Bad Postcard from Bamako
On the 21st of March, 2012, mutinous soldiers of the Malian army invaded the Presidential Mansion in the capital city of Bamako. The mostly other rank soldiers were thrilled to burst into the luxury and opulence of the mansion. Their instant punishment for any unfortunate occupants they found in the place was merciless flogging with several strokes of horsewhip. The soldiers then proceeded to empty the refrigerators of expensive rare liquor before ransacking the kitchen for choice leftover presidential food. They then sank briefly into the pampering comfort of sumptuous presidential leather sofas while savouring their momentary opulence, a taste of the gravy of privilege and the spoils from the conquest of power.
This earlier coup, like the recent one, began as a mutiny ostensibly in protest against the government’s handling of the Tuareg jihadist insurgency in the desert north of the country. The soldiers then proceeded to sack the government of Ahmadou Toumani Toure. Then as now, the coup was greeted with unanimous international condemnation and a barrage of sanctions, blockades and diplomatic lockouts. Concerted diplomatic squeeze led to negotiations between the coup leaders and ECOWAS which yielded an understanding that the coup leaders would hand back power to a transitional government in return for some form of amnesty. The ousted President was allowed to proceed on exile.
Before then, the Tuareg insurgents had taken control of northern Mali and declared an independent nation of Azawad led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a separatist movement that dates back to about 1916. The armed wing of the Tuareg insurgency is fuelled partly by returnees from the Libyan civil war and sundry Islamist movements in the Arab world, some inspired partly by the Arab Spring.
Following a UN resolution and a formal invitation by the then interim government of Mali, the French intervened by launching “Operation Seval” in January 2013. The aim of the operation was to neutralize the threat of the rampaging Tuareg Islamist insurgents in the northern parts of the country. They had initiated a southward push to sack the government of the country. The French operation was part of an international effort to contain the spread of Islamist fundamentalist terrorism in the Sahel.
Fast forward to 18th of August, 2020. Widespread protests and civil unrest over worsening economic conditions and bad governance produced widespread discontent. The spectre of growing insecurity from continuing threats from the Tuareg Islamists in the north in the country worsened a bad political situation.
Another set of mutineers from a wing of the Malian army from a base in the small town of Kati invaded the capital city of Bamako and stormed the presidential palace. They arrested and detained the President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and the Prime Minister Boubou Cisse with key government officials. The government was forced to resign. The protesting mobs jubilated in the streets. A coup was completed with Col. Assimi Goita emerging as head of the new junta. Both the political opposition and the leaders of the civil unrest have welcomes the coup. No one knows whether there is a collaboration between the coup leaders and the opposition elements.
International condemnation and sanctions have followed. Mali has been suspended from the African Union while ECOWAS has imposed a land and air blockade of the country. The United States has suspended military training and assistance. ECOWAS has sent in a negotiating team headed by former Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan. It is only likely that the soldiers will negotiate everything except their hold on power and the duration of their tenure.
The new coup in Mali is a replay of a familiar African script. Insecurity has bred bad politics. Political instability has in turn opened the door for ambitious soldiers to topple democracy at a bad time and in a dangerous place. The sad truth is that fragile democracies cannot in and of themselves protect themselves from the forces that bad politics and atrocious governance unleash.
Sadly, the ripples of the drama in Bamako will not stop in Mali. A host of regional security issues have been come to the fore. First is the future of democracy in vulnerable places where bad governance and unsettled national questions inevitably endanger national security. Second is the security of the nations sharing the Sahel against the strategic peril posed by the geo political relocation of international terrorism to the Sahel.
The long standing conflict between the Tuaregs in the north of Mali and political factions in the southern half of the country has remained intractable for decades. Mali’s geographical location as a gateway between North Africa and the Sahel make the strategic implications somewhat compelling and treacherous. Local Islamist jihadists have mixed freely with fundamentalist terrorists from North Africa and the Arab world from where they have been routed by concerted Western pressure. Instability has also made Mali a hot highway for illicit trade in drugs and human beings seeking a safe corridor to Europe.
Malian politics has been infiltrated by these contending forces. The jihadists have embedded themselves into the partisan divides of the country. Assorted Islamist fundamentalist groups have sheltered into the equation. The political opposition now includes jihadist elements seeking a bigger voice in the government.
It is doubtful if a government assailed on all sides with sectarian and political turmoil can deliver good governance to avert the kind of civil unrest that quickened the latest coup. Most tragically, the politicians in Mali have failed to strengthen the apparatus of state security over these years. Consequently, the periodic easy invasions of the centres of power and authority cannot be a credit to any credible concept of state security.
The fragile state of Mali’s national security has major regional and international security implications. Mali is central to the Sahel which is a continuum with the entire West Africa. This zone has also become the festering ground for the renegade formations of Al Queda, ISIS and now ISWAP. These terror groups having been routed in Europe and most of the Arab world have become more active in West Africa up to Nigeria where Boko Haram has remained a major threat for over a decade. Countries as far afield as Senegal, Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Cameroun have all been targeted by the terrorists.
It is good that ECOWAS has initiated a mechanism for some resolution. Coaxing the soldiers to leave the comfort of the presidential mansion and return to the barracks may not be so easy. Forging a platform of common national commitment between the Tuaregs and the rest of the political factions in Mali may be the real challenge. Even more daunting would be how to dissuade the more militant wing of the islamists in northern Mali to disconnect from their patrons in the larger Arab jihadist formations.
For us in Nigeria, the development in Mali has an urgent resonance. We have unresolved internal security challenges. We have since adopted a strategy of involving the military in internal security operations. Increasingly, the insurgency in the North East is becoming institutionalized. It could acquire political coloration over time. They have attempted an assassination of the Governor of Borno state. They had previously tried establishing a caliphate spanning the border areas between Nigeria, Chad and Cameroun. There are unproven allegations of complicity between active politicians and elements of the insurgents. There have also been charges of sabotage of operations by elements in the security forces. These problems further complicate Nigeria’s internal security nightmare. Mali has shown that where insecurity and instability persist, incompetent governments no matter their military backing are a danger to national security and democracy itself. That incidentally is the postcard from Bamako to Abuja.