Coups and counter-coups
This is another account of the 1966 coup as captured by retired Major General Paul Tarfa
The Nigerian Army before 15 January 1966 was one big family, where tribe or region was never an issue. Some of us joined the army straight from secondary schools and knew nothing other than the interest which we had for the armed forces. We knew nothing about politics and knew little about politicians from the pages of newspapers. For us, it was all about comradeship and professionalism. We were told to be loyal to the government and that our role as officers was the defence of the territorial integrity of the nation. In all formations, as officers, we ate together, trained together and played together. Promotions in the army depended on merit and fairplay. We were truly one happy family. Then suddenly, a group of officers staged a very bloody coup d’etat which overthrew the federal government.
The main characters at the centre of the coup are no longer secret because a lot has been said about them through police investigation reports and on the pages of national daily newspapers. There have been many interpretations of the 15 January 1966 coup and the aftermath by various writers. It is today over three decades that the coup took place, but the memory of it still remains fresh as part of our dark history.
Insight by the actors, some of who are still living today, have revealed how and why they struck. There are also many writers on the subject who have highlighted the actions of the principal actors and their accomplices. Some were privy to correct information and put across what actually happened. Some have merely distorted facts, with a view to absolve criminal actors to turn the course of history and to earn cheap favours. It is in the light of this that I felt obliged to state my experience in the areas where I was involved, for the sake of history and posterity.
THE SHADOW OF 15 JANUARY 1966 Coup
It was on 11 January 1966 when I returned from Kano, after seeing off General Sir Welby-Everard, the former General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army, back to the United Kingdom after a one month official visit to Nigeria, that I witnessed what I can now claim to have been the shadow of the coup. The General was in Nigeria on the invitation of the Ministry of Defence to commission a new Defence Headquarters in Lagos and I was appointed to be his Aidede-camp (ADC) during that period. He took advantage of his return to Nigeria to visit some military locations in Lagos, Kaduna and Kano. At the end of the visit, he returned to the UK through the Kano Airport on 11 January, 1966.
After the General’s departure, I went straight to the 5th Battalion Officers’ Mess in Kano to relax and wait for a flight to Lagos. In the mess, I met Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Commanding Officer and some of his officers enjoying mess life. It was my second time of meeting this impressive man who was sharing jokes with his officers. The first time was in Congo Kinshasa when he was the Quartermaster-General of the Nigerian Army in 1963. After his formal address to us in the mess, I remember asking him how the Nigerian Army was coping with officers’ idiosyncrasies, having trained in various countries. His reply was that he would not tolerate any officer coming to him saluting without a cap saying, ‘Hi Colonel’. We all laughed. I think he remembered me well.
I saluted him and proceeded to meet my old friends who I had not seen for some time. Because I walked into the mess with my Sam Brown Belt on, Ojukwu threatened to order me to buy drinks for all the officers in the mess. It was customary for Nigerian Army officers to remove their belts while relaxing in the officers mess. But I told him that as tradition demanded, we, the proud officers of the Federal Guards, do not remove our belts in the mess, and that was why I did not remove mine. In a soft voice looking straight at me, Ojukwu said, I have forgiven you because Federal Guards officers are always in a hurry to move to the airport to mount Guards of Honour. I relaxed and enjoyed myself.
I returned to Lagos that evening. When I arrived at No. 4 Lugard Avenue, Ikoyi, my residence, I rushed upstairs and went straight to the flat of Lt. Ezedigbo to let him know that I was back. I opened his door without knocking and I saw him with three young officers in the room in a pensive mood. The officers were Lt. Igweze, Lt. Oyewole and 2/Lt Nguluka. Igweze at that time had been posted to Supply and Transport Company, Apapa. I had no idea what they were talking about but it must have been something very serious. They were surprised to see me, especially when I did not knock before barging in. Oyewole and Nguluka were officers from the Supply and Transport Company, 2nd Brigade, Apapa. I was in uniform and in a hurry to go to my room to change. Leaving the door ajar, I jokingly said, I have caught you. You cannot do anything, especially you Nguluka, bloody S&T officer.
