Humane authoritarianism, anyone?

For many visiting functionaries, today's China is a source of awe. Notwithstanding the irresistible charm of the country's authoritarian rule (specifically for political elite) and growth, it's worth discussing what policy lessons it holds for countries that aim to mirror its economic growth in the coming decades. Beware, when it comes to lessons, some can be learned whereas some must be unlearned.

Many Western analysts denigrate China's economic achievements under the premise of the extractive nature of its institutions and suggest that the Communist Party rule and sustained economic growth will ultimately prove mutually exclusive. And those who celebrate its sizzling GDP growth want the developing world to emulate this model of state-led growth. Naturally, the latter comprises mainly of politicians representing dysfunctional, developing states. For that, they believe, is a recipe for success and, when given the "right environment", they can pull off a great growth miracle.

However, when the heads of representative democracies bemoan the nonexistence of the 'Chinese model' in their country, it represents their craving to wield power on the lines of the Communist Party of China (CPC). They may think that their poor governance is rooted in an inability to turn things round on a whim while, in fact, the opposite is often true. The impunity of our former rulers - most attributable to the nonelected lot - encouraged them to take steps that impaired the nation-building exercise badly.

The foundational principles of the

Madina delegitimise authoritarian rule.

For our country, with its fragile institutions, the desire for the Chinese model is far from ideal. It draws on a rudimentary understating of China's success in poverty alleviation - not necessarily synonymous with human development - and the number of officials jailed on corruption charges. It's chilling for its disregard of our sociopolitical realities, which must be the foremost priority of a democratic setup. Most worryingly, it underlines the ruling elite's failure to comprehend a basic lesson from our history: Every time a ruler forced an intervention from outside the constitutional framework, it caused insurmountable harm.

China may have some lessons for economies around the world, more so the Global South. It is,

state of however, important for those nations to be cognisant of their own needs and limitations. They ought to understand contemporary China in the context of its economic and political institutions and its compatibility with their indigenous modes of governance. Pakistan's current rulers, who aspire to emulate the state of Madina, may ponder how exactly the foundational principles of that state and authoritarianism would play out together.

In China's institutional setting, the CPC holds ultimate supremacy and has economic institutions as its subordinates. Broadly speaking, the performance of the latter can be categorised in two phases. The first under Mao's chairmanship, during 19491976, and the second as post-Mao era. Maoism boosted the national economy from $60 billion in 1960 to $154bn in 1976 but is marred with the dire consequences of political decisions to introduce the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. This phase is characterised by multiple cycles of boom-and-bust and human tragedies.

Despite widespread miseries, dissent wasn't tolerated within the CPC, let alone from the outside. Deng Xiaoping, a decorated military general, fell out of Mao's favour and was targeted by the radical Red Guards for suggesting economic alternatives outside the Marxist-Leninist mould. Mao's death in 1976 created a vast power vacuum since he had accumulated enormous authority. A power struggle ensued within the CPC and at this defining moment in China's history, Deng prevailed over the Maoists.

In the following years, Deng spearheaded sweeping economic reform, which were embraced by Western democracies. In the backdrop of the Cold War - and due grossly to a distorted worldview on their part - Western leaders argued that economic prosperity will drive the country out of the communist fold. That hope was nipped in the Tiananmen Square in 1989 but, unsurprisingly, Western corporations lobbied their governments into oblivion within a matter of few years. The global capitalist establishment flocked communist China in its pursuit of cheap, frail labour and imperfect environmental regulations. Since the CPC had a firm grip over economic resources, namely land, labour and capital, Western openness helped the party extract more value and solidify its iron grip further.

China's growth story is incomplete without contextualising external factors that helped catalyse it. Secondly, the probability of Maoists outmanoeuvring Deng was same in which case the CPC, and hence the Chinese nation, would have stayed the

Maoist course. Thirdly, perhaps most importantly, authoritarianism is fraught with fragilities. Its unipolar view of human society considers dissent as a 'force of evil' and justifies suppression. It draws legitimacy from conformism, as defined by a select few, rather than empathy. Its playbook lacks tools to deal with diversity of thoughts and beliefs. Today's Hong Kong and Xinjiang offer befitting case studies in this regard.

We Pakistanis shall find these lessons easy to grasp. For instance, Ayub's aid-fuelled growth enriched the political and business elites of West Pakistan but fostered a sense of alienation in East Pakistan.

The legitimacy of their demand for provincial autonomy and democratic rule was enshrined in the very movement for a separate homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims. Ayub's authoritarian measures yielded the most painful chapter of our history in no time. Despite a commendable job of salvaging national dignity and placing Pakistan among the leaders in the Muslim world during the 1970s, Bhutto's authoritarian instincts orchestrated his misadventures in Balochistan and resentment towards political opposition from across the country.