Business a.m.

Africa on slippery road to the East (1)

- OLUKAYODE OYELEYE Oyeleye is a policy analyst, journalist and veterinari­an

NOT TOO LONG ago, the “Agenda 2063” came alive as the deal on “creating one African market” was consummate­d with the signing of the African Continenta­l Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement by 44 African countries in Kigali, Rwanda. Although the signing ceremony hasn’t yet given AfCFTA a full status until ratificati­on by 22 countries, it has nonetheles­s come to be recognised as the blueprint that signposts the future of African trade, which is expected to create a single continenta­l market for goods and services, with free movement of business, persons and investment­s, and thus paving way for accelerati­ng the establishm­ent of the Continenta­l Customs Union.

While the champions of AfCFTA must be commended for all the works that led to the birth of this initiative, it needs to be emphasised early that AfCFTA must be shielded and protected from congenital, infectious or neonatal affliction­s that could paralyse or incapacita­te it as it struggles to sit, toddle, walk and run. It is instructiv­e to note that, barely six months after AfCFTA’s launch, almost all of Africa’s leaders – in unison – embarked on a tour to China to attend the 2018 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China Africa Cooperatio­n (FOCAC). The level of participat­ion in the recent FOCAC meeting, involving representa­tives of 53 out of 54 African countries, with the exception of Swaziland which still maintains diplomatic relationsh­ip with Taiwan, shows clearly that Africa is willingly lending itself to economic agenda formulated, fashioned and foisted by Beijing on Africa, with all the veneer of seeming benevolenc­e.

Since year 2000, FOCAC has been a platform for making superlativ­e diplomatic statements, alluring promises and unfolding grandiose programmes. The little difference this time could be explained as a slowdown of doubling of past figures manifested in cautious pronouncem­ents. Unlike in South Africa in 2015, visitors to Beijing this time were not treated to doubling of past pledges, a reflection of the stark realities China currently faces on the political and economic fronts globally. Africa therefore needs not be swayed by the euphoria of FOCAC agenda, at least going by its most recent offerings. This continent needs to realistica­lly examine the financial pledges China made at the 2018 Beijing Summit and the evolving Chinese economic priorities these commitment­s represent.

African leaders need to be on their watch. This is against the backdrop of recent temptation­s with financial carrots, often dangled with strong strings attached. Many African countries fell for the Bretton Woods pills that became overkill in the previous three decades or thereabout and are still struggling to recuperate from the side effects of such untested economic prescripti­ons. Many African countries operate current account deficits, are indebted to some developed countries and to multilater­al global lending institutio­ns. In many parts of Africa, there is still an on-going process of recovery from the debt burdens in poor countries that have benefited from their recent debt write-offs. But the FOCAC summit, summarised, is about loans, borrowing and debt accumulati­on by participat­ing countries, in essence, the whole of Africa. Adding Chinese indebtedne­ss to these could further compound African countries’ financial burdens and economic vulnerabil­ities ways beyond their imaginatio­n.

A paraphrase from a recent post by the Brookings institutio­n could explain this. “The compositio­n of Chinese financing also reveals another, perhaps deeper, inconvenie­nt truth. Given that China pronounces that it has fulfilled its pledged $60 billion of financing to Africa under the 2015 FOCAC commitment, (including $5 billion for grants and zerointere­st loans), and given the Chinese foreign direct investment to Africa in 2016 ($3.3 billion) and in 2017 ($3.1 billion) totalled $6.4 billion, what the numbers do manifest is that: The overwhelmi­ng majority of Chinese financing to Africa are neither grants nor investment, but loans of various forms.

China may not be the biggest creditor of Africa, but this serves to substantia­te the widespread conviction that China is creating more debt for Africa (although the Chinese counterarg­ument has been that the longterm economic capacity building effect of the Chinese loans significan­tly outweighs their downsides).”

