Nigeria: ln the next 36 months

By Ejeviome Eloho Otobo and Oseloka H. Obaze

EVER before the first ballot in the 2019 presidential elections was cast, some members of Nigeria’s leadership elite, across the political spectrum, were already signaling their intention to run for the presidency in 2023. It seemed as if the President’s term, when re- elected, would be for 48 weeks rather than 48 months. Today marks one full year since the re- elected President Buhari was sworn in for a second term. This article outlines some of the major issues, which will preoccupy public policy making and other likely developments in Nigeria in next 36 months. Most likely, Nigeria might witness a deterioration of her fiscal, foreign exchange and debt situation; growing incidence of poverty; heightened criminality linked to unemployment and impunity; and probable fiscal insolvency of some states. Other key developments will include electing a new president; with luck and assertive military valour, the overcoming of Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa Province insurgency; and growing public awareness of, and insistence on, strict adherence to constitutional norms on protection of life.

Nigeria’s deep- seated economic challenges have been simmering for a while; but the dramatic fall in global oil prices triggered by a confluence of factors including COVID- 19 pandemic, has laid bare the vulnerability of Nigeria’s dependence on oil. While Nigeria’s economy is nominally diversified with oil now accounting for less than 10 percent of gross domestic product; oil, nonetheless, still accounts for nearly 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings and 60 percent of government revenue. Hence, the overarching challenge is that even if the Federal government were to ramp up its domestic revenue generation capacity to the African average of 17- 20 percent of GDP; Nigeria has no immediate substitute for oil as a major foreign exchange earner. Diaspora remittances to Nigeria, though huge, remain largely informal and quite mercurial. Since the end of the civil war in 1970 – some fifty years ago – successive Nigerian governments have relied on two major resources or tools for governance: military force in the political realm, and oil in the economic realm. The use of the military to address public policy issues, even as their structural causes are political or economic in nature, has become the default feature of public policymaking. This has led to overstretching the capacity of the military in domestic operations. Of the various security threats confronting Nigeria presently, the lone crisis that required military force is combating the terrorism of Boko Haram and Islamic States West Africa Province ( ISWAP). Thus, Nigeria now seems to be suffering from the law of diminishing marginal utility in its reliance on military force and dependence on oil.

As we approach 2023, a trenchant debate is unfolding as to which geopolitical zone should produce the next president. On one side are those who argue that the next president must come from the same part of the country as the current incumbent, insisting that the principle of rotation is not in the 1999 Constitution. On the other side are those who argue that there is no clause or principle in the 1999 Constitution, which stipulates that the same region or geopolitical zone is entitled to produce the next president. These two equally valid assertions could drive the country in a wrong acrimonious, direction. The cast of probable presidential aspirants may be classified into three categories: the plausible, the pretenders, and the perspirants. Given Nigeria’s long unfulfilled national aspirations, Nigeria’s attentive public has growing expectations concerning the attributes of the next president. These include broad national outlook; ability to communicate frequently and honestly with the public; willingness to be accountable to the people, parliament, and the press; abjuring patrimonial claims to leadership and crass partisanship; upholding constitutionalism and rule of law; and commitment to free, fair and credible elections.

On the last point, it bears emphasis that the 2023 presidential elections will transcend just electing a candidate to occupy

Nigeria’s highest political office: lt will be more of a referendum on democracy in Nigeria. The report of European Union Observer Mission cast a harsh spotlight on several shortcomings of the 2019 general elections, which INEC has promised to remedy. Equally important, all presidential aspirants must refrain from any form of conduct that undermines the integrity of the electoral outcome. Given that the presidential elections are scheduled first in every election year, how the presidential elections are conducted in 2023 will determine whether Nigeria’s electorate will have the confidence and enthusiasm to vote in the follow- on elections in 2023. The frequent resort to the Supreme Court to adjudicate electoral disputes does not only burden the Court unduly, but has unwittingly converted the apex court into an electorate college, thus diminishing the value of the popular vote.

Electoral legitimacy is a core value and pillar of good governance. Yet much else rides on performance legitimacy. Action will be needed in three critical areas. First, is reforming the machinery of government. This goes beyond the implemention of the rather limited number of recommendations in the White Paper on the Oronsaye Report. Precisely because the presidency is at the “central nervous system of the government”; reforming it will be an important component of improving the functioning, efficiency and effectiveness of the government. Dwindling fiscal resources are an additional impetus for undertaking wide ranging public sector reforms. Meanwhile, Nigerians are hopeful that the recent ranking appointment in the presidency might yet bring the desired reforms within the presidency and signal the resolve for broader and deeper public sector reforms.