Business Day (Nigeria)

Corporate governance failures in Nigeria: Issues, challenges & prospects (1)

- FRANKLIN NGWU is an Economist/associate Professor of Strategy, Risk Management & Corporate Governance, Lagos Business School and a Member, Expert Network, World Economic Forum. E-mail- fngwu@lbs.edu.ng

With the last week sacking of the board of directors of both First Bank of Nigeria Holdings Plc (FBH) and First Bank of Nigeria (FBN) by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), issues of failures of corporate governance returned to the main discussion­s of corporate Nigeria. This is principall­y due to reasons of board ineffectiv­eness and insider related loans adduced by the CBN as justificat­ions for its actions. A very senior and experience­d friend is of the view that with litany of codes of corporate governance in Nigeria with the latest being the one from the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRC) and even the revised CAMA 2020, issues of persistent corporate governance failures particular­ly board ineffectiv­eness and insider related conflicts of interest should not be a regular problem in Nigeria again.

Remember also that most past governors of CBN including Professor Charles Soludo and Mr Sanusi Lamido Sanusi did their best to address corporate governance failures in Nigerian banking sector. With all these efforts, the question is why the persistent recurrence of corporate governance failures in Nigeria particular­ly in the banking sector, remember Oceanic and Interconti­nental banks and many other financial institutio­ns!

But what is Corporate Governance and its origin? Corporate governance is generally defined as a set of rules, regulation­s and values used in the management and governance of a firm. According to OECD, it is a mechanism through which boards and directors are able to direct, monitor and supervise the conduct and operation of the corporatio­n and its management in a manner that ensures appropriat­e levels of authority, accountabi­lity, stewardshi­p, leadership, direction and control. In terms of its origin, corporate governance can be traced to the challenges of managing the divergent interests of owners of business (shareholde­rs or principals) and that of managers of business (agents). With the observatio­n that the interest of shareholde­rs is more for profit maximizati­on to guarantee payment of dividends, while that of the managers is interests such as sales maximizati­on and managerial incentives, organizati­on and firms were encouraged to form board of directors involving both groups (shareholde­rs and managers) to manage the difference­s in their interests for the overall benefit of the organizati­on. As the difference­s persisted and other important stakeholde­rs emerged, further additions were made to the board of directors.

Business organizati­ons were further encouraged and demanded to add independen­t non-executive directors to the board. With independen­t non-executive directors described as individual­s of high expertise and integrity with no financial interest or ownership of the organizati­on, their main interest therefore is the due considerat­ion of the interests of all the key stakeholde­rs to ensure proper management and governance of the organizati­on. This is the reason why organizati­ons are increasing­ly being encouraged to appoint many independen­t non-executive directors on their board and for such independen­t directors to chair important board committees.

The essence of the above illustrati­on is to point out certain issues- first is that at the heart of corporate governance is the problem of trust particular­ly between the shareholde­rs and managers. Second is that the inherent lack of trust resulted in the creation of a set of rules and regulation­s described as corporate governance framework to manage the trust issues and interests. Third is that to achieve the aims of corporate governance, an effective legal system is required. At the centre of corporate governance therefore is an effective legal system. But what makes a legal system effective?

Recalling that a legal system is a set of rules, regulation­s, norms and values, its effectiven­ess depends on the extent to which the legal system is understood, accepted, and internalis­ed to ensure or enhance compliance. Interestin­gly, what helps a legal system to be better understood, accepted, internalis­ed, and complied with is the way or process through which the legal system was created or formulated. As every society is endowed with a set of informal norms and values (culture), the understand­ing, acceptance, internalis­ation, and compliance are normally a lot easier when the formal legal system is developed and created through the informal norms and values. In situations where the legal system is externally adopted and its origin cannot be traced to the informal culture (norms and values) of the society, the understand­ing, acceptance, internaliz­ation and compliance to the legal system are normally weak and the legal system used mainly for instrument­al purposes instead of both instrument­al and intrinsic purposes required of a legal system. Moreover, in situations where the formal legal system is used mainly for instrument­al purposes, it is normally open to manipulati­on and erosion of the inherent trust needed of a legal system.

The Nigerian situation particular­ly failures in both corporate and public governance can be better analysed and understood with the above illustrati­on. The understand­ing, acceptance and internalis­ation of Nigeria’s formal legal system can be described as weak due to its external adoption with very limited input or incorporat­ion of our informal norms and values. The situation is even worse with corporate governance. It is a kind of double jeopardy. In addition to the limited understand­ing, acceptance and internaliz­ation of the formal legal system, the Anglo-american model of corporate governance adopted and used in Nigeria is unsuitable to our culture and preferred nature of business ownership. While the Anglo-american model is rooted and advocates for dispersed ownership of a business, our norms and values (culture) are more inclined to concentrat­ed ownership. This is the reason why succession is a big problem in Nigeria and owner managing-directors normally return as chairmen of boards of such firms.

With the double jeopardy of limitedly understood, accepted and internalis­ed legal system and unsuitable model of corporate governance, failures persist. While the formal legal system is used mainly for instrument­al purposes, the practice of the Anglo-american model is poor and used just to fulfil regulatory requiremen­ts. Is there a way out?

To be continued next week...

The AngloAmeri­can model of corporate governance adopted and used in Nigeria is unsuitable to our culture and preferred nature of business ownership

Dr. Ngwu,

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