Turkey’s Me­di­a­tion:

The Diplomatic Insight - - Contents -

In to­day’s world there are se­ri­ous prob­lems in the re­gional and global sys­tems. The end of the Cold War did not help much in re­gard to de­vel­op­ing mech­a­nisms to re­solve those prob­lems. The post-Cold War era con­tin­ued to present big chal­lenges, and the emer­gence of new is­sues com­pli­cated the deep prob­lems in in­ter­na­tional pol­i­tics. Eth­nic, sec­tar­ian and re­li­gious the world are in need of ef­fec­tive me­di­a­tion. In the chang­ing se­cu­rity en­vi­ron­ment, in ad­di­tion to bi­lat­eral dis­putes and state se­cu­rity, the se­cu­rity of in­di­vid­u­als as well as crises sparked by non­state threats fur­ther com­pli­cate this grim pic­ture. In this pe­riod, in ad­di­tion to the global eco­nomic cri­sis, the broader Mid­dle East is ex­pe­ri­enc­ing a po­lit­i­cal earth­quake cre­at­ing new chal­lenges that are do­mes­tic rather than in­ter­state. The need for me­di­a­tion is ob­vi­ous in this new era. In the last three decades, Turkey’s po­si­tion has been based on the use of diplo­macy Turkey works to de­velop ef­fec­tive dis­pute res­o­lu­tion in­stru­ments for the sur­round­ing re­gions, and is af­fected di­rectly or in­di­rectly, his­tor­i­cally or cul­tur­ally, by the myr­iad crises tak­ing place through­out a wide area. When there was a cri­sis in Bos­nia, all those who were suf­fer­ing tried to es­cape to Turkey. When there was a cri­sis in Nagorno-Karabakh, we felt its bit­ter con­se­quences be­fore any­one else — and a sub­stan­tial num­ber of refugees es­cap­ing from Syria turn to Turkey as a hu­man­i­tar­ian safe haven. In times of cri­sis — as in Tu­nisia, in Egypt or in Libya last year — Turkey is al­ways among the coun­tries that try its res­o­lu­tion. This is a chal­lenge for Turkey. In our en­deavor to de­velop ef­fec­tive mech­a­nisms for me­di­a­tion, we are par­tic­u­larly pleased to see that we share this vi­sion with sev­eral like­minded states. Many coun­tries are joined to­gether around a com­mon vi­sion based on mu­tual un­der­stand­ing, of diplo­macy to re­solve dis­putes. It was this com­mon vi­sion that led to the for­ma­tion of the Friends of Me­di­a­tion, launched un­der the UN frame­work in a part­ner­ship be­tween Turkey and Fin­land, bring­ing to­gether states, in­ter­na­tional or­ga­ni­za­tions and NGOs. The Friends of Me­di­a­tion plat­form with Fin­land was the most mean­ing­ful ini­tia­tive for us with re­gard to this chal­lenge. The idea is to have a global plat­form to con­trib­ute pos­i­tively to the res­o­lu­tion of crises. In many ways, it par­al­lels the Al­liance of Civ­i­liza­tions pro­ject, which was ini­ti­ated with Spain. The Al­liance of Civ­i­liza­tions aimed to ease ten­sions and cre­ate a new plat­form to coun­ter­act those who want to cre­ate ten­sions along cul­tural and civ­i­liza­tional fault lines. Within the frame­work of this ini­tia­tive, Turkey hosted the Is­tan­bul Con­fer­ence on Me­di­a­tion on Fe­bru­ary 24-25, 2012, bring­ing to­gether rep­re­sen­ta­tives of NGOs (non­govern­men­tal from a va­ri­ety of coun­tries. Turkey will con­tinue to pro­mote this plat­form in or­der to con­trib­ute to greater in­ter­na­tional con­ver­gence on this is­sue. Me­di­a­tion is a long and chal­leng­ing process. The me­di­a­tor needs to op­er­ate with the ut­most care and pa­tience within a well-pre­pared and com­pre­hen­sive frame­work. Based on Turkey’s ex­pe­ri­ence, a suc­cess­ful me­di­a­tion ef­fort has four di­men­sions: psy­cho­log­i­cal, in­tel­lec­tual, eth­i­cal and method­olog­i­cal.


