Kabul deal
APART from the myriad problems facing Afghanistan - decades of war, militancy, a barely functioning state, etc - the infighting amongst the Kabul elite has hobbled all efforts to address problems in an effective manner. This, of course, is not a new phenomenon, as for decades militia leaders, warlords and strongmen have jostled for the throne of Kabul, which has resulted in the collapse of governance in Afghanistan, and the emergence of semi-autonomous fiefdoms within the country based on ethnic and tribal lines. Even after the American invasion and the fall of the Afghan Taliban, the US and their Nato allies failed to 'build' a functioning state. For example, the Ashraf Ghani-Abdullah Abdullah partnership that started in 2014 ended up in acrimony.
While the Afghan election commission had declared Mr Ghani victorious in last year's presidential election, Mr Abdullah cried foul and declared himself leader of the country. However, after much bitterness both men seem to have reconciled, apparently after considerable 'prodding' by the Americans, as they signed a powersharing deal on Sunday to end the impasse.
It would be naïve to assume that the deal will lead to a perfectly functioning dispensation in Kabul; expectations should be realistic and not too high, as the relationship between both men is tenuous. However, for the sake of Afghanistan, they will need to sink their differences and maintain a working relationship, or else the considerable challenges their country faces will overwhelm them.
For example, the peace deal that the Americans signed with the Taliban is close to death; major efforts are needed to revive it. Unless this deal succeeds, an intra-Afghan settlement will be difficult to reach. Moreover, the bloodthirsty fighters of the ISKhorasan chapter are waiting in the wings to pounce. The recent diabolical attack on a maternity hospital in Kabul, believed to have been the handiwork of IS, shows that the terrorist group can easily reach the capital.
Also, if the Ghani-Abdullah combine fails to function, there will be a major financial crisis; the Afghan government suffered a blow when Washington cut funds as 'punishment' for infighting in Kabul. And with Covid-19 cases threatening the feeble Afghan health system, a paralysis in governance will only make matters worse for the Afghan people.
Considering these challenges, Mr Ghani and Mr Abdullah will have to make greater efforts to deliver good governance to their people, and above all tolerate each other. If petty infighting and power games continue, the Kabul elite will not stand a chance against the various threats they face from militant actors. Moreover, unless there is unity within the government, the Taliban will not take them seriously and the bloody battle for the control of Afghanistan will continue. And as events have shown, IS and terrorists of their ilk will gain the most from a state of chaos.