AfrIdI urgEs yOutH tO bEcOmE vOIcEs Of gAggEd KAsHmIrIs

IT’S CLEAR A FULL WITHDRAWAL BY MAY 1 IS “OFF THE TABLE” THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TALIBAN WON’T STRIKE A DEAL BY APRIL, BUT THEY MIGHT IF GIVEN ENOUGH TIME

PARLIAMENTARy Committee on Kashmir Chairman Shehryar Khan Afridi has urged the Pakistani youth to become the voices of the unheard people of Indianoccupied Kashmir (IOK).

Addressing the participants of a seminar, held here at the Lahore College for Women University (LCWU) with regard to the Kashmir Solidarity Day, Afridi said that the prosperous world needs to build pressure on India and compel it to end its genocide policy against the Kashmiri

people. He said laws, including the UAPA, are being used to suppress freedom of expression and freedom of speech, adding that the Pakistani youngsters need to become voices and storytellers of the Kashmiri people as the world needs to be informed about the true stories of Kashmir.

He further said that Kashmir is a human issue and it is wrongly being portrayed as a political and geographical conflict in South Asia.

"The world needs to see Kashmir as a humanitarian issue and the Kashmiris should be given their right of self-determination," he added.

Afridi stressed that the reports of United

Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and other institutions have pointed out that the Indian occupational forces are committing war crimes in IOK. However, practical action is missing in the world’s reaction towards India.

The Kashmiri mothers are standing like rock and encouraging their sons to offer sacrifices for the freedom struggle.

The Indian atrocities being committed against the fearless and brave people of IOK have failed to break resistance of Kashmiris.

He urged the academia to help generate new content on Kashmir so a new and strong narrative building process on Kashmir could be started.a

IF my nation has sensible young men like Hameed Nizami, my nation’s future is very bright,” said Quaid-e-azam while addressing the participants of the annual session of the all-India muslim Students Federation in Jalandhar. That was when the struggle for Pakistan was gathering momentum. The late Hameed Nizami commenced his professional life as owner of a newspaper, technically on march 23, 1940, the very day on which the Lahore Resolution was tabled in a public meeting held at the then minto Park. The future doyen of Urdu journalism of this land founded, literally from scratch, his fortnight publication Nawa-i-Waqt, with the help of a couple of his friends on that momentous day, when the muslims of the subcontinent had gathered to voice their resolve to have a homeland of their own.

Hameed Nizami was not new to journalism; he had learnt the ropes the hard but the right way. a master of arts from the University of the Punjab in english Literature he had acquired the knack of gathering and reporting news while he was employed as a young reporter with the associated Press of India. He had spent some time as coeditor of ‘Saarbaan’, a political journal, before becoming the manager of the Orient News of India owned by the muslims.

Hameed Nizami’s approach towards handling contemporary issues, whether political, social or economic, was invariably appreciated for being correct and lucid. He dared to take exception to outmoded concepts and succeeded in advancing correct and rational ideas. That was what developed further as his style of writing till his last days. When Quaid-i-azam visited Lahore in 1944 after expelling malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana from the muslim League he sent for Hameed Nizami and said to the budding journalist that he wished him to publish a daily newspaper from Lahore to 100 per cent represent the views of the muslim League and the Pakistan movement and asked to get going right away.

That was the day when Hameed Nizami and his Nawa-i-Waqt joined the front lines of the struggle for Pakistan. Both Hameed Nizami and his paper had to face the wrath of the government day. Financial squeeze was a favourite weapon to keep newspapers in line and for close to three years, till the Unionist Government of Khizar Hayat Tiwana fell no government advertisement was placed for publication with the ‘Nawa-iWaqt’. That was despite the fact that the ‘Nawa-i-Waqt’ was neither a party paper nor an official mouthpiece of the muslim League Party which was in opposition to the Unionist party and the Zamindara league.