One may di­vide ne­go­ti­a­tions into three

phases: over­com­ing psy­cho­log­i­cal bar­ri­ers, com­pro­mis­ing on tech­ni­cal dif­fer­ences, and mus­ter­ing po­lit­i­cal will. Psy­cho­log­i­cal con­sid­er­a­tions im­por­tant as the sub­stan­tive as­pects of the cri­sis at hand. At the very least, with­out mu­tual trust or ap­pro­pri­ate psy­cho­log­i­cal prepa­ra­tion, you can­not achieve suc­cess. Tech­ni­cal de­tails of ne­go­ti­a­tions come next, and the rest is about hav­ing the right po­lit­i­cal will to solve the is­sue.


A me­di­a­tor, whether an in­di­vid­ual or an in­sti­tu­tion, must em­pathize: try to un­der­stand, and put him­self or her­self in the shoes of the other. If a me­di­a­tor can­not achieve em­pa­thy, he can­not un­der­stand the psy­cho­log­i­cal dy­nam­ics of a dis­pute. Like­wise, those whom we want to bring to­gether should see the me­di­a­tor as one of them. Let me ex­plain my ar­gu­ment by re­fer­ring to an in­di­vid­ual ex­pe­ri­ence. In 2005, be­fore the elec­tions in Iraq, Sunni re­sis­tance groups were re­fus­ing to par­tic­i­pate in the elec­tions. At the time, as the chief ad­viser to Prime Min­is­ter Er­do­gan, I en­gaged to bring all the pri­mary re­sis­tance lead­ers to Turkey in or­der to per­suade them to par­tic­i­pate in the elec­tions as po­lit­i­cal par­ties. For three months we ne­go­ti­ated, day and night. As th­ese co­or­di­nat­ing their po­si­tions. Af­ter two or three months, in the last meet­ing, I said I wanted to lis­ten to all of them. They crit­i­cized each say­ing any­thing about the dis­pute among them, I de­scribed to them the Bagh­dad of the tenth cen­tury, when it was the cen­ter of civ­i­liza­tion: how peo­ple lived, the in­tel­lec­tual vi­vac­ity, the or­der, Harun Rashid and all the great lead­ers. Then I de­scribed an­other Bagh­dad, which was de­stroyed by Mon­gols in the thir­teenth cen­tury. Fi­nally, I de­scribed the choice be­fore them: “Ei­ther you will reestab­lish Bagh­dad as a cen­ter of civ­i­liza­tion or you will be part of the de­struc­tion of Bagh­dad, as the Mon­gols were.” It took an hour to re­late all th­ese de­tails. One of the lead­ers, the old­est one, in his seven­ties, from the Ubey­diye tribe, stood up and said, “Look, my sons” — the oth­ers were much younger — “we have to lis­ten to this brother, be­cause he speaks like a Bagh­dadi.” He doesn’t speak like some­one from the out­side. Af­ter that hour, we reached an agree­ment; th­ese groups came to­gether and formed what we call tava­fuk, and they par­tic­i­pated in the elec­tions. The im­por­tant thing is this: If we are me­di­at­ing be­tween Iraqi peo­ple, we should be speak­ing like Bagh­dadis. We have to speak like Da­m­a­scenes if the is­sue is Syria, or like some­one from Sara­jevo if the is­sue is re­lated to the Balkans. This is the most im­por­tant as­pect, if we are to con­vince oth­ers.

