Nigeria and China, 1971-2016: Beyond Forty-five Years of Great Power and Regional Power Relationship
On Thursday, February 4, 2016 Nigeria and China had every reason not only to celebrate in Abuja the Chinese Spring Festival but particularly also the establishment of diplomatic ties between Nigeria and China which clocked 45 years on Wednesday, 10th February, 2016. The relationship is quite interesting because of its dynamics: an asymmetric relationship, one between a great power, China, and an aspiring great power, Nigeria. It is a relationship between a global power and a regional power, a relationship between the most populous country of the world and the most populous country in Africa. China is the third biggest country in the world in terms of territorial size with 9,700,000 km2 coming after former Soviet Union with 22,270,000 km2 and Canada with 9,700,000 km2. In fact, it is a relationship in which foreign policy objectives are not only common but also in which their techniques are also shared.
China presents herself as a Third World country, but, true enough, China is a great power by whatever objective definition. China is a power that has manifest power while Nigeria is a power in the making, only having potential power. Nigeria has necessary resources and other elements of power to become great but such resources are yet to be translated into manifest power like in China. Explained differently, China, as a power, and for that matter, a ‘great power’, has the capacity to produce and destroy. Raymond Aron, in his Paix et guerre entre les Nations, says power is ‘la capacité d’imposer sa volonté aux autres (‘the capacity to impose one’s wish on others’, vide page 58) while Arnold Wolfers sees it as the ‘ability to coerce or, more precisely, to inflict deprivation upon others.’ Power as a means of changing the wishes of others is different from the notion of ‘a power,’ the definition of which is largely based on many factors (see Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Qu’est-ce qu’une grande puissance? Relations Internationales, no. 17 (Paris, IHRIC, Université de Paris Sorbonne).
From this perspective, China is a power in the sense the French would describe it: ‘pouvoir’ in its domestic sense and not ‘puissance,’ which implies an extra-national dimension. From the perspective of Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, power in the sense of pouvoir, is about a state ‘ qui est capable, en certaines circonstances, de modifier la volonté d’individus, groupes, ou Etats étrangers’ at the domestic level, while power in the sense of ‘puissance,’ involves the domestic and external factors of persuasion, coercion and influence politics. China, both in the domestic and external dimensions, is a power to reckon with in the post-World War II era.
In spite of this, China identifies more with Third World countries at the level of their development objectives, Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle, politico-economic emancipation, and especially offering affordable concessionary development loans to African countries more than what the traditional allies of Africa do. While several observers take the delight in looking at China as a developing nation, the Chinese underscored a more quiet diplomatic approach to the conduct and management of their foreign policy, waxing stronger without drawing any international attention to it.
Main Dynamics of the Relationship
The emergence of the People’s Republic of China following the end of World War I, and particularly, her emergence as a great power in international relations constitutes a source of inspiration for many Nigerians who want to deal with the country as an alternative source of development aid. Without jot of doubts, China was not a major power until the outbreak of World War II. It should be recalled here that, in the 17th Century, the recognized countries with great power status, were only France, England, Austria, The Netherlands, Spain, and Ottoman Empire. In the 18th, the last three countries were replaced by Russia and Prussia, meaning that the number has decreased from six to five: France, England, Austria, Russia and Prussia. In the 19th Century, Italy joined the league in 1861. At the end of the century, the United States and Japan also joined the club of great powers. At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as super powers. In all these cases, there was no mention of China.
However, with the admission of People’s Republic of China into the United Nations, and particularly to the Security Council, the story has been different and this is what has been an inspiration in Nigeria-China ties: how did China manage to quickly address the challenges of her underdevelopment within a short period of time? This has been a push factor in the relationship.
Chinese foreign policy posture, generally vis-à-vis Africa, and particularly towards Nigeria, also constitutes a push factor. For instance, the Chinese Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Nigeria, H.E. Gu Xiaojie, noted, in his statement delivered on February 4, 2016 at the reception organized to mark the 45th Anniversary of the relationship that ‘China will firmly implement the policy of “sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith” towards Nigeria and Africa put forward by President Xi Jinping, uphold the correct viewpoint of righteousness and benefit, join hands with Nigeria for win-win cooperation and persist in planning and promoting bilateral relations from a strategic and long-term perspective.’