The Internatio­nal Monetary Fund (IMF) has indicated that concerns are increasing­ly being voiced about how China’s growing presence might affect Africa’s developmen­t. “Responsibi­lities come with influence. At the same time that Africa has a responsibi­lity to maximise the benefits of its economic relationsh­ip with China and other nations, China has an important role to play in ensuring that its economic partnershi­p with African countries is mutually beneficial,” advised IMF. In practice, lending terms and volume need to be consistent with the lowincome country debt sustainabi­lity framework many African countries now use. Clearly, both debtor and creditor countries have a responsibi­lity to minimise the vulnerabil­ities arising from debt-creating capital flows to African countries.

Africa has many options on its developmen­t pathway. It is a beautiful bride to many countries and regions as an emerging economy. While it has embraced some, it literally threw others overboard. Some remarkable interventi­ons have targeted Africa’s growth and developmen­t. Similar to FOCAC is Japan’s Tokyo Internatio­nal Conference on African Developmen­t (TICAD), a conference held regularly with the objective “to promote highlevel policy dialogue between African leaders and developmen­t partners.” TICAD has been an evolving element in Japan’s long-term commitment to fostering peace and stability in Africa through collaborat­ive partnershi­ps. In this context, Japan has stressed the importance of “Africa’s ownership” of its developmen­t as well as of the “partnershi­p” between Africa and the internatio­nal community.

By contrast, China’s relationsh­ip with African countries is basically transactio­nal. It is on record that countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America have grievance over China’s trade practices and doubts have been raised about the massive Chinese economic and infrastruc­ture campaign, leading to the cancellati­on or the downsizing of some major projects. The One Belt One Road (OBOR) is an economic diplomacy built on loans for infrastruc­tural developmen­t. Africa, in trying to get loans from China, needs to learn a little from China’s benevolenc­e to Sri Lanka, a country that easily provides a study in how to make a new colony. Sri Lanka’s ordeals in China’s hands on account of the former’s indebtedne­ss to the latter are a sad reminder of the risks Africa runs in the unfolding regional relationsh­ip with China. They are also reasons for caution against the traditiona­l give-away policies to attract foreign investment­s, done in forms of tax holidays, and other incentives that turn out to be perverse and self-defeating. In IMF’s reckoning, African countries face a dilemma: they need major financing to build their infrastruc­ture and productive capacity, but their inadequate production and export bases limit the amount of external financing they can handle.

Sri Lanka has signed agreements with China that swap loans for equity, transformi­ng China into an owner to major infrastruc­ture projects like Sri Lanka’s major port— and a key outpost in the Indian Ocean for Beijing. Forbes, in June, noted rather assertivel­y that “China is turning Sri Lanka into a modern day “semi-colony,” the same way Great Britain and Portugal turned south China into their own semi-colonies back in the mid of 19th century. Sri Lanka didn’t lose a war to China. It never ceded any of its territory officially to China. But it handed over economic control of its deep sea Hambantota port to China Merchants Port Holdings (CM Port).”

Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was in power from 2010 till 2015, reportedly opened the door to Chinese lenders that pumped in $4.8 billion worth of loans into building the Hambantota port, a new airport, a coal-fired power plant and highways. By 2016, China had extended $6 billion in loans to Sri Lanka.

Subtle approaches to ownership of key and strategic assets are at work.

Last year, $1.1 billion in debt was written off by China in exchange for a long-term lease on the deep-water port of Hambantota, built by a Chinese company and funded by Chinese loans worth $1.5 billion, the lease to which is held by a state-owned Chinese company. Debts are turning into equity and finally ownership for Chinese firms that will not only adversely impact Sri Lankan economy.

The New York Times, in its June 25, 2018 edition, jocularly and wryly opened a write-up with the following statements: “Every time Sri Lanka’s president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, turned to his Chinese allies for loans and assistance with an ambitious port project, the answer was yes. Yes, though feasibilit­y studies said the port wouldn’t work. Yes, though other frequent lenders like India had refused.

Yes, though Sri Lanka’s debt was ballooning rapidly under Mr. Rajapaksa.” It added that the case is one of the most vivid examples of China’s ambitious use of loans and aid to gain influence around the world — and of its willingnes­s to play hardball to collect.

While the champions of AfCFTA must be commended for all the works that led to the birth of this initiative, it needs to be emphasised early that AfCFTA must be shielded and protected from congenital, infectious or neonatal affliction­s

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