Be­lief in a So­lu­tion

An­other psy­cho­log­i­cal ne­ces­sity is to be­lieve in a so­lu­tion. For a me­di­a­tor a must. In­deed, if the me­di­a­tor does not be­lieve that the prob­lem can be solved, he can­not con­vince oth­ers. I know var­i­ous me­di­a­tors, even to­day, who make so many ex­cuses dur­ing the me­di­a­tion process for why the prob­lem is not solv­able. The me­di­a­tor him­self should be­lieve that the prob­lem can and will be solved. If we do not be­lieve that, we can­not con­vince the pos­si­bil­ity of a so­lu­tion. My col­league Celso Amorim, the for­mer Brazil­ian for­eign min­is­ter, worked very closely with me to per­suade Iran to sign on a deal. When we were en route to Tehran in the early stages of this process, a jour­nal­ist had asked me, “How come you are so or that you can help at least, when un­til now there has been no agree­ment?” This was seven or eight months be­fore trip to Tehran. I told her, “If I do not be­lieve in a so­lu­tion, I can­not per­suade oth­ers to solve the prob­lem.”

Ad­vance Prepa­ra­tion

Both sides must be pre­pared psy­cho­log­i­cally be­fore bring­ing them to­gether. Usu­ally, peo­ple want to em­bark on the ne­go­ti­a­tion process right away, think­ing that the me­di­a­tion starts when all the con­cerned par­ties come to­gether. It does not hap­pen like this in the ac­tual sit­u­a­tion. The process starts be­fore; and if in the early phases you do not pre­pare them a so­lu­tion will be slim. When we launched in­di­rect talks be­tween Is­rael and Syria, they were an­nounced in May 2008. The ac­tual process, how­ever, had started three years be­fore that, when Prime Min­is­ter and Ehud Olmert, at the same time. Dur­ing the two-to three-year in­terim pe­riod, we tried to lay the ground­work and pre­pare both sides psy­cho­log­i­cally for a so­lu­tion. In the case of the Tehran deal, again, my col­league Celso Amorim and I worked pa­tiently for grad­ual progress. A me­di­a­tor should be pa­tient, mak­ing sure, be­fore the dis­cuss and ne­go­ti­ate.


The sec­ond as­pect of me­di­a­tion is the in­tel­lec­tual di­men­sion. I do not re­fer just to an aca­demic frame­work. What I mean is hav­ing thor­ough knowl­edge about the is­sue in ques­tion. The me­di­a­tor must know the de­tails as much as pos­si­ble, even bet­ter than the

Study­ing the De­tails

Nat­u­rally, know­ing all as­pects of the sub­ject re­quires the me­di­a­tor to pre­pare in ad­vance. Be­fore start­ing the in­di­rect talks be­tween Syria and Is­rael, I read all the mem­oirs of par­tic­i­pants in the Mid­dle East ne­go­ti­a­tions of the 1990s. I ex­am­ined all the ac­tors and per­son­al­i­ties, col­lected all the books on the topic and read all the re­lated doc­u­ments. For ex­am­ple, one of my con­clu­sions re­gard­ing the fail­ure of the Syr­ian-Is­raeli talks in the 1990s con­cerned se­crecy. Be­fore start­ing the in­di­rect ne­go­ti­a­tions, I placed one con­di­tion on both sides: there would be no shar­ing of in­for­ma­tion with the press be­cause, in the 1990s, a leak to the press at the most crit­i­cal stage had led to the col­lapse of the process. I can tell you that I ad­mired both teams in talks, and there was no leak­age, partly be­cause I had said if there were, we would quit the ne­go­ti­a­tion process.

