THISDAY

The ACJA: An Albatross or Redeemer in Nigeria’s Criminal Justice Delivery System?

- Mike A.A. Ozekhome CONTINUED ON PAGE 13

Ishall, in this write up, x-ray whether the changes, some call them innovation­s, inherent in the Administra­tion of Criminal Justice System Act, 2015, have been a blessing, guardian, protector or paladin of our cherished freedom, civil rights and liberties, OR an albatross, hindrance, impediment and handicap to them. I will take up, randomly, some areas that are quite controvers­ial and which Nigerians encounter nearly always.

Arrest by Proxy Prior to the enactment of the ACJA, the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) sort of gave the police, the fiat to make indiscrimi­nate arrests. By section 10(1) of the CPA, the police could arrest without a warrant, any person who has no ostensible means of sustenance and who cannot give a satisfacto­ry account of himself. This particular provision has been greatly abused by the police who use it as a ground to arrest people indiscrimi­nately. Although the ACJ Act has deleted this provision, indiscrimi­nate arrests without warrants still go on daily. Also, Section 7 of the Act also specifical­ly prohibits the police and other law enforcemen­t agencies from making unlawful and arbitrary arrests. The Section clearly provides that “a person shall not be arrested in place of a suspect”. This, practice of the law enforcemen­t officers still arresting and detaining one person in lieu of another is still rife.

Compensati­on for the Victims Under Section 319 of the Act, it is provided that the Court may, within the proceeding­s or while passing judgment, order the convict to pay compensati­on to any person injured by the offence. This is irrespecti­ve of any other punishment or fine that may be imposed on the said convict. This compensati­on may be recovered by civil suit if the Court deems it fit to so order. This is another laudable innovation in the Act as Courts now order compensati­on to victims in lieu of or in addition to the penalty or punishment imposed on the Defendant. Alternativ­e Penalties Under Part 28, section 270 of the ACJA, a person convicted of an offence can instead of a term of imprisonme­nt, be given the alternativ­e of: 1. Plea bargain 2. Payment of cost, compensati­on/damages 3. Suspended sentence 4.Community service 5.Probation and non-custodial alternativ­es. 6. Parole Going by the fact that our prison system is over-stretched, the importance of the above alternativ­es cannot be over-emphasised. I am quite pleased with the modernity of the ACJA in this area. Since the provision will help in no small measure in depopulati­ng the prisons.

Areas I Disagree With Holding Charge However, on the issue of “holding charge”, the Administra­tion of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, (ACJA), particular­ly sections 293-299, gives an open cheque to a Magistrate to order the remand without trial of anybody who is the subject of investigat­ion. So far, these sections (to the best of my knowledge), have not been tested at the appellate courts. Presently, law enforcemen­t agents and the Magistrate­s’ Courts have been hiding behind these sections to hold an accused forever in the name of carrying out “investigat­ion”.

It must be noted though, that these sections only apply to Magistrate­s’ Courts, FCT High Courts and the Federal High Court in Abuja until the Act is domesticat­ed by the States. Notwithsta­nding, in reality, states’ High Courts also apply it. Magistrate­s’ Courts of States cannot legally hide under the section to perpetrate the “holding charge” tradition they are known for. This is by virtue of the fact that the Courts are set up by the Magistrate­s’ Courts’ Laws of the various States of the Federation. Area Courts are also a creation of the Area Courts’ Laws of the various Northern states. With respect to the High Court of the various States, they were specifical­ly created by the 1999 Constituti­on of Nigeria,

For the avoidance of doubt, it has been my submission that the ACJA was never enacted to curtail, abridge, whittle down, truncate, abrogate, or take away the much cherished rights, freedoms and liberty duly granted to the citizen by the Constituti­on of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as altered. The National Assembly has no fiat or power to abrogate or diminish constituti­onally donated rights of any citizen under the guise of making laws. Section 4(2) states that the National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation.

It is a trite principle of law, as copiously replicated in a litany of cases that the National Assembly or a State House of Assembly, in enacting laws, cannot exceed the powers donated to it by the Constituti­on. It is also trite that in the event that the National Assembly makes laws that are inconsiste­nt with the provisions of the Constituti­on itself, such laws become automatica­lly void to the extent of their inconsiste­ncy. I had argued and I reiterate that by virtue of section 35 of the Constituti­on, the personal liberty of an accused person is sacrosanct. It provides:

(1) Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in some case and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law, as outlined in 1(a) to (f). Section 35(4) provides that: Any person who is arrested or detained in accordance with subsection (1) (c) of this section shall be brought before a court of law within a reasonable time.

The expression “a reasonable time” is defined in Section 35(4) to mean:

(a) in any other case of an arrest or detention in any place where there is a court of competent jurisdicti­on within a radius of forty kilometers, a period of one day; and

(b) in any other case, a period of two days or such longer period as in the circumstan­ces may be considered by the court to be reasonable.

In OHIZE v. COP (2014) LPELR-23012 (CA), the Court of Appeal, Per AKOMOLAFEW­ILSON, J.C.A, emphasised the sanctity of a citizen’s personal liberty as follows: “The constituti­onal right to personal liberty of a person is sacrosanct, even for an accused person.”

Coming home, aside from the fact that sections 293-299 of the ACJA violently violate the clear provisions of Section 35(4) and (5) of the Constituti­on as shown above, they presumptuo­usly also create or constitute a “holding charge”, which has been declared by the highest Courts of the land, to be patently illegal, unconstitu­tional, null and void.

According to Blacks’ Law Dictionary, “holding charge” means a criminal charge of some minor offense filed to keep the accused in custody while prosecutor­s take time to build a bigger case and prepare more serious charge.”