The same squeeze was applied after independence, too. mian mumtaz daultana, just five days after becoming the Punjab Chief minister tried to coerce the Nawa-i-Waqt to toe the official line. as Hameed Nizami refused to bow down, the government revoked the paper’s declaration Not only that, somebody else was surreptitiously encouraged to publish a propped-up Nawa-i-Waqt. That was open war. Hameed Nizami, to the charging of the government, shot his first volley in reply, by launching his Jihad. When the government tried to throttle Jihad, he responded by catapulting his ‘Nawa-iWaqt’. at last in June 1952 the government gave up and ‘Nawa-i-Waqt’ made its proud re-appearance. This entire affair never dampened the spirit of Hameed Nizami who, a staunch believer in the freedom of the press, brooked no curbs on its independence or censorship of its contents.

Hameed Nizami truly believed that the power of the pen was more lethal than of the gun while dealing with adversaries especially in those days when every muslim worth his salt was involved, one way or the other, in the Pakistan movement. Hameed Nizam used his pen with undeviating resolution and undiminished devotion. He was straightforward, to the point, with a clear idea of what he was saying or writing about and was fearless in expressing his opinions. That is a trait considered essential for an upright journalist. Ho belonged to that crop of journalists who were born in a period when journalism was taken very seriously and as a profession was held sacrosanct, one in which there could be no middle ground or compromises with principles.

So, when Hameed Nizami took up the cause, he already had some idea what needed to be done; he seemed to have known what Quaid-i-azam desired, for he had been an active member of the Punjab muslim Students Federation and had done a lot to propagate and popularise the programme of the muslim League amongst the muslim masses of Punjab and neighbouring areas. The leading role Hameed Nizami and Nawa-i-Waqt played in the struggle for Pakistan cannot be underestimated. He rejected all ideas that were at cross-purposes to the concept of Pakistan. and those who advanced such mischievous ideas were countered by Hameed Nizami’s power of the pen. No critic of the need for Pakistan to become a reality was spared and the argument for establishing an independent homeland for muslim was advanced with full force and vigour. Hameed Nizami never reconciled with the politics of opponent of the idea Pakistan. according to him, a subservient press was of no service either to the country or the government. The flatterer kept the leadership unaware of the mind of the people and the real happenings in the country, creating a false sense of security in the rulers who then, unwittingly, could start thinking that the masses were satisfied and happy with their policies.

The present management of Nawa media, which publishes Pakistan Today, one of the most widely read english language dailies, Paperazzi, a lifestyle and fashion magazine, Profit, country’s best business magazine, The Dependent, a satirical publication, and ABC (Arts, Books and Culture), that focuses on country’s arts, books and culture, is carrying on the principles and standards the late Hameed Nizami had prescribed and determined while laying the foundations of the paper. They are, with care and diligence, keeping the torch alight, which Hameed Nizami lit more than half a century ago.

Hameed Nizami believed in Pakistan as a modern muslim State, a Republic, democratic in polity, following the teachings of Iqbal and the guidelines given by Quaid-i-azam. He was totally opposed to obscurantist ideas. One of the cardinal points of the policy he set for Nawa-i-Waqt was to completely reject those who had opposed the concept and creation of Pakistan, whether they be socalled old politicians or the newer ones of varying hues or the self-appointed custodians of the faith of contrasting creeds and their followers. In his (Hameed Nizami’s) opinion, nothing good could be expected from people who opposed the Quaid and the creation of Pakistan. He never agreed with their ideas, and neither did he reconcile with anybody putting the rank and file of the common people in straightjacket and directing their politics.

The writer is a freelance columnist. He is a close observer of Hameed Nizami’s life and struggle for Pakistan.

pReSIDeNT Joe Biden has been presented with three broad options for how to prolong or end America’s involvement in the 20-year Afghanistan War — and all three have significant drawbacks for the administration and the Afghan people.

Here’s what Biden’s military and intelligence advisers offered up in recent days, as reported by the New York Times and the Washington Post’s David Ignatius, details of which I later confirmed.