An­other as­pect of the in­tel­lec­tual di­men­sion is that me­di­a­tors must have a vi­sion. The suc­cess of a me­di­a­tion process de­pends on the ex­tent to which a me­di­a­tor can con­cep­tu­al­ize, not only the so­lu­tion, but also the new sta­tus quo that he is try­ing to es­tab­lish af­ter the so­lu­tion. Equally im­por­tant is the need for the me­di­a­tor to be clear about this vi­sion in his in­ter­ac­tion with the

par­ties, as if he is one of them. In the case of the Is­raeli-Syr­ian in­di­rect talks, for in­stance, I spoke to both sides. To the Is­raeli side I said, “If this peace is achieved, one day an Is­raeli can drive his car through Da­m­as­cus to Is­tan­bul to Europe with­out any bar­rier.” And to the Syr­i­ans, I said, “One day you can go from Da­m­as­cus to Jerusalem to pray in Masjid Al-Aqsa with­out any bar­rier.” Here is an ex­am­ple of shar­ing a vi­sion of what the pos­i­tive con­se­quences of a ne­go­ti­a­tion process could be. The same goes for our ex­pe­ri­ence in the Balkans. When we es­tab­lished the Bos­nia- Herzegovina- Ser­bia- Turkey tri­lat­eral dia­logue mech­a­nism last year, we had 10 meet­ings; and we had great suc­cess in re­solv­ing al­most all of the pend­ing is­sues be­tween Ser­bia and Bos­nia-Herzegovina, largely ow­ing to the fact that we shared a com­mon vi­sion for the Balkans.

Un­der­stand­ing Con­texts

An­other very im­por­tant point re­lated to the in­tel­lec­tual di­men­sion is for the ne­go­tia­tor to un­der­stand and an­a­lyze the in­ter­na­tional con­text of the process. No cri­sis takes place in a vac­uum; all the in­ter­na­tional crises that we are seek­ing to ad­dress have hap­pened in a global con­text. For ex­am­ple, be­fore the war in Iraq, our analy­ses told us of Iraq would cre­ate a disas­ter be­fore or af­ter the war. Then we de­cided to form the Iraqi Neigh­bor­ing Plat­form, com­posed of all the neigh­bors of Iraq. The mem­bers of the plat­form had 12 meet­ings be­fore and af­ter the war and tried to cre­ate at least a min­i­mum con­sen­sus in or­der to have a pos­i­tive im­pact on Iraq and its neigh­bors. We did so be­cause my anal­y­sis of the Bos­nia-Herzegovina cri­sis in the 1990s led me to the con­clu­sion that not only the do­mes­tic prob­lems, but also were re­spon­si­ble for the con­tin­u­a­tion the fail­ure of ne­go­ti­a­tion at­tempts. In­ter­na­tional ac­tors seek­ing to me­di­ate have to con­tain neigh­bors in or­der to con­trol a cri­sis. Thus, un­der­stand­ing re­gional and in­ter­na­tional con­texts is as im­por­tant as the sub­stance of the is­sue it­self.

Thirdly, there is the eth­i­cal di­men­sion of the ne­go­ti­a­tion process. Any­one who rises to the chal­lenge of me­di­a­tion should act eth­i­cally and have per­sonal in­tegrity. The rel­e­vant ques­tion to ask is, “What are the main eth­i­cal val­ues rel­e­vant to the ne­go­ti­a­tion process?” adopt a value-ori­ented ap­proach. The me­di­a­tor should be the defender of shared val­ues rather than a par­tic­u­lar in­ter­est. He should not be seen as be­ing both sides feel that you are shar­ing their val­ues, they are ready to ac­cept me­di­a­tion from your end. Shared cul­tural and his­tor­i­cal val­ues are very im­por­tant eth­i­cal fac­tors. For ex­am­ple, Turkey was very suc­cess­ful in bring­ing about con­crete out­comes through an­other tri­lat­eral plat­form, the Afghanistan-Pak­istanTurkey Tri­lat­eral Process. Be­gin­ning with the Ankara Dec­la­ra­tion af­ter tri­lat­eral meet­ings in April 2007, we had sev­eral meet­ings as part of this process. It has been the most mean­ing­ful plat­form for eas­ing the ten­sion be­tween the two neigh­bors and for dis­cussing, de­vel­op­ing, im­ple­ment­ing and over­see­ing var­i­ous co­op­er­a­tion projects. In ev­ery meet­ing, we have re­ferred to the same val­ues and to Turkey’s cul­tural ties with both coun­tries. Th­ese are not di­rectly re­lated

Turkey’s ac­cess to both coun­tries.

