Propriety of Conviction of Accused Person Based on Only the Confessional Statement
Facts
On 9th December, 2000, the deceased, a certain Chief Layi Balogun, and his security detail, were accosted at his residence by five unknown armed men who fired gun shots. The deceased, his security aide and members of his family, were then taken hostage and at about ten minutes later, both the deceased and the security aide were shot, after which the gun-men carted away the deceased’s cell phone, omega wristwatch and the sum of N20,000.00. The deceased later died, at the hospital.
The Appellant, (1st accused person), was charged along with three other co- accused persons, for the offences of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, murder and receiving stolen goods contrary to Sections 403A, 402(2) (A), 319(1) and 420 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap 32, Vol. 2 Laws of Lagos State of 1994. During trial, the defence objected to the admissibility of the confessional statement made by the Appellant, on the ground that it was made involuntarily, owing to which the trial Court conducted a trial-within-trial to determine its voluntariness. The trial Court found that the statement was made voluntarily, and admitted it in evidence. Thereafter, the Court found that the Respondent had proved its case against the Appellant and his co-accused persons beyond reasonable doubt, and convicted them accordingly. The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court, unsuccessfully appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Appellant further appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues for Determination In deciding the appeal, the Supreme Court was guided by the encompassing issues distilled by the Respondent thus:
(i) Whether the eminent justices of the Court of Appeal, were right in holding admissible Exhibit H, the purported confessional statement of the Appellant predominantly relied on in convicting him as charged, same having been established not to have been obtained under duress; and
(ii) Whether apart from the Exhibit ‘H’, the Prosecution led cogent and credible evidence in proof of the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Arguments For the Appellant, it was contended that the confessional statement obtained was made involuntarily, and that where elements of oppression either by way of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment is established, the voluntariness of the
statement is vitiated thereby. The Court was urged to expunge from the record, the legally inadmissible purported confessional statement attributed to the Appellant. Counsel submitted further that, the purported identification of the Appellant was vague and imprecise, as the identification of the Appellant on the television by PW1 and PW2 as one of the robbers, cannot take the place of lawfully conducted identification parade.
The Respondent on its part, argued that the Court below rightly considered the ratio decidenci adopted by the trial Court, in reaching the decision that the confessional statement was voluntarily obtained.
Court’s Judgement and Rationale In determining the appeal, the Court reiterated the renowned modes of proof of criminal cases which are: (i) by testimony of eye witness(es) who watched, heard or witnessed the commission of the crime by the accused person(s); (ii) through confessional statement voluntarily made by the accused person; and (iii) through circumstantial evidence, which clearly points to the sole fact that the accused and no other person, committed the offence charged. In this case, the prosecution sought to tender in evidence the confessional statement made by the Appellant, which was objected to on the ground that it was obtained through torture. The Court on this noted the settled law that, where there is a dispute on whether or not an accused person made the statement sought to be tendered, and if same was voluntary, it was the duty of the trial Court to try the voluntariness of such statement by conducting a trial-within-trial, otherwise known as a mini trial. OLAYINKA v THE STATE (2007) 9 NWLR (PT. 1040) 5. The trial Court having ascertained the voluntariness of the extra-judicial statement of the Appellant, it was duty bound to rely and act on the confessional statement.
The court noted the principle that, the free and voluntary confession of guilt alone by an accused person, provided it is direct and positive and was duly made voluntarily, is sufficient to ground a conviction, since a confession always remains the best proof of what he had done. ALABI v STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (PT. 307) 5. Looking at the statement of the accused person vis-à-vis the record of proceedings, the trial Court undoubtedly examined and evaluated the statement guided by the requirements set down by the Apex Court, which the lower Court duly considered before endorsing the decision of the trial that the statements were voluntarily made.
Noting that, the confession of an accused person to the commission of an offence, plays a vital role in the determination of his guilt; a trial Court is thereby, free to convict him, even on the confessional statement alone, once that trial Court is convinced that the confession is voluntary. It was also emphasised that a mere retraction of a voluntary statement by an accused person, as in this case, does not render such statement inadmissible, worthless, or untrue in considering his guilt. IDOWU v STATE (2000) 7 SC (PT.II) 50
On want of corroborative evidence, the Court noted that PW1 and PW2 were eye witnesses, who witnessed the criminal act perpetrated by the Appellant and his partners. They heard the sound of the gunshots fired at the deceased, and both gave uncontradicted and uncontroverted testimonies, which corroborated the statement. Similarly, some exhibits in the nature of goods that were robbed from the deceased, were tendered by the prosecution at the trial, in proof of the offences the Appellant was charged with, tried and convicted for by the trial Court. Furthermore, the witnesses called by the prosecution, had given credible and reliable evidence, which fixed the Appellant at the scene of the crime. Thus, the pieces of evidence were neither contradicted nor challenged in any material respect at the trial, and the Appellant was pinned down in the commission of the offences charged.
Regarding the complaint by Counsel for the Appellant, that the Prosecution did not provide a witness to testify in the case during the trial-within-trial, the Supreme Court noted that the prosecution is not bound to call every person linked to the commission of the crime by physical presence or otherwise, to give evidence on what he perceived. Once persons who can testify to the actual commission of the crime and on the other ingredients have done so, such will suffice for the satisfaction of the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt, as stipulated in Section 138(1) Evidence Act, 2011 as amended. THE STATE v OGBUBUOYO & ANOR (2001) 12 NWLR (PT. 678) 576. As a matter of fact, the evidence of a single witness who gives cogent eye witness account of the incident, can suffice. ODILI v STATE (1977) 4 SC 1.
On the requirement for identification parade as posited by the Appellant, their Lordships held that identification parade is not sine qua non for conviction. It is sufficient, if credible evidence is adduced to show that the person charged with an offence, is the same as the person who was seen committing the offence(s). Thus, when a trial Court is confronted with identification evidence, all it is required to do, is to be satisfied that the evidence of identification had established the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. UKPABI v STATE (2004) 6-7 SC 27. In this case, the two eye witnesses had interaction with the Appellant and the other co-accused persons, for a reasonable time during the commission of the offences. Also, the Appellant had fixed himself at the scene of the crime, on the day of the incident. Agreeing with the two lower Courts, the Apex Court held that, the requirement of formal identification parade was superfluous.
On the quality of evidence of the Investigating Police Officer (IPO), the Court disagreed with the Appellant that the evidence of the IPO was hearsay, because he narrated to the Court the outcome of his investigation, and in the course of his duty, he must have discovered some pieces of evidence vital to the commission of the crime, which the Court considered in arriving at a just decision, one way or the other. Hence, the lower court was right in refusing to discountenance the evidence adduced by PW3. Finally, the Court noted the concurrent findings of two lower Courts, that the prosecution had proved it case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt; thus, as matter of practice, the Apex Court is usually hesitant in interfering with such findings, except in special circumstances, such as where the findings are perverse or where there is misapplication of law.
Based on the foregoing, the Court resolved the two issues against the Appellant, and accordingly, dismissed the appeal. The judgement of the Court of Appeal, which had earlier affirmed the judgement of the trial Court, was affirmed.
Appeal Dismissed.
Representation: F.A. Dalley and O.A. Olude for the Appellant
Adedoyin Rhodes-Vivour (Mrs.) with Thomas Ojo, Ireti Banjo and Princess Obi for the Respondent. Reported by Optimum Publishers Limited (Publishers of the Nigerian Monthly Law Reports (NMLR))