The first option is to adhere to former President Donald Trump’s deal with the Taliban, which would require Biden to withdraw all remaining 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan by May 1. The second is to negotiate an extension with the insurgent group, allowing American forces to remain in the country beyond early May. And third is to defy the Trump-Taliban pact altogether and keep fighting in Afghanistan with no stated end date.

each plan has serious pitfalls, experts and US officials say. If the US leaves in the next three months, it’s likely the Taliban will overrun the US-backed Afghan government and once again make life worse for millions of Afghans, especially women and children.

Staying in Afghanistan just a little bit longer would likely delay that takeover, but would also expend any diplomatic capital the US has left with the Taliban and keep US troops in harm’s way.

Finally, violating the terms of the agreement and remaining indefinitely will almost certainly lead the Taliban to restart its campaign, put on hold ahead of the May 1 deadline, to kill American service members in the country. “These are all bad options,” said Asfandyar Mir, a Stanford University expert on the Afghanistan War. Multiple US officials told me in recent days that the administration’s Afghanistan policy review is nearing its end, with one telling me they expect Biden to make a decision “very soon.” “I don’t know which way the president will go,” said this official, who like others spoke with me on the condition of anonymity to talk freely about a sensitive national security deliberation. Another person familiar with the Afghanistan discussions told me it’s clear a full withdrawal by May 1 is “off the table.” Public statements from the Biden team offer additional clues as to which way Biden will lean.

Biden promised during the presidential campaign to bring home US combat troops from Afghanistan, but gave himself until the end of his first term to do so (though, importantly, this statement came before the TrumpTaliban deal). He also said he would still potentially keep a small US military presence in the country to continue counterterrorism operations against ISIS and al-Qaeda. That meant it was always possible Biden wouldn’t abide by the terms of the Trump-era deal.

Recent statements by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin also suggest a full withdrawal may not be on the immediate horizon. A Pentagon summary of his comments during a NATO ministerial last Thursday said Austin had “reassured Allies that the U.S. would not undertake a hasty or disorderly withdrawal from Afghanistan.”

In comments to reporters the following day, Austin added, “[W]e are committed to a responsible and sustainable end to this war, while preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups ... that threaten the interests of the United States and our allies, and ensuring a just and durable end to the long-running conflict.”

The signal many are getting from Austin and others is that Biden will be the fourth president to prolong America’s engagement in Afghanistan, most likely by pushing for an extension to the deadline.

Biden still hasn’t made a decision, though, so it’s worth taking a look at the three options he has in front of him — and why each is fraught with risk and danger.

OPTION 1: WITHDRAW ALL 2,500 US TROOPS BY MAY 1:

Few experts or US officials I spoke to believe Biden will adhere to the timeline laid out in the Trump-Taliban peace deal — either because Biden wants to seek a more lasting diplomatic solution to the war in Afghanistan or because his team fears an intensified civil war on the heels of a US withdrawal would make the administration look bad.

In January, Secretary of State Tony Blinken told Afghan President Ashraf Ghani that the US supports diplomatic negotiations between the government and the Taliban. America’s hope is to help “achieve a durable and just political settlement and permanent and comprehensive ceasefire that benefits all Afghans.”

But those talks are barely underway and have little to no chance of ending by the May 1 deadline. Both parties hold opposite positions on key questions — among them, how much power can the Taliban have in Afghanistan’s government? — that likely won’t be reconciled in a few months. What’s more, the Taliban hasn’t stopped killing Afghans or curbed it’s relationship with alQaeda. To ensure those talks proceed instead of stalling out, many experts believe a small American troop presence must remain in the country. Still, there is a vocal contingent advocating for the US to finally withdraw from Afghanistan after 20 years of war. “I support leaving by May,” said Adam Weinstein, who served as a Marine in Afghanistan and is now a research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington, DC. “The Afghanistan talks may fall apart if we leave, but they also will fall apart if we stay.”

Weinstein acknowledges that the Taliban will surely intensify its civil war with the Afghan government once the US departs, further destabilizing an already bad situation. But that’s likely to happen whenever America withdraws its forces, whether in May or later. “Leaving by May frontloads these risks while not risking American lives,” he told me.