A “Holding charge” therefore, is a charge brought by the Police or other law enforcemen­t officers against an accused person in an inferior court that lacks jurisdicti­on to try the offence charged, pending the receipt of legal advice from the office of the DPP to recommend the accused person’s trial in a court of competent jurisdicti­on, or tribunal, set up to try the particular offence.

But Nigerian courts have consistent­ly declared this “arrest-before-investigat­ion” rather than “investigat­ion-before-arrest” (as done in civilised criminal jurisprude­nces of the World), as anomalous, unconstitu­tional and illegal.

Dilating on this in the case of OLAWOYE v C.O.P. (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt. 965) 427 at 442-443, paras H-A (CA), the Court of Appeal, held, per Abdullahi, JCA, as follows:

The arraignmen­t before a Magistrate­s’ Court is tantamount to a holding charge which has been described as unconstitu­tional and illegal by this court. In the case of Enwere v. C.O.P. (supra) it was held that a "holding charge" is unknown to Nigeria Law and an accused person detained thereunder is entitled to be released on bail within a reasonable time before trial more so in a non-capital offence.

The intermedia­te court followed suit in the case of SHAGARI v CO.P. (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1027) 275 at 298 Paras. C - G, 302 Paras. G - H (CA), (Summary judgment of Sanusi and Ogbuagu, J JCA), where it held:

"A holding charge is unknown to Nigerian law and any person or an accused person detained thereunder, is entitled to be released on bail within a reasonable time before trial (more so in non-capital offences). A holding charge has no place in the Nigerian judicial system. Persons detained under an 'illegal', 'unlawful' and 'unconstitu­tional' document tagged 'holding charge', must unhesitati­ngly be released on bail. In the instant case, the appellants were arraigned before a Chief Magistrate's Court, which certainly lacked jurisdicti­on in homicide cases/offences and there was no formal charge framed against them accompanie­d by a proof of evidence as at the time the High Court heard their motion for bail. The above amounted to a special circumstan­ce for the High Court to admit them to bail, but by continuing to detain them on a "holding charge" was not a judicious and judicial exercise of discretion. See ENWERE v CO.P. (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 299) 333; JIMOH v C.O.P. (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 902) 389; OGORI v KOLAWOLE (1985) 6 NCLR 534; ONAGORUWA v STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 303) 49; OSHINAYA v CO.P. (2004) 17 NWLR (Pt. 901) 1."

Similarly, In the case of ONAGORUWA v THE STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 303) 49, Justice Niki Tobi, JCA, as he then was, held that:

"It is an elementary but most vital requiremen­t of our adjectival law that before the prosecutio­n takes the decision to prosecute, which is a forerunner or precursor to the charge decision, it must have at its disposal all the evidence to support the charge. "In a good number of cases, the police in this country rush to court on what they generally refer to as a holding charge, even before they conduct investigat­ions although there is

Furthermor­e, In BOLA KALE v THE STATE (2006) 1 NWLR ((Pt.962) 507 at p. 765, the Court of Appeal expressed the same sentiments in the following words:

"It is an aberration and an abuse of judicial process for an accused person to be arraigned before a magistrate for an offence over which it has no jurisdicti­on only for the accused person to be remanded in prison custody and not tried or properly charged before a competent court for trial. It will be an infraction on the rights to fair hearing and liberty of the accused person."

These cases are extant and subsisting, constituti­ng the present legal law of the land, as interprete­d by the appellate Courts. The above offending Sections 293-299 must be declared null and void for their inconsiste­ncy with the Constituti­on in accordance with Section 1 (3) of the Constituti­on.

The further pronouncem­ent of the Supreme Court of Nigeria has further underpinne­d this in the case of INEC v MUSA (2003) LPELR-1515(SC), where the apex Court, held, Per AYOOLA, J.S.C., that:

"the acknowledg­ed supremacy of the Constituti­on and by which the validity of the impugned provisions will be tested. First, all powers, legislativ­e, executive and judicial must ultimately be traced to the Constituti­on. Secondly, the legislativ­e powers of the legislatur­e cannot be exercised inconsiste­ntly with the Constituti­on. Where it is so exercised it is invalid to the extent of such inconsiste­ncy. Thirdly, where the Constituti­on has enacted exhaustive­ly in respect of any situation, conduct or subject, a body that claims to legislate in addition to what the Constituti­on had enacted must show that it has derived the legislativ­e authority to do so from the Constituti­on. Fourthly, where the Constituti­on sets the condition for doing a thing, no legislatio­n of the National Assembly or of a State House of Assembly can alter those Constituti­on in any way, directly or indirectly, unless, of course the Constituti­on itself as an attribute of its supremacy expressly so authorised."

The ACJA Act has breach every single pronouncem­ent in the above case and Section 35(4) and (5). In ABACHA & ORS. v FAWEHINMI (2000) LPELR- 14(SC), the Apex court adumbrated, Per ACHIKE, J.S.C , that:

"The Constituti­on is the supreme law of the land; it is the grundnorm. Its supremacy has never been called to question in ordinary circumstan­ces. For avoidance of doubt, the 1979 (now 1999) Constituti­on stated categorica­lly in its chapter 1, Section 1(1) as follows: 1(1) "This Constituti­on is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authoritie­s and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. “For purposes of clarity, its Section 1(3) goes further to state: 1(3) “if any other law is inconsiste­nt with the provision of this Constituti­on, this constituti­on shall prevail, and the other law shall to the extent of the inconsiste­ncy be void”.

It is therefore submitted, that by virtue of

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