s political team has its sights on New Hampshire, which the president lost by less than half a point, as well as Minnesota, which he lost by only a point and a half.
Trump’s team has also said Nevada and New Mexico will be targets in 2020. Both present obstacles unless Trump can expand his electorates. His advisers have also mentioned Oregon as a possible target, though Democrats take that less seriously.
Trump advisers say that, as Democrats focus on picking a nominee, Republicans have an opportunity to begin to build organisations in these kinds of states and to identify sporadic voters who are attracted to the president.
‘‘We have the luxury of having the resources to protect the states President Trump won
in 2016 and expand into states we think we can add to his column in 2020,’’ says Tim Murtaugh, the Trump campaign’s communications director.
Cornell Belcher, who was a pollster for Obama’s campaigns, says that, because of the changing status of some traditional battlegrounds such as Ohio and Iowa, it is more vital than ever for Democrats to compete hard elsewhere.
‘‘Democrats have to expand the playing field and not put all our eggs in the basket of the traditional battleground states.’’
David Bergstein, the Democratic National Committee’s battleground states communication director, says the party is doing that even in the absence of a nominee.
‘‘[We] are laying the groundwork now to ensure our eventual nominee has multiple pathways to 270 electoral votes.’’
Democrats see opportunities in North Carolina, despite losses there in 2012 and 2016, as well as Arizona and Georgia. Arizona, which Trump carried by just 3.5 percentage points, might prove to be a more attractive target for Democrats than either of the two southern states.
Some strategists see Arizona, with 11 electoral votes, as a possible hedge against a loss in Wisconsin, which has 10 electoral votes. In-migration from other western states and a growing Latino population have changed the political makeup of the state.
Public Opinion Strategies charted the ideological movement of Arizona voters earlier this year, and found that the state today is only marginally more conservative than the nation as a whole, a significant change since 2010.
‘‘The Arizona as you knew it is gone,’’ says Republican pollster Bill McInturff. But he adds that Trump’s strong support among older white men and potential appeal to some Hispanic men could help to offset some of the movement in the state.
One state not likely to figure prominently into expansion possibilities for the Democrats is Texas. However attractive it might be as a state in transition, Texas would require an enormous investment. Democrats will play there only if everything else is moving in their direction.