President Jinping’s policy statement is quite significant in many ways. The operational words are very thought-provoking: sincerity, results, good faith, righteousness and benefit. In other words, are the Chinese truly sincere about them? If we bear in mind that international politics and international relations are largely predicated on untruth as main dynamics, if we also remember that countries that are already big and powerful do not want any other big power to emerge, if we have not forgotten that nuclear powers continue to strengthen themselves but do not want any new nuclear aspirants, if we also recall that all efforts to bring about a new information order in the 1970s, a new world order of fairness and justice, as well as a world in which international peace and security will no longer be threatened to the extent of provoking another scourge of global war, have all failed so far, if we also remember that not even the democratization of the UN Security Council is feasible for now, we must therefore appreciate that this Chinese statement is a major departure from what we know about western attitude.
This sincerity of purpose, pursuit of concrete results and demonstration of faith become, perhaps, more interesting if we also reckon with the suggestions made by the Chinese ambassador to Nigeria on how to showcase sincerity and good faith in the pursuit of concrete and beneficial goals. As suggested by Ambassador Xiaojie, there is the need to enhance political mutual trust; maintain close and friendly exchanges; deepen cooperation in all areas of human endeavour, especially infrastructure construction, industrial parks and zones, industrial connection, resources exploration and utilization, processing and manufacturing, related industrial production capacity, and agricultural modernization. He also suggested the need to start the construction of a series of big projects, beefing up cooperation in security, as well as in the cultural and people-to-people exchanges in the education, science and technology, healthcare, youth, media, etc sectors. Most interestingly, he called for the enhancement of communication and coordination on major international issues ‘so as to jointly safeguard the common interests of China and Africa, as well as other developing countries. In this way, the China-Nigeria strategic partnership with win-win cooperation at the core could bring tangible benefits to the two peoples.’
If the Chinese can openly declare their readiness to relate on the basis of honesty and good faith, without expression of reservations so far, it can be rightly noted that the challenge is no longer at the level of China but Nigeria and her people. What really can we say is Nigeria’s policy on China? Can Nigeria timely take advantage of China’s currently good attitudinal disposition towards Nigeria? Can there be any form of transfer of technology from China to Nigeria? When the totality of Nigeria-China cooperation is put together, how do we assess it? How do we put it on a larger scale for improvement?
For instance, the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) of the Chinese Oil Companies (COCs) is lesser than that of Western oil companies for various reasons: COCs concept of CSR is narrow as they ‘confine CSR to philanthropic donation on small projects. They have adopted a simplistic way of implementing CSR in Nigeria, especially that they have limited contacts with local actors or international stakeholders. More disturbingly, ‘they are not sensitive to external appeals and pressure from local NGOs and transnational networks,’ which probably, make them attract more criticism from Nigerian civil society than the established Western oil majors, especially when dealing with issues of transparency and human rights (vide Wang Xuejun, op cit). When will the Chinese be able to overcome this insensibility?
Beyond 45 Years of Relationship
If we take a look at the past 45 years, it can be submitted that the future of the relationship is quite bright. The ties are likely to be warmer. The Finance Minister, Mrs. Kemi Adeosun, is expected to conclude negotiations on a loan of $2 billion from China to fund the 2016 budget. As reported by The Nation, ‘Nigeria wants to raise about $5 billion abroad to cover part of its 2016 budget deficit. This is projected to hit N3 trillion ($15 billion) due to heavy infrastructure spending at a time when the slump in global oil prices has slashed export revenues… Nigeria had wanted to raise $1 billion from Eurobond investors but has dropped plans to sound them out at a non-deal road-show.’ This loan has the potential to serve more as a push, rather than a pull, factor in the management of Sino-Nigerian relations of the future.
Another factor that is more critical is the development of the Lekki Free Zone (LFZ) by the Chinese in Lagos State. The LFZ is sited at the tip of Lekki Peninsula, south of the Lekki lagoon and north of the Atlantic Ocean. It is about 50 km from Victoria Island, 10 km from the new international airport being planned by the Federal Government of Nigeria and 60 km from Apapa Harbour. The LFZ occupies a 30 km2 of land for which the Lagos State Government has issued a Certificate of Occupancy.
