Qatar out on a limb in Gulf crisis
Donald Trump’s visit appears to have given Arab states the confidence to act, writes David Mednicoff Showing sympathy a crime
ulf Arab countries summon images of oil- fuelled wealth, luxurious malls and strong Muslim identity. Nasty regional rivalry, diplomatic ruptures and panicked citizens stockpiling groceries don’t usually figure.
So why have Gulf states Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates ( UAE) and Yemen, as well as non- Gulf Egypt, dramatically ruptured relations with tiny Qatar? What will this international crisis mean for the Middle East and the broader world? The Gulf spans diverse countries. On one end of the scale is fractured, wartorn Yemen. Then come the tourist destination and politically unassertive Oman, the small oil kingdoms of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and regional powerhouse Saudi Arabia.
As the largest country in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia has long championed common regional policies under its leadership. However, in the past few decades, the rapid growth of massive oil wealth in smaller countries like Qatar and the UAE has allowed them excess capital to establish their own global influence.
The UAE has largely aligned its foreign policy with its larger neighbour. But Qatar has used its wealth to adopt policies different from, and sometimes rivalling, Saudi Arabia’s. Qatari positions have been propelled through the Al- Jazeera media network, based in Qatar’s capital, Doha, partially funded by Qatar’s ruling family, and popular throughout the Middle East.
The Saudis have not appreciated Qatar’s foreign policy assertions, particularly its warmer relations with their archrival Iran. In Syria’s civil war, Qatar and Saudi Arabia both oppose ruler Bashar al- Assad, but have supported competing Sunni militias. Qatar also had good relations with the freely elected Muslim Brotherhood Government in Egypt and other anti- establishment Islamist organisations, again in contrast to Saudi positions.
The 2013 removal by the military of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Government under President Mohamed Morsi spearheaded a broader move among Arab governments to crack down on Sunni Islamist organisations that could threaten their authority. Some of these organisations had received Qatari support.
In 2014, to pressure Qatar to fall in line with Saudi- led policies, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE suspended diplomatic ties with their neighbour. In response Qatar pulled back somewhat from open support for militant Sunni political groups and co- operation with Iran. It continued nonetheless to assert a right to its own foreign policy. Relations improved modestly since 2014. But Saudi and other commentators still complained that Qatar was “sabotaging the region”. And then came United States President Donald Trump’s May 21 visit to Riyadh, bolstering US ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and promoting a common front against Iran and Islamist “extremism”, a vague term which for the Saudis can include political opposition groups like the Muslim Brotherhood.
Soon after, on May 24, Qatari news sites were blocked by Saudi Arabia and the UAE after alleged remarks by Qatar’s ruler that openly acknowledged Iran’s regional political role and Qatari ties to Israel. Gulf leaders would not normally take such positions publicly. Qatari sources insisted that the remarks were inaccurate, and that Doha’s media had been hacked.
But Saudi Arabian and Emirati sources played up the alleged comments. They portrayed them as a renewed sign that Qatari policies remain deviant, despite the 2014 efforts to make Doha fall in line.
The Trump Administration’s announcement of a large military sale to Saudi Arabia suggests new assurance in Riyadh that Washington will back confrontation against Iran. This likely bolstered Saudi confidence that it could move to rein in Qatar. Qatar’s ambitious growth has included opening its society to global cultural, educational and business influences, as the country completes its plans to host s football’s 2022 World Cup. As part of this ambition, Qatar has asserted its intention to work with a range of global partners.
This foreign policy has included mediating between Islamist groups and Arab governments, as well as between Iran and other countries. Although some have critiqued such an approach as two- faced, Qatari officials could argue that it is a rational strategy to resolve conflict in places where repressing Islamic political opposition has not worked.
Whatever actually happened to trigger the crisis, Qatar’s concerns about hacking, recent Saudi and other critiques of the country, and leaked emails from other Gulf governments make Qataris feel victimised by what could be a wellorchestrated campaign against them. Stability in the Gulf region is critical to world trade, global transportation and regional military security. Dubai, for example, has been the world’s busiest airport by international passenger traffic for several years, with Qatar’s Hamad Airport not far behind. And, with 11,000 US troops on site, Qatar hosts the Middle East’s major American military base.
The bottom line is that the dramatic escalation of tensions in the Gulf threatens regional stability, and makes it much harder to resolve graver conflicts in Syria, Libya, Isiscontrolled Iraq and Yemen. Indeed, Qatar’s isolation from other Arab states could lead it closer to Turkey or even Iran.
More generally, the move against Qatar is part of a broad regional shift since the Arab uprisings of 2011. Many Arab governments now feel justified in acting strong to quash dissent. They are now more likely to condone using force internally to maintain stability and in external conflicts like Yemen. The Trump Administration appears comfortable with this.
Indeed, the President has inserted himself directly into the growing conflict in several tweets, pointing a finger at Qatar as a funder of “radical ideology”. Bahrain yesterday declared it a crime, punishable by imprisonment of up to five years and a fine, for “any show of sympathy or favouritism” to Qatar or objection in any way to Bahrain’s decision to break relations and impose economic and border restrictions on the neighbouring Gulf country.
A similar statement by the United Arab Emirates, with a possible 15- year penalty, was issued on Thursday, prohibiting
The US may end up mediating the dispute out of its own interest in regional stability and its military base.
At the same time, Trump has revealed his support for the Saudi position, and the trend to curb dissenting Arab voices around regional policy.
This trend goes against Qatar’s past autonomy and policies, leaving it little wiggle room. Qatar may have no choice but to conform its policies to criticism of that government, or sympathy toward Qatar, “whether it be through the means of social media, or any type of written, visual or verbal form”.
The measures, in countries where civil rights are already sharply restricted, came as Al Jazeera, the state- funded Qatari media organisation, said its website and digital platforms were “under cyberattack” and facing “systematic and continual hacking attempts”. Saudi ones, and to limit Al- Jazeera’s independence. Whether or not the crisis resolves soon, Riyadh’s new move against Doha has underscored its clear determination to limit Qatari policy influence as much as possible. David Mednicoff is director of Middle Eastern Studies at University of Massachusetts Amherst