Nguluka and I were friends and we joked a lot whenever we met. He was a regular visitor to our mess and really it was not a surprise he was there. Similarly, Oyewole was a good friend of Lt. Igweze, formerly of the Federal Guards. There was, therefore, nothing to suspect when I shut the door and went to my room. It was in the normal spirit of comradeship which we were used to in the army. But the mood in which I found them seemed unusual. What could they be discussing in Ezedigbo’s room at that time? They appeared to have taken my outburst for possible information that I must have heard, for they did not stay long after the intrusion before they dispersed. Even my friend Nguluka did not stay to challenge me on my unfair comment on him. Ezedigbo later came to my room for what I now perceive to be a diversionary talk after his visitors had left. Indeed, I suspected nothing evil as it was back to business as usual between us. THE 15 JANUARY 1966 Coup Planning and Execution The details of the planning and execution of the coup has been discussed in many books written by critiques and some of the surviving plotters. While some of the plotters tried to justify why they struck, others confessed that they were conscripted to take part or be killed. It is today over 40 years since the coup took place, but the event is still fresh in the minds of some people. Many of the plotters have died with their conscience. Some people say nemesis caught up with them as most of them died the same way their victim went. Through reports of interrogations and self confessions, it was clear that the coup was carried out in bad light and grossly misguided. It was a fact that majority of the young officers and men were used by the ringleaders against their will, but in the end, had to suffer the consequences of their actions. It was a coup that was motivated by greed and false self confidence. It was a sectional coup which set in motion, the seed of hatred and mistrust among people who had lived together in harmony for decades. It was a product of political development and military gang up against the day.
The idea of the coup was alleged to have been initiated in August 1965 by Major Donatus Okafor of the Federal Guards, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna of 2 Brigade Headquarters and one Captain O. Oji. These officers were joined by Major I. H. Chukwuka, Major C. I. Anuforo, Major C. K. Nzeogwu and Major A. Ademoyega. This is highly disputable because of professional background and positions held by these officers, as well as their intellectual capacities. For instance, some of them were from the ranks before getting commissioned while some were staff officers or in command of small units in the army. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that this collection of motley officers could form and run a government. However, behind them were some faceless politicians who, through their behaviours and utterances before and after the coup, showed that they were the real initiators and had hoped to be the beneficiaries. By November 1965, the number of officers in the plot had doubled, all of whom were of Igbo extraction, with the exception of a few Yoruba officers. The point to note here is that, if the plotters had acted on their own as army officers in the interest of the country as a whole, why and how did they fail to find colleagues from the North? The army was very united. Trust and respect among officers was very high. The sectional nature of the coup, to my mind, was the strongest weapon that was used to defeat their lofty ideas.
Indeed, it was impossible to recruit reliable officers from the North because most the targets for elimination would be from the North and a few from the West. Because of their number and the strategic positions they held in the army, they thought they could do it alone with the backing of their civilian supporters. That was where they went wrong. Most of the young officers and men who were drawn for the operations in Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna were from the Signals, Supply and Transport, Workshops and Support Units. In all the centres where they operated that night, none of the five Infantry battalions were engaged, except in Kaduna where Major Nzeogwu deceitfully used the “C” Company of 3 Battalion under the guise of his Exercise Damisa. The composition of troops they assembled would not stand against combat units if things went wrong. They failed to take cognizance of that in their plan. From the onset, they started from a position of weakness. Their strength was the cover of darkness and the element of surprise. Before they struck on that early morning of 15 January, their deliberations were broadly as follow:
(a) To arrest key targets in Kaduna, Ibadan, Lagos, Enugu and Benin. The plan stipulated that wherever resistance to arrest was encountered, the individuals concerned were to be killed.
(b) To use selected units of the army due to the secrecy and aims of the operation, hence the limitation to use mainly soldiers who would be loyal to them.
(c) To select officers and men for the operation and avoid leakage of information.
(d) To assassinate all senior army officers from the North because they were considered to be obstacles to the success of the coup.
(e) To select a suitable time and date for the operation.
They decided to strike on 15 January when all their targets would be in place. The choice of 15 January was because they wanted to make sure that Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of Northern Nigeria, who was away in Mecca, in the country. The other factor was to ensure that the Heads of State
of the Commonwealth countries attending a conference in Lagos had left for their respective countries. It was also the night when Brigadier Maimalari, the Commander, 2nd Brigade, would host his officers to a dinner in his house. All the officers who were listed as targets would be at the Brigadier’s party. The party was attended by General Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army.