Which leads to the second reason observers doubt Biden will stick to the May withdrawal timeline: Images of a renewed, bloody war after America’s withdrawal plastered on the front pages of newspapers would embarrass the Biden administration. Pressure would mount on the president and his team to reenter the fray to quell the violence, just like many pushed Obama to send US forces back into Iraq to defeat ISIS.

It’s therefore possible that leaving prematurely might lead the US to reenter the conflict again — perhaps with an even larger troop presence. Weinstein told me he knows that’s a risk and hopes Biden would resist such pressure. There will be problems, but all this comes down to the fact that America hasn’t proven its ability to win the war against the Taliban, even with tens of thousands more troops in the country.

Today, the insurgents control more territory in Afghanistan than they did in 2001 when the US invaded, making it even harder to push for a military victory. “You could kick the can down the road, or you could accept the limits of US control of ground realities in Afghanistan,” he said. In other words, leave now and don’t look back.

OPTION 2: NEGOTIATE AN EXTENSION WITH THE TALIBAN, THEN LEAVE:

This is the option most people I spoke with favor and believe Biden will choose. They argue that withdrawing by May is simply too soon, but that staying indefinitely is also politically and militarily infeasible. Delaying America’s full withdrawal for a few months or even years, then, allows the peace process to play out and for an unhurried US exit from Afghanistan. “It’s unquestionable that an extension should be negotiated,” said Laurel Miller, who was the acting special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Obama administration.

Simply put, the Afghan government and the Taliban won’t strike a deal by April, but they might if given enough time. Penning an agreement would allow officials in Kabul to lead their country without the major threat of violence, while also giving the Taliban some governing power and global legitimacy. “There’s reason to believe the Taliban would genuinely negotiate and accept some kind of political settlement [that] satisfies their interests,” said Miller, who’s now at the International Crisis Group. With such a deal in place, the US and its NATO allies could extricate themselves from Afghanistan without fear their absence would lead to more bloodshed. This is what Ghani, Afghanistan’s president, and others close to him have been pushing for. After NATO last week said its 5,000 troops wouldn’t leave the country imminently, Ghani said their presence would help provide a “window of opportunity to accelerate the peace process.”

An extension was also the key recommendation in a congressionally mandated report earlier this month from the Afghanistan Study Group, an independent, bipartisan commission of experts co-chaired by retired Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, former Republican Sen. Kelly Ayotte, and US Institute of Peace President Nancy Lindborg. But this Goldilocks option has flaws, too.

For example, it’s unclear whether the Taliban would even agree to an extension. Their messaging for America to date, Stanford’s Mir said, is “leave by May 1 or we fight you.” Biden therefore risks adding to the 2,400 dead Americans in Afghanistan if the US overstays its welcome.

And even if it does, staying beyond May 1 would mean Biden chose to prolong America’s engagement despite having a ready-made excuse for withdrawal. That would no doubt anger a lot of people, namely progressives and some on the right, who hoped the Democrat would finally bring the US war effort there to a close. “What’s worse: Being accused of being too status quo, or being accused of taking risks and having ugly eventualities happen on your watch?” Miller asked, describing the question the Biden team is wrestling with.

There’s also a glaring weakness with this plan: There’s just no guarantee that the Afghan government and the Taliban will actually make a deal. After months or even years of talking, it’s possible neither side will make concessions to the other to hash out a comprehensive peace pact. If that’s the case, US troops will have remained in danger for little to no progress.

Still, experts believe there are ways the US can get the Taliban to agree to an extension and perhaps pave the path toward a negotiated deal. That could include lifting UN and other sanctions on the Taliban, working with Kabul to release some or all of the group’s 7,000 prisoners, and removing the group from the State Department’s terrorist list. each of those moves would be politically costly and may end up strengthening the Taliban without eventually striking an agreement. But for some, taking bold steps to improve the chance of peace after so many years of fighting is worth the risk.