Sim­i­larly, it is im­por­tant for a ne­go­tia­tor to have sin­cer­ity and hon­esty, es­pe­cially when car­ry­ing mes­sages be­tween par­ties. The Is­raeliSyr­ian talks have failed be­cause of the Gaza War, but both Is­raeli and Syr­ian teams, through­out three years of prepa­ra­tion and then six months of in­di­rect ne­go­ti­a­tions, al­ways ad­mired the hon­esty of the Turk­ish side in car­ry­ing mes­sages. We nei­ther ex­ag­ger­ated the mes­sages in a pos­i­tive sense, nor did we add any neg­a­tive in­put to the mes­sages them­selves. You have to carry the mes­sages from one side to the other in an hon­est and sin­cere way. Dur­ing one no­to­ri­ous cri­sis, a me­di­a­tor shared two dif­fer­ent doc­u­ments with the two sides. It cre­ated a huge breach in mu­tual trust, which cre­ated prob­lems for the res­o­lu­tion of the cri­sis. The me­di­a­tor has to share the same doc­u­ments and speak the same lan­guage with both sides. It was in­ter­est­ing when the Wik­iLeaks doc­u­ments were re­leased on the In­ter­net. That day I was in Wash­ing­ton for bi­lat­eral talks. It was Sun­day, and there were sev­eral ref­er­ences to Turkey in those doc­u­ments. The next day Sec­re­tary Clin­ton and I held a press con­fer­ence on bi­lat­eral is­sues, sec­re­tary of state in pub­lic af­ter the Wik­iLeaks doc­u­ments were re­leased. There­fore, the press were very crit­i­cal. Af­ter­ward, in an­other press con­fer­ence some­body asked me what I thought re­gard­ing th­ese Wik­iLeaks doc­u­ments, which con­tained so many ref­er­ences to Turkey. I said I did not feel any­thing, be­cause I hoped that one day all the doc­u­ments in Tehran and Moscow and other places will be trans­par­ent, so that all th­ese par­ties might see that Turkey has used only one lan­guage to all the par­ties in all the ne­go­ti­a­tions. We are not afraid. We have used the same lan­guage con­sis­tently. When the Iraqi diplo­matic ar­chives were made pub­lic af­ter the war, Kur­dish friends said, “It was shock­ing for us that all the par­ties used dif­fer­ent lan­guage to us and to Sad­dam. Only Turkey used the same lan­guage to us and Sad­dam in the same way.” Such hon­esty and sin­cer­ity is very im­por­tant. There should not be du­plic­i­tous lan­guage, but some­times me­di­a­tors are tempted by their de­sire for suc­cess. Many me­di­a­tors want to have the No­bel Prize, and this is in­deed a good ob­jec­tive. How­ever, this temp­ta­tion for suc­cess some­times may lead a me­di­a­tor to try to sat­isfy one side by chang­ing the con­text a lit­tle bit. He/ she may wish to con­vince one side in this way and try to con­vince the other side by pre­sent­ing a slightly dif­fer­ent pic­ture, hop­ing that one day th­ese in­no­cent lies will bring them to­gether. But such lies even­tu­ally will de­stroy the par­ties’ trust in the me­di­a­tor. In short, sin­cer­ity and hon­esty are im­por­tant eth­i­cal val­ues that should be pre­served by me­di­a­tors.