In Lagos, on the night of the operation, a meeting by members of the inner circle was held after attending the dinner. It afforded them the opportunity to know who among their targets were present and where they had lodged for the night. As for me being unaware of what was going on, I went to a nearby cinema, returned to residence about 10.30 pm and went to bed, not knowing that within a few hours of sleep, there would be a big knock on my door to wake me up to face an uncertainty. The H-hour (Time of Operation) The operation started simultaneously at 0200 am in Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna under the command of the ring leaders: Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu and Captain Nwobosi. No operation took place in Benin and Enugu because there were no targets in those cities .
In Lagos, Major Ifeajuna addressed the operators and talked about the political situation in Western Nigeria. He said the politicians had failed to find a solution and the country was heading to chaos and disaster. He put it to the gathering why they had to act. Some officers who were hearing the information for the first time were said to be reluctant to comply with what Ifeajuna said, but it was made clear to them that they would be regarded as saboteurs and might suffer death as a consequence. Likewise, some of the non-commissioned ranks were given no previous information of the true nature of the action in which they were called to execute but had no choice. In the long run, they all had to comply.
Consequently, tasks and targets were issued to various groups for abduction and killing of key personalities and occupation of sensitive posts. Details were as follows:
(a) Abduction of the Prime Minister and the Federal Minister of Finance by Major Ifeajuna and two 2/Lts.
(b) Killing of Colonel Mohammed and Lt. Col. Unegbe by Major C.I Anuforo and one 2/Lt.
(c) Killing of Brigadier Maimalari by Major D. Okafor, Capt. O. Oji, and one 2/Lt. from the Federal Guards.
(d) Killing of Lt. Col. Pam by Major IH Chukuka, and one 2/Lt.
(d) Occupation of the Control Room at Police HQ, known as Lion Building by one 2/Lt.
(f) Occupation of P & T Telephone Exchange by two Lts.
g) Occupation of N.E.T. Building by one 2/Lt and a section of soldiers.
The Federal Guards Officers Mess at Ikoyi was named as the rendezvous for all teams on completion of their tasks. The 2 Battalion was strategically avoided. On the night of the operation, myself and one Lt called Osuma were avoided and left totally uninformed by our OC Major Okafor and our junior colleagues who participated in the coup, They reckoned we would be saboteurs. The gang took full advantage of the element of deceit and surprise that night and cowardly stormed the residences of their targets and murdered them one by one in cold blood. In Lagos, the casualty list included the following: Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria, Chief F. S. Okotie-Eboh, Finance Minister of the Federation, Brigadier Z. Maimalari, Commander of the 2 Brigade NA, Colonel K. Mohammed, Chief of Staff Nigerian Army, Lt-Col. A. C. Unegbe, Quartermaster General, Lt-Col J.T. Pam, Adjutant General, Nigerian Army and Lt-Col A. Largema, Commanding Officer 4 Battalion, Ibadan.
In Ibadan and Kaduna, the officers assigned to carry out their assignments did so with ruthless efficiency. Major Nzeogwu, who commanded the Kaduna zone of the operation, had rehearsed his troops under the guise of Exercise Damisa. Their targets were S. L. Akintola, Premier of Western Nigeria who was killed, and Chief Fani Kayode, who wisely surrendered to be arrested. In Kaduna, the targets eliminated were Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of Northern Nigeria and his senior wife. Brigadier S. Ademulegun, Commander of 1 Brigade NA and his wife. Colonel R. A. Shodeinde, Deputy Commandant, Nigerian Defence Academy, Ahmed Dan Musa, Senior Assistant Secretary (Security) to the North Regional Government, and Sergeant Duromola Oyegoke of the Nigerian Army.
In addition to the foregoing, a number of political leaders and civil servants were arrested and detained in military establishments at Lagos and Kaduna. Among them were Sir Kashim Ibrahim the Governor of Northern Nigeria, Alhaji Hassan Lemu - Principal Private Secretary to the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Aba Kadangare Gobara, Assistant Principal Private Secretary to the Premier of Northern Nigeria and Chief Fani-Kayode, the Deputy Premier of Western Nigeria. Chief Kayode was to be taken alive to the Federal Guards Officers Mess when they had dumped the corpses of those who were killed in Lagos.
