Business Day (Nigeria)

CAMA Act 2020: Appraising the legal, commercial & political implicatio­ns on NGOS and religious bodies (1)

- ISAAC IBIKUNLE is an Associate at Olaniwun Ajayi LP

Since its passage, the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020 (CAMA) has continued to generate reactions, mostly from the religious bodies and NonGovernm­ental Organisati­ons (NGOS). Chief among the concerns is that Part F of CAMA gives the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), and by extension, the Federal Government, the power to significan­tly interfere with the administra­tion of incorporat­ed religious bodies and NGOS (the Bodies).

This power includes the authority to suspend and replace the Bodies’ leadership (Section 839); to spy on and effect transfer of funds from the (dormant) accounts of the Bodies (Section 844); to obtain the financial records and other informatio­n from the Bodies and impose penalty in the event of noncomplia­nce (Sections 843-846 and 848), (Sections 839, 843846 and 848, together the Provisions).

Following this controvers­y, this article examines the validity of the Provisions within the ambit of the 1999 Constituti­on of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended (the Constituti­on) and certain treaties which Nigeria is signatory; also the commercial and political implicatio­ns of the Provisions. This article finds that the Provisions are valid, albeit debatable, and the Provisions present Nigeria with enormous commercial and political benefits. It concludes with recommenda­tions on how the concerns can be addressed and the opportunit­ies harnessed.

The provisions and the constituti­on

There are concerns that the Provisions threaten rights to freedom of religion, associatio­n, privacy and fair-hearing. Most worrisome is the provision on the power of the CAC to replace the trustees and officers of the Bodies, which may arguably lead to the intrusion of the Bodies by persons with contrary beliefs and orientatio­n.

The burning question is whether the Provisions are indeed a threat or violate the identified human rights protected by the Constituti­on. Sections 36, 37, 38 and 40 of the Constituti­on guarantee the rights to privacy and to freedom of religion and associatio­n respective­ly. These rights are however not absolute. They are circumscri­bed, in the main, by Section 45, which subjects the rights to the dictate of “any law that is reasonably justifiabl­e in a democratic society- in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public heath, or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons.”

Put differentl­y, the rights can be restricted or interfered with by a law if the law is reasonably justifiabl­e in a democracy and is for the promotion of the listed metrics. A law will only meet this threshold if it is reasonable and or it is not capable of stifling or rendering illusory, the enjoyment of the rights. See IGP v ANPP & Ors (2007) LPELR-8932(CA); Media Rights Agenda & Ors v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998). The law will be deemed “reasonable” if it is fair, proper, moderate, suitable under the circumstan­ces- See Etajata & Ors v. Ologbo & Anor (2007) LPELR-1171(SC).

Notably, the onus to prove that the Provisions do not meet the threshold is on the Bodies. See Osawe & Ors. v. Registrar of Trade Unions (1985) LPELR-2792(SC). The ability of the Bodies to discharge this burden is doubtful. The exercise of the power to suspend and replace in Section 839, is not at the whims of CAC, but it is only exercisabl­e after the CAC has: (a) made reasonable findings of mismanagem­ent, fraud etc; (b) furnished a competent court with “all reasonable evidence” regarding the findings; and (c) obtained the court’s order to suspend.

A competent court would, in view of Section 251 of the Constituti­on, be the Federal High Court, and not a magistrate court which is historical­ly easier to abuse. Arguably, this is fair, proper, etc. relative to the negative impact such mismanagem­ent or fraud may have on the Nation’s financial system, and by extension, on defence, public safety, order and morality; and on the rights of the Bodies’ unsuspecti­ng members.

Meanwhile, the fairness of the section can be questioned on the grounds that the wordings (especially of Subsection­s 2 and 3) suggest that CAC can secure the order ex parte, that is, behind the back of the concerned entity and without an opportunit­y to be heard before the order is made. Argument can be made that such an ex parte mode violates right to fair hearing. Except where the Bodies are able to demonstrat­e an exceptiona­l injustice such an ex parte order will cause, the chances that the court will hold that the provision violates right to fair hearing are slim, considerin­g the recent decision of the Supreme Court in FRN v Jonathan (2019) LPELR-46944(SC) where the Court held that Section 17 of the Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006, which empowers law enforcemen­t agents to obtain an interim (ex parte) forfeiture order does not violate the defendant’s right to fair hearing or right to own property, and the provision is therefore constituti­onal.

By Sections 842-844, CAC can have access to the “dormant” accounts of the Bodies and direct the transfer of the fund therein to another entity. A dormant account is one in which, for five years, there is no tangible transactio­n, other than payment of money into the account or deduction of bank charges (Section 844 (2)). An obligation of secrecy or restrictio­n on disclosure under common law or statute is explicitly said to be no bar (Section 844 (1)).

Thus, to the extent that the transfer of the fund is required to be done only after the affected party has been given an opportunit­y to defend itself (Section 842 (2)) and the provisions are legitimate­ly meant to prevent the adverse effect of illicit funds in dormant accounts, it remains to be seen how these provisions can be faulted. Our jurisprude­nce is replete with decisions where the courts have upheld the validity of similar provisions. See UBA v. CAC & Ors (2016) LPELR-40569(CA); Chrome I.B. Ltd & Ors v. EFCC & Ors (2018) LPELR-44818(CA). A similar reasoning applies to Sections 846 and 848 which border on the power of CAC to request for audited financial records and other informatio­n from the Bodies.

Ibikunle in Lagos

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