An­other eth­i­cal qual­ity which we should all de­fend is neu­tral­ity. Here, some con­cep­tual clar­ity is needed; neu­tral­ity and ob­jec­tiv­ity are two dif­fer­ent things. All me­di­a­tors should be neu­tral, but in or­der to be ob­jec­tive, some­times you have to say to par­ties on one side that they are right or wrong. Neu­tral­ity means not fa­vor­ing one side; ob­jec­tiv­ity means be­ing on the side of truth. The P5+1 Iran talks were held last year in Turkey. Dur­ing the ini­tial din­ner, since we were the host coun­try, we were not plan­ning to talk on the sub­ject. I de­cided to make some jokes. In Turk­ish pop­u­lar cul­ture, we have Nasred­din Hodja, a well-known scholar and judge. One day a case was brought to him. He lis­tened to one side and said, “You are right.” Then he lis­tened to the sec­ond side and said, “You are right, too.” His wife was watch­ing him, and she said, “How views and you said ‘right’ to both of them.” He turned his face to his wife and said, “You are right, too.” If you lis­ten to all the par­ties to a con­vince you of the merit of their case. Neu­tral­ity means lis­ten­ing in a neu­tral way. Ob­jec­tiv­ity means, af­ter lis­ten­ing, telling one party, “You are wrong,” and the other, “You are right.” But you need to do so in the ab­sence of the other side, not in front of them, in or­der to bring them closer. The ab­sence of neu­tral­ity un­for­tu­nately af­fected the 2004 Cyprus ne­go­ti­a­tions neg­a­tively. We missed a great op­por­tu­nity be­cause the con­cerned par­ties did not say to one side in an ob­jec­tive way that they were wrong. Con­se­quently, the Greek Cypriot side re­jected the plan. Neu­tral­ity and ob­jec­tiv­ity should go hand in hand.


Fi­nally, there is the method­olog­i­cal di­men­sion. Me­di­a­tion is, in most cases, a long-last­ing process and should be han­dled with the ut­most care, sen­si­tiv­ity and pre­cise plan­ning. Be­sides psy­cho­log­i­cal, in­tel­lec­tual and eth­i­cal con­sid­er­a­tions, a me­di­a­tor should have a pre­cise plan for the tim­ing of the me­di­a­tion and for con­trol­ling among them­selves and with out­side

ac­tors in a wider con­text. In ad­di­tion, me­di­a­tors should also be able to draw the bound­aries of the me­di­a­tion process and de­ter­mine the scope and con­tent of the ne­go­ti­a­tions.

Cor­rect Tim­ing

The most im­por­tant as­pect of the method­olog­i­cal di­men­sion is to pur­sue cor­rect tim­ing, the es­sen­tial part of any me­di­a­tion. Let us have a closer look at the 2004 Cyprus ne­go­ti­a­tions to gain some in­sight from the ground. At a time when no hope for a so­lu­tion was on the hori­zon, Turkey took an ini­tia­tive in Jan­uary 2004. The tim­ing was for­tu­itous: on May 1, 2004, Cyprus would be­come a mem­ber of the EU. We wanted to com­plete the ne­go­ti­a­tions within those four months, which was a great in­cen­tive for both sides. We in­deed achieved a com­pre­hen­sive set­tle­ment, but that set­tle­ment was even­tu­ally re­jected by one party. Still, this ex­am­ple is il­lus­tra­tive of the value of cor­rect tim­ing. Sim­i­larly, our 2005 ini­tia­tive in Iraq was also un­der­taken with ad­van­ta­geous tim­ing for the pur­pose of po­lit­i­cal rec­on­cil­i­a­tion. Even our ef­fort in Syr­ian-Is­raeli in­di­rect talks had cor­rect tim­ing, both Ehud Olmert and Pres­i­dent Bush. We wanted to achieve a suc­cess­ful set­tle­ment for all the par­ties be­fore the end of that year.

An Inclusive Ap­proach

It is es­sen­tial to have an inclusive ap­proach to var­i­ous stake­hold­ers in to­gether all the con­cerned par­ties. Turkey’s tri­lat­eral dia­logue in­volv­ing Ser­bia and Bos­nia-Herzegovina and Cro­tia and Bos­nia-Herzegovina are ex­am­ples of this inclusive at­ti­tude. It brings all par­ties to­gether to ad­dress the prob­lems in a com­pre­hen­sive man­ner.

