Battle is a must-win for Netanyahu but the cost will be high
The Israeli military operation in Gaza marked another sad chapter in the history of Israeli-palestinian conflict yesterday.
Weakened domestically by his continued inability to garner enough support to form a government, Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu must “win” this battle, or else what little remains of his political gravitas will be eroded.
For Netanyahu, and indeed the high command of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), this will mean a complete dismantling or destruction of the infrastructure in Gaza that allows Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to build rockets and explosives, or assemble drones to strike into
Israeli territory.
A “win” for Israel will not be a simple task, anything less than outright victory will be portrayed by Hamas as a defiant draw in the face of overwhelming odds, and be hugely damaging for Israel’s political leadership. Speed will be of the essence. If conflicts in 2008-9 and 2014 are anything to go by, the operation will last, at most, a matter of weeks.
The Israelis will be under intense global scrutiny and so will be operating under tight constraints. Simply bombing will not achieve their objectives, and will also drastically increase the chance of civilian casualties.
The only option is to have soldiers go street by street through Gaza, clearing out ammunition dumps and military facilities, some of which are beneath civilian infrastructure.
The human cost will be high. Hamas favours the use of roadside bombs, snipers and small handheld drones to fight in a guerrilla style that uses the urban landscape to provide its fighters with maximum cover.
Hamas fighters have dramatically improved their urban combat skills in recent years and will not be the pushover they were a decade ago, meaning the IDF won’t come through this operation free of casualties.
Nevertheless, Israel’s technical and aerial dominance means that among combatants we should expect to see a casualty ratio of somewhere in the region of 25:1 in Israel’s favour. In the past two years,
Hamas operatives have disrupted Israeli government websites, and successfully hacked IDF soldiers’ phones. How this area of warfare develops will be of particular interest. We should expect to see new methods of electronic and online disruption in the coming days.
The upcoming operation will define the political fortunes for both Netanyahu and Hamas for the next two to three years. The Israelis have had too many elections, the Palestinians too few, and both Hamas and the Israeli leader will be anxious not to show weakness, or admit defeat.
For Hamas, simply surviving until the inevitable ceasefire will be enough to declare victory; for Netanyahu, a few years of quiet on the southern border is probably the best he can hope for.