Coups and counter-coups

In that state of confusion, I started to put on my boots but realised that I was still in pyjamas. When I got out of the initial shock, I knelt down for a short prayer. I remember having prayed:

Lord, I don’t know where I am going at this moment but give me guidance and take charge of my life.

From then on, I became fully composed and ready for the unknown. I quickly dressed up in battle dress and rushed down to the waiting Landrover. I did not know if they were really taking me to the barracks or kidnapping me but I had faith in myself and confidence in RSM Tayo. With a quick glance benina, I realised that most of the soldiers in the Landrover were from the North and only Tayo and one Lance Corporal Jimo Were from the West. They all looked grim and confused. Tayo tried to tell me what had taken place during the night and how they risked going to find out about me. He said the shootings were heard from the senior officers’ residences in Ikoyi and that troops were moving recklessly all over the island. When I asked the RSM whether he had seen the Officer Commanding, Major Dkafor, and the other two officers of the unit, Ezedigbo and Igweze, Tayo said ‘them no dey’ meaning they were not around. He said they were worried by the sounds of gunshots of the night and in the confusion, got wind of what was going on. Tayo told me that the OC Major Okafor and the officers, as well as the senior NCOS of the Motor Transport section of the unit, all of whom were Igbos could not be seen in the barracks and that was why they risked going to find out if I was still alive. The firing had by then stopped. At that stage, my mind quickly went to the meeting of Ezedigbo and the three S&T officers on 11 January 1966 and concluded that they were discussing their role in the coup. Their absence in the barracks confirmed it. It was equally the same reason why Lt. Igweze, a sharp infantry officer from the Federal Guards, was for no reason, posted to the S&T before the coup. It was all confusion and suspicion in the barracks that early morning. There were no officers and the situation was delicate.

Until 15 January 1966, officers and men of the army cared less about their ethnicity or state of origin. It was all about respect for one another in the service of our country. It was trust, loyalty and comradeship at all levels. But the sectional murders of that night ushered in ethnic sentiment. It was a surprise to me when I learnt of the involvement of my Officer Commanding, Major Okafor who was never identified with tribalism. Even more surprising were some of the reasons advanced for the coup, which was to eliminate political profiteers, and corrupt political leaders. I cannot testify against the integrity or professional competence of the young officers but the memory of Okafor’s involvement in financial misappropriations was fresh in my mind. As majors and captains, they were company commanders or staff officers at battalion or Brigade Headquarters in the small army, as it were. How then could they claim to have answers to the political problems of a country so diverse in culture like Nigeria, barely six years after independence? However, many had linked the coup to the outcome of the 1964 Federal elections between the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) group, and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) group. The UPGA was predominantly built around an eastern political party and a faction of a western political party. Could that have attracted sympathy from the young Igbo officers with one or two Yoruba officers?

The leaders of the coup recruited many young officer and men from selected units, and ordered them to participate or be killed. Over 50% of the officers and men whom they recruited for the night operations were only told of the plot that night. They were given no option. I had persona knowledge of some of them, especially the young officer whom we trained together. Their main targets in the arm) were Brigadier Maimalari, Col. Kur Mohammed, Col. James Pam, Col. Largema, and Col. Unegbe, all in Lagos. Others were Brigadier Ademulegun and Col. Shodeinde in Kaduna. The political leaders marked for elimination included the ‘Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Premier of Northern and Western Regions, Sir Ahmadu Bello am Chief Samuel Akintola respectively. They believed however, that the abduction and killing of the political leaders would not be difficult as they were guarded by the police who were lightly armed.

The coupists took full advantage of the element 0 surprise and struck simultaneously in the early hours of January 15, 1966 in Lagos, Ibadan and Kaduna, when their targets were ill bed.

In Lagos, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna made a careful selection’ of junior officers and men for the operations from the Army Workshop, Signals, and Supply and Transport units. To ensure that Maimalari, the key threat did no escape, the assignment was given to Major Okafor, the Officer Commanding Federal Guards. The soldiers of the Federal Guards unit were not expected to present any serious opposition to him. At the scheduled time, Major Okafor, assisted by Lt. Igweze, led a platoon to Maimalari’s residence at No. 11 Brown Road, Ikoyi and overpowered the guards by killing the guard commander who challenged them. The sound of the pistol killing the Guard commander awoke Maimalari from his sleep. It must have been obvious to him that he was the target. So he escaped through the I boys’ quarters and headed for the Federal Guards barracks. Unfortunately, he ran into Major Ifeajuna, his Brigade Major and Lt. Ezedigbo by the Ikoyi Golf Course which lay adjacent to the mess. They killed him on the spot and proceeded to eliminate the other senior officers on their hit list, in their houses. Others like Abogo Largema were hunted for and killed at the Ikoyi Hotel. Ifeajuna, Okafor and Ezedigbo went to the Lodges or the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa

Balewa, and the Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, and took them alive to where they were later killed in the bush along Lagos-Abeokuta road.