OPTION 3: STAY IN AFGHANISTAN INDEFINITELY:

everyone I spoke with said this is by far the worst option. Continuing the war with no clear end date would keep US troops in harm’s way and further doom any prospects of a negotiated peace, since one of the key reasons the parties are talking is because America said it was leaving soon.

Plus, there’s little popular support in the US for continuing the mission in Afghanistan, as most polling shows Americans prefer a withdrawal sooner rather than later. More than that, there’s just no clear path to victory in the war.

As mentioned above, the Taliban today controls more territory than it did when the US invaded in 2001. After 20 years of war, trillions of dollars spent, and tens of thousands of deaths, the US has only managed to achieve what Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, humbly described as “a modicum of success” in Afghanistan. At this point, there’s little reason to expect that the US staying in Afghanistan indefinitely, spending billions more and risking more US lives, will magically improve that outcome. And doing so is just not desirable considering the coronavirus pandemic has killed 500,000 Americans, Iran nears the acquisition of a nuclear bomb, China grows in strength, domestic terrorism threatens the homeland, and more. So why even discuss this option? It’s not that Biden would pick it, but that he might be forced into it if the limited extension (option 2) fails to actually produce a peace agreement.

Again, few think Biden will withdraw all US troops by May 1, which means he will be keeping US service members in the country with or without the Taliban’s approval. If he does it without their approval, that could lead the insurgents to attack and kill American personnel as they overtake major Afghan cities, perhaps even Kabul.

At that point, withdrawing from Afghanistan would be harder, experts say, because the administration won’t want to look like it’s running away from the fight. A return to a larger war, then, would likely ensue, leading to more death and woes for the millions of Afghans who’ve already suffered tremendously. “If a negotiated extension fails, there’s not going to be a withdrawal,” said the Quincy Institute’s Weinstein. If there were a perfect option, the US would have found it by now. It hasn’t, and that’s left Biden with three paths to take, each full of obstacles and risk. It’s a tough spot to be in, but sometimes the options a president has range from horrible to bad. The hope is he picks the least bad one.

fLARE gas is currently being burnt in the air at various field sites of the country as the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) has so far not allowed its utilisation for commercial purposes, it was learnt on Wednesday.

According to sources, as many as 18 applications seeking licence for use of flare gas are pending with the OGRA for the last four years. But hindrances created by different functionaries of OGRA in this regard has so far caused around Rs40 billion loss to the national exchequer.

"Unfortunately, wastage of flare gas is going unnoticed despite the fact that daily production of flare gas from different fields is approximately 100 Million Cubic Feet," an insider said. "Flare gas could not be injected into gas pipelines due to delay in OGRA decisions in this regard."

As per the sources, CNG stations are among the main consumers of flare gas, as identified by the applicants seeking licence from OGRA for sale of flare gas at CNG stations. Similarly, Utilization of Flare Gas Guidelines, 2013, do not restrict utilization of flare gas in CNG sector. In addition, according to clause F (I) and G, flare gas can be sold to third party at a negotiated price mutually agreed specifications.

However, different OGRA functionaries have so far raised serious reservations with respect to flare gas specifications, works related to compression at well-head/oil & gas field/site, transportation procedures, decanting of flare gas at CNG stations, specific design of equipment at CNG stations, and use of flare gas in CNG converted automobiles.

According to documents, the total potential of flare gas conservation in the country is over 100MMCFD, while use of only 20MMCFD of flare gas for commercial purposes could help the exchequer earn around $300,000 per day or $109.5 million per year.

It is pertinent to mention that OGRA Member (Gas) Muhamamd Arif, in a letter dated 11th February 2021, had requested the acting OGRA chairman to take necessary measures to control the damages caused to the institutional reputation, integrity and obligations of OGRA as regulator. He said that confusion created by different functionaries of OGRA over the issuance of flare gas licence has become big problem in spite of his best efforts.

"There is no bar or restriction on use of flare gas, inert alia, in the CNG stations as long as flare gas meets pipeline specifications; compression system is certified by CIE and TPI, and travasi system/bower is certified by CIE etc.," he noted.