Con­cen­tra­tion of Talks

Yet an­other method­olog­i­cal prin­ci­ple is the con­cen­tra­tion of talks. To­day, one of the rea­sons for the fail­ure in the P5+1 Iran talks is the in­fre­quency of the meet­ings. There was only one meet­ing last year. It is bet­ter to con­duct con­cen­trated ne­go­ti­a­tions as reg­u­larly as pos­si­ble. In our last meet­ing in Tehran, Celso Amorim and I ne­go­ti­ated pa­tiently for 17 hours non­stop, in the end reach­ing a so­lu­tion. If we had said, “stop here, let’s con­tinue af­ter one week,” we would have had

The last method­olog­i­cal prin­ci­ple is to con­trol and con­tain all out­side fac­tors. In to­day’s world, the in­ter­de­pen­dent na­ture of the dis­putes places the bur­den on the shoul­ders of the me­di­a­tor for con­trol­ling out­side fac­tors in the wider con­text of the me­di­a­tion at­tempts. The per­fect sit­u­a­tion for deal­ing with the not likely to oc­cur in the ma­jor­ity of me­di­a­tion pro­cesses. There will al­ways be un­ex­pected out­side fac­tors af­fect­ing the process. The me­di­a­tor should be ready to face this chal­lenge and pre­pare for con­trol­ling and con­tain­ing th­ese fac­tors. For in­stance, in the case of the Gaza War, where we ne­go­ti­ated The chal­lenge was not only to per­suade in­ter­na­tional ac­tors take re­spon­si­ble po­si­tions in not pro­vok­ing the sit­u­a­tion. The na­ture of the Pales­tinian prob­lem re­quires han­dling the out­side fac­tors and con­nected is­sues with the ut­most care in or­der to make progress. The me­di­a­tor needs to have all the ac­tors in­cluded in the process, while si­mul­ta­ne­ously be­ing able to con­trol

In short, me­di­a­tion is a one of the main in­stru­ments of peace and hap­pi­ness for hu­man­ity. Ob­vi­ously, there re­main many chal­lenges to the re­al­iza­tion of ef­fec­tive me­di­a­tion in world pol­i­tics. Turkey has re­ori­ented its for­eign pol­icy by means of an ac­tive, mul­ti­di­men­sional and vi­sion­ary frame­work. Me­di­a­tion is an in­te­gral part of this pol­icy. Turkey’s unique ac­cess to both the global north and south makes it a suit­able me­di­a­tor over a wide ge­o­graph­i­cal range. Turkey’s cul­tural-civ­i­liza­tional back­ground and long ex­pe­ri­ence with Western po­lit­i­cal and se­cu­rity struc­tures cre­ates strong po­lit­i­cal will and con­sid­er­able so­ci­etal sup­port be­hind Turkey’s chronic prob­lems, in par­tic­u­lar to those in Turkey’s neigh­bor­ing re­gions. Turkey has as­sumed for it­self a cen­tral role in re­gional and in­ter­na­tional pol­i­tics, and me­di­a­tion is a nec­es­sary tool for con­tribut­ing to peace and sta­bil­ity at var­i­ous lev­els. Turkey’s dy­namic civil so­ci­ety is also ac­tive in as­sis­tance, fur­ther sup­port­ing the dy­namism of Turkey’s me­di­a­tion ef­forts. For its part, Turkey is work­ing hard to en­sure that the Friends of Me­di­a­tion and other plat­forms can cre­ate a new in­ter­na­tional in­tel­lec­tual at­mos­phere where states and NGOs can work for peace and sta­bil­ity in re­gions over the en­tire globe. *The writer is For­eign Min­is­ter of Turkey Court­sey by Min­istry of For­eign Af­fairs of Repub­lic of Turkey.

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