In Kaduna, the night operation was carried out under the command of Major Nzeogwu’s. Nzeogwu carefully coordinated the operation immediately after the end of his exercise damisa in the early morning of January 15, 1966. The soldiers were issued live ammunition after the exercise That looked suspicious to some soldiers who questioned the rationale for getting live ammunition after the exercise was over. However, Nzeogwu convinced them that they were going for another special internal security operation. He handpicked the officers and men who went with him to the Lodge of Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of Northern Region, where they killed Sir Ahmadu Bello and his wife in cold blood and set the Lodge ablaze. As part of the conspiracy, some unit commanders in Kaduna and some other locations who were sympathetic to the plot, positioned themselves to be inaccessible on the day of the coup. The Governor of Northern Nigeria, Sir Kashim Ibrahim was arrested and taken to the officers mess but his life was spared. Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun, the Commander of 1 Brigade and his wife were however brutally murdered by Major Onwatuegwu and two other officers. All the killings took place between the hours 02.00 to 04.00 a.m on 15 January 1966.

In Ibadan, the operation was easier for there were only two targets, the Premier of Western Region, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola and his deputy Chief Fani-Kayode. It was conducted by Captain Nwobosi and his men of the 2 Field Battery.: They first arrested the Deputy Premier and forced rum to lead them to the Premier’s Lodge. Both Chief Akintola and Chief Kayode we,re to be arrested and taken to the Federal Guards Officers Mess, Ikoyi, Lagos. Whilst FaniKayode wisely surrendered to be arrested, Chief Samuel Akintola tried to fight back until he ran out of ammunition. He surrendered thereafter and asked for mercy but his assailants did not spare him. Chief Fani-Kayode was however lucky not to have been killed, and was brought to the Federal Guards in the morning but fortunately for him, the tide had turned against the plotters and Fani-Kayode was handed over to me by Lt-Col. Yakubu Gowon with instructions to take good care of him in the Officers Mess, Ikoyi, arid not to disclose his identity to anyone for security reasons. REACTION IN THE BARRACKS A junior officer is supposed to take legitimate orders from his superiors. His loyalty is to his country first according to the laws of the land. But there comes a time when you are totally ignorant of what is going on around you and have to decide on a course of action alone. Sometimes you have to lose the fear of death to be able to decide and do what your conscience dictates. That was the situation with me in t}; early hours of that fateful 15 January 1966.

When we got to the barracks, a soldier asked me, “08 (sir) what is happening?” I looked at him and said we shall know soon, just keep calm. There was confusion and the soldiers looked agitated. They wanted to know what to do but as disciplined soldiers, someone had to give them order’! Faced with that circumstance, I decided to take command of the troops in the absence of the Officer Commanding and ordered that thearmoury and magazine be opened so that arms and ammunition be given to the soldiers. I also order€( them to observe and report suspicious movements and will utterances of the soldiers in the barracks. We could not take chances as no one could tell who was involved at that stage Realising that Major Okafor and my other colleagues wen probably involved, I thought that I was alive only by the grace of God.

Tayo and the senior NCOs hailed the idea of taking up arms as I commanded them to. They were ready to fight back at the slightest provocation. Within minutes, every soldier had his rifle and ammunition ready to shoot it necessary. The dawn of mistrust had set in. Later in the day 2/Lt Joseph Osuma surfaced. He was not with me that night but was definitely not one of the night operators. Throughout the period ahead, he maintained low profile in the barracks.

We were on our own throughout the night without instructions from anybody and I was left to take the initiative on my own and waited for my fate. The opportunity came when the dissident officers started to troop into the barracks after they had completed their killing assignments. It appeared the coup plotters had planned to regroup in the Federal Guards Barracks in Okafor’s office for their next line of action. They did not expect any opposition there, being Major Okafor’s unit. But they grossly miscalculated. The ‘Canadian Tiger’ 2/Lt. Tarfa, was awake and ready for any eventuality. I had already heard of the killings that had taken place that night and made up my mind to face the situation squarely, whatever the consequences may be.

While alone in the barracks, I decided to be curious and looked into the loose files on the table in Okafor’s office. There were many loose papers on the table which did not make sense but I was shocked to find one signal message from Major Nzeogwu to Okafor in one of the files. It read:

Ensure the Tiger is in the net. Even if it means recruiting more captains.

Without any doubt, the tiger referred to was Brigadier Zakariya Maimalari. The coup could only succeed if Maimalari was killed.