Towards daybreak, Major-General Aguiyi - Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army appeared at the Posts & Telegraph Building and told the officers and men who had been deployed by Major Ademoyega to return to their bases. The troops complied. He told the soldiers that he was preparing troops of the 2 Battalion to confront the rebellion. The General then went to the 2 Battalion, Ikeja, where he discussed with Lt-Col Hilary Njoku, who at that time should have reported to his new posting in Kaduna. The question to ask here is, “Was the General not supposed to be a target for elimination since he was one of the officers who could have been one of the obstacles to the success of the coup? How was he able to go about without being shot by the forces of rebellion? Which troops were protecting him as he drove round that night when there were shootings all over Ikoyi where his senior officers were being killed? By 0400 am, all the targets in Lagos had been eliminated and it was time to consolidate at the Federal Guards, Ikoyi. How Fani-Kayode was Saved After the killing of Akintola, Capt. Nwobosi ordered his men to proceed to Abeokuta to collect a 105 mm Howitzer from the battery gun park and proceed to 2 Battalion, Ikeja. On the way out of Ibadan, Fani-Kayode begged Capt. Nwobosi to release him, but Nwobosi refused and informed him that he had orders to take him to the Federal Guard Officers’ Mess in Lagos. The party drove to Dodan Barracks where they arrived around 07.00 am. Before their arrival in Lagos, things had changed against them through the efforts of Lt-Col Yakubu Gowon and Major Murtala Mohammed and they were all arrested. Lucky Chief FaniKayode was handed over to me by Lt-Col. Yakubu Gowon, with the instruction to look after him as best as I could. He said I should not disclose his presence in the mess to anyone. I did as I was told until the 17th when he was collected by Lt-Col. Victor Banjo who claimed that it was an instruction from Lt-Col. Gowon. The Deputy Premier was shaken when he appeared at the Officers mess, but he was not harmed. Rather, he was lucky. At the end of it, he was full of appreciation for his safety in the mess. The soldiers travelling in the 3-Tonner with the 105 mm Howitzer were arrested on arrival in 2 Battalion lines, Ikeja. Gowon and Mohammed were able to coordinate the arrest of some of the officers and men who took part in the coup, especially in the Signals and Transport units in Apapa. By daybreak, the ring leaders were no longer together to plan the next course of action. They had killed their superior officers and the key political figures in cold blood but were unable to consolidate because they did not have the troops to advance their plan. The collapse of the coup was eminent.
After the killings in Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna that night, Ifeajuna and Okafor proceeded to Enugu and held discussion, with some top government officials in the region.
It was in Enugu that they later became aware that events in Lagos and Kaduna had turned sharply against their plan. They separated and went into hiding after the collapse of the coup. Ifeajuna eventually escaped to Ghana where he was received at government level and was sent to Winneba as a guest of the government.
It is at this point that I have to give account of my experience of the events that took place that night and the days after as the only officer left in the Federal Guards.
The 15 January 1966 coup was a turning point in the history of the nation. It was the day that the military turned against itself through a coup that had support of some faceless politicians to overthrow the legitimate government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Although the plot had leaked to the ears of those who later became victims, it was dismissed as a hearsay because of the loyalty which the Nigerian Army was noted for. But some people have described some of the plotters as eccentrics and fanatics who had imported foreign ideas through reading revolutionary books when in school. They had probably joined the army with a purpose to effect changes in government through the barrel of the gun in the guise of patriotism. But their strategy turned out to be faulty. They could not claim to represent the interest of Nigeria while they operated as a tribal group. In the long run, they merely succeeded in sowing the seed of hatred and death among millions of Nigerians through subsequent events.
About 4.30 am that morning, I was disturbed by hard knocks on the door of the house. I heard someone calling, “Sir, Sir, wake up.” I woke up and I looked down through the window. What I saw frightened the hell out of me. It was a Landrover full of soldiers in battle dress. Feeling confused, I thought for a moment that they had come to arrest or shoot me. I could not think of the reason for their being there at that time. But I heard the voice of Samuel Tayo, the Guards RSM, who led the troops to my residence saying,
Thank God, so he is still alive. He said, Sir, come down now, now, the country is in confusion. As we dey here now is not good for we. Them don kill the Prime Minister, and Maimalari. Please Sir, hurry let us go to the barracks.
What a rude shock. I quickly went knocking on Ezedigbo’s door, which was facing mine, but he was not there, so I returned to my room. Where had he gone to? I asked myself, for it had not dawned on me that a coup had taken place. Coups and counter-coups were not part of the subjects I was taught as a cadet in Nigeria or Canada, but surprisingly I found myself caught in that situation. Who were those behind it and how safe was I?