The LFZ is a joint venture, involving the Lagos State Government which has equity share of 20%, Lekki Worldwide Investments Limited with an equity share of 20% and the China-Africa Lekki Investments Limited which has the biggest equity share of 60%. The Chinese Harbour is already handling the project. According to the Chinese, ‘LFZ is planned to develop into a comprehensive industry zone, a new city with manufacture, processing and service industry and a new hub of the sustainable regional export-oriented economy.’
In this regard, the LFZ, which is the biggest economic free zone in Nigeria and which is one of the 18 overseas cooperation zones supported by the Chinese government, is designed to have a customs and administrative building, sophisticated road network, exhibition centre, staff camp, medical clinic, 12 mw power plant, 11kv power transmission line, standard factory, customs processing centre, police station, office building complex, oil and gas tank farm, apartment building for investors, and hotel, among others. And perhaps most interestingly, the LFZ is expected to attract not less than $20 billion worth of investments, as well as create 100,000 employment opportunities. Not less than 120,000 people are expected to reside in the zone. In other words, the LFZ is designed to be a satellite city, and not simply a town. As such, the LFZ cannot but continue to be a factor of rapprochement between China and Nigeria.
It is useful to also recall here that the Chinese are similarly playing an active part in the development of the air transportation industry. The CCECC is handling the modernization of several international airports in Nigeria. The modernization is not just about rehabilitation but also about the reconstruction and construction of new ones. Currently, the Chinese are handling five airport projects: Murtala Muhammed International Airport (domestic wing), Abuja International Airport, Port Harcourt International Airport, Mallam Aminu Kano International Airport in Kano and Akanu Ibiam International Airport in Enugu.
For a long time to come, the perception of China by most African leaders as a reliable partner who is ready ‘to share with Africa experiences in its own scientific, technical, technological and economic success,’ and particularly ‘the absence of a colonial history between Africa and China… which accounts for the absence of destabilizing tension and an ever growing spirit of cooperation and solidarity,’ is likely to continue to shape Nigeria-China ties. This reliability is shown in the oil services industry.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, Chinese oil engineering companies worked in the Niger Delta as contractors and thereafter began to seek ownership of Nigeria’s oil reserves. As noted by Wang Xuejun, the companies wanted to expand oil production capability of their enterprises and secure access to crude oil from Nigeria. In this regard, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), all state companies, registered their own companies in Nigeria: SINOPEC in 2003 and CNPC and CNOOC in 2006. With this development, they began to invest in Nigeria’s oil sector: the CNPC had four oil blocks (two in the Niger Delta and two in the Chad Basin) in 2006 in exchange for a $2 billion investment in the Kaduna refinery. The CNOOC also got four oil blocks in the Niger Delta in exchange for a $2.5 billion loan from China’s Exim Bank for rehabilitating the Lagos-Kano railway and the construction of a hydro-electric power station in Mambilla. In fact, the SINOPEC acquired 29% share in block 2 of the Nigeria-Sao Tome Joint Development Zone while the CNOOC ‘paid $2.3 billion for a 45% stake in an oil mining license in the lucrative Akpo offshore field (see Wang Xuejun, “The Corporate Social Responsibility of Chinese Oil Companies in Nigeria: Implications for the Governance of Oil Resources,” in Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe and Liu Hongwu, eds., China-Africa Relations (Addis Ababa: IPSS, University of Addis Ababa and IASZNU, 2013), p. 128.
Besides, the Chinese oil companies not only have a strict environmental protection policy that underscores ‘a careful investigation into the local environment before beginning exploration… and an environment impact assessment report before any operation is conducted in the oil fields’ but also have respect for the local content requirements of Nigeria, by giving emphasis on professional training for Nigerian employees. For instance, in September 2011, the SIPEC (Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration Company-Nigeria) had 33 Chinese, 3 western and 120 Nigerian staff, with those well-educated and having executive ability holding management and technical positions. This is good but cannot be good enough unless the whole Sino-Nigerian cooperation enables the transfer of technological knowhow. This is what the